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Over the past several years, the press, trade publications and academic literature 
have reported with increasing frequency on the social concerns caused by ubiquitous 
computing—Information Technology (IT) embedded in artif cts, infrastructure and envi-
ronments of daily life. Designers and researchers of ubiquitous computing (ubicomp) 
technologies have spent considerable efforts to address these concerns, which include 
privacy and data protection issues, information security and personal safety. Yet, design-
ing successful ubicomp applications is still an unreliable and expensive endeavor, in part 
due to imperfect understanding of how technology is appropriated, the lack of effective 
design tools and the challenges of prototyping these applications in realistic conditions.  
I introduce the concept of proportionality as a principle able to guide design of 
ubiquitous computing applications and specifically to attack privacy and security issues. 
Inspired by the principle, I propose a design process framework that assists the practitio-
ner in making reasoned and documented design choices throughout the development 
process. I validate the design process framework through a quantitative design experi-
ment vis-à-vis other design methods. Furthermore, I present several case studies and 
evaluations to demonstrate the design method’s effectiveness and generality. I claim that 
the design method helps to identify some of the obstacles to the acceptance of ubiquitous 
computing applications and to translate security and privacy concerns into research ques-
tions in the design process. I further discuss some f the inquiry and validation tech-








Starting around the 1970’s, artifacts and environmets of everyday use have been 
increasingly embedded with Information Technology (IT)—computation and telecom-
munications capabilities that have enabled more elaborate behaviors and operation 
modes. This trend, made possible by the convergence of miniaturization and increases in 
computational power and energy-efficiency, has been r cognized by the computer sci-
ence community since the early 1990’s, when Mark Weiser spelled out the vision of 
Ubiquitous Computing (herein called simply ubicomp following the community’s cus-
tom1). According to Weiser’s vision, in the future, peole would increasingly be sur-
rounded by large numbers of ‘intelligent’ artifacts—making computing, in fact, ubiqui-
tous [178]. 
Today, this vision is becoming reality, and the collection and use of information 
about people and their environments is raising far-re ching organizational, social and in-
stitutional concerns, including concerns relating to information security and privacy.2 
                                                
 
 
1 A note on my use of the term ‘community:’ unless otherwise specified, I use the term 
community to reference the extended ubiquitous computing community roughly repre-
sented by the attendees of conferences such as the International Conference on Ubiqui-
tous Computing, the International Conference on Pervasive Computing, the International 
Conference on Human Computer Interaction with Mobile Devices and Services, the In-
ternational Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications and Services, the IEEE Interna-
tional Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications, etc. 
2 In this thesis, I will consistently talk about security and privacy as two facets of the 
same concept. Traditionally, information security has been defined as the protection of 
 
 2 
Early signs of these concerns have surfaced repeatedly over the past few years not only in 
trade publications but also in the press, as shown by the heated debate on Closed-Circuit 
Television surveillance (CCTV) [61, 140, 173], the risks associated with Radiofrequency 
Identification (RFID) technology in consumer goods [70], and the debate on positioning 
technology in the Enhanced 911 (E911) system.3 
The ubicomp research community has long recognized that these are not just en-
gineering concerns, but represent formidable challenges to adoption. Furthermore these 
technical developments may present undesirable side effects that require researchers and 
manufacturers to exercise their professional and ethical judgment. In a historical perspec-
tive, these issues are hardly novel: the introduction of automatic data processing in the 
1960’s raised similar concerns over control and accountability in the processing of infor-
mation (both related to security and privacy). These concerns prompted far-reaching ac-
tion, such as the enactment of data protection and computer security Acts in Europe and 
the United States and the development of professional codes of ethic, such as ACM’s and 
IFIP’s [23, 35]. What is arguably different today, is the amount and quality of collected 
information, which have changed vastly over what was possible in the 1970’s, and the 
automatic and unsupervised operation of many ubicomp applications. Existing technical, 
                                                                                                                          
 
 
the “confidentiality, integrity and availability” of information and information services 
[50]. There is no such straightforward, agreed-upon definition of privacy, in part due to 
the heated policy debate around this concept. For the purposes of this thesis, I will adopt 
the concept of security and privacy suggested by multilateral security [153]. According 
to multilateral security, privacy and security defin  potentially competing requirements 
on the confidentiality, integrity, availability and accountability of information with re-
spect to multiple parties. The use of the word ‘privacy’ in this context should not be con-
fused with the concept of personal privacy that I use in opposition to data protection. 
3 Enhanced 911 is a program of the US Federal Communications Commission that re-
quires operators of wireless phone service to locate the customer’s handset in case of 




organizational and legal frameworks for protecting i formation security and privacy may 
not be adequate in this new landscape. 
1.1.1 The Response of Computer Science Researchers 
The automatic collection, processing and storage of large amounts of data engen-
der worries about the uses or abuses of such information, which may cause economic 
harm, disrupt established social practices or affect t hnology adoption. In response to 
these concerns, several research groups in the ubicomp ommunity have attempted to ad-
dress security and privacy issues arising from ubicomp applications, both by examining 
individual applications (e.g., Boyle et al.’s work on a privacy-sensitive web cam [38]), 
and by suggesting general design approaches (e.g., Jiang et al.’s Approximate Informa-
tion Flows analysis framework [110]).  
Although reflections on specific applications and mistakes typically have been 
well received, general ‘design methods’4 and guidelines addressing security and privacy 
have met the skepticism of the research community ad of industry. Such lukewarm re-
ception may be due to several factors, including the lack of prescriptive power of these 
methods for a diverse range of applications, their p rceived cost in the overall design 
process, the lack of a design process model to situate them and an unclear definition of 
the target audience for these methods. Whatever the reason, the lack of follow-up to, let 
                                                
 
 
4 A note on terminology: in this thesis, design method indicates a general process for 
solving design problems in the context of security and privacy (e.g., follow a certain set 
of steps). Design technique indicates a specific tool used in accomplishing part of the de-
sign task (e.g., a user survey). Design guidelines are rules-of-thumb with pre-defined 
suggestions on how to tackle design problems (e.g., minimize information collected). De-
sign frameworks propose a certain way of segmenting and decomposing the design space 
(e.g., look at information flows between individual users). 
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alone adoption of, these techniques both within the res arch groups that published them 
and in the ubicomp community at large is striking. 
This is not to say that no progress has been made. Over the past 10 years, the dis-
course around security and privacy in ubicomp has become increasingly refined. After 
initially discussing generic threats to the users of these applications, researchers concen-
trated on specific concerns raised by practical ubicomp applications, such as location sys-
tems and video-communications in office environments (for example, the work at Eu-
roPARC and Olivetti Research in the late 1980’s). Often, reflection on these deployments 
resulted in specific design guidelines (a classic example of this is the work of the early 
1990’s by Bellotti and Sellen [31]). As understanding of specific applications progressed, 
others have attempted to translate security and privacy principles originating from differ-
ent disciplines to the domain of ubicomp design. For example, in an often-cited theoreti-
cal paper of 2001, Marc Langheinrich attempted to expose the implications of the Fair 
Information Practices (FIPS), a widely known set of data protection principles used in IT, 
on the design of ubicomp systems [116].  
More recently, several authors have pointed out that concepts deriving from eco-
nomics and social sciences may be applied to understanding users and thus defining re-
quirements in this domain. For example, Jiang et al. have proposed employing economic 
theories to evaluate transactions based on the valu that knowledge and information have 
in making optimal security choices [110]. Palen andDourish, among others, have pointed 
out how the social sciences can help in the understanding of behaviors people adopt when 
modulating their personal ‘privacy boundaries’ in interpersonal relations [143]. This 
work is significant because it suggests that the traditional approaches of computer scien-
tists to these problems (adding security functions t  applications, restructuring communi-
cations networks, etc.) may not be sufficient to solve the security and privacy challenges 
of ubicomp applications. In fact, there has been much work by systems and networking 
researchers focused on providing technical solutions t  actual or perceived privacy and 
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security problems, but few real-world applications, if any, have been able to satisfy all 
security requirements using technology alone.5 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Motivated by the above considerations, I started to explore whether it is possible 
to provide designers with more effective and general tools to address security and privacy 
concerns in a structured and systematic way. Specifically, I am interested in enabling de-
signers6 to be more responsive to user needs and social policy, by performing better as-
sessments of emergent uses and acceptance problems and exert effective influence on the 
security and privacy properties of ubicomp technologies during development. 
In light of these concerns and the lack of adoption of these general techniques, I 
am interested in providing tools for improving the d sign of ubicomp applications as well 
as aiding those in charge of deploying them in research environments or in real-world 
settings. One contribution to solving these problems is by proposing a design method for 
ubicomp applications that focuses on security and privacy. This is not the only way that 
these problems can be addressed: policy intervention, education efforts aimed at increas-
ing awareness of novel technologies among the public, industry cooperation for devising 
best practices, and developing adequate management and organizational structures all 
contribute to the same goal. In fact, all these intrventions may be necessary to increase 
                                                
 
 
5 In fact, it is ironic that some of the most advanced security and privacy technologies 
(e.g., Public Key Infrastructure, Anonymity Networks), built to change the “distribution 
of trust” that is necessary to achieve application g als, require increasingly sophisticated 
social and organizational support structures to redistribute such trust.  
6 A clarification on the definition of designers: this work is currently targeted at the ubi-
comp research community, which is composed of a mix of engineering sub-disciplines, 
including systems, networking, and human-computer interaction. While I have tried to 
make this work appealing for the industrial development community, I did not engage in 
a dialog with that community that would allow me to claim that this work could be 
adopted by them in its current format.  
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technology acceptance. In proposing a design method, it is necessary to understand why 
the success of previous design methods has been limited. I claim that this lack of success 
is in part due to a disconnect between design and users and to a perception that design 
methods are costly and unnecessary. 
1.2.1 Disconnect Between Design and Users 
First, security and privacy have been approached, by the research community, in 
an absolute way, disjoint from each other and from the manifold concerns of the broader 
socio-technical and economic environment. The debates over CCTV, RFID and E911 
cited in the opening section suggest that achieving adequate security and privacy is in fact 
embedded in a broader discourse of evolving dynamics related to purposefulness, fair-
ness, and appropriateness in social relations. Recent sociological theories (such as that of 
Latour’s socio-technical hybrids [118]) highlight the integrated nature of socio-technical 
evolution. Even in the ubicomp literature, accounts of deployments of applications such 
as video awareness systems [31] or location technology [176], indicate that privacy sub-
sumes a system of stakeholder concerns, including power balances, social relations and 
knowledge, which reflect the evolving dynamics mentioned above. These dynamics are 
not always made explicit during design and development, because they are hard to ex-
press in terms of technological design choices. 
Cultural circumstances have a strong impact on design practice as well. Assess-
ments over what constitutes a threat to privacy or what is appropriate conduct in mediated 
communication vary over time and across social, organizational and cultural contexts 
[21]. Even cultures that share much, both socially nd technologically, like Western 
Europe and the United States, have different perceptions that are reflected, for example, 
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in quite different stances on the need for data protection, and in different legislative and 
organizational measures for addressing these challenges.7 
Furthermore, IT security has traditionally been considered antagonistic with us-
ability: an entire line of research in usable security demonstrates the difficulty of manag-
ing and operating all kinds of IT security functions [156, 187]—from personal encryption 
tools [182], to usability of network administration i terfaces [27] and software updates 
[148]. These problems are in part caused by unripe understanding of the use of the tech-
nology in everyday settings and misleading risk analyses, as detailed by Grinter t al. 
[80].  
User perceptions of security are as important as the actual usability of the security 
functions of an application or system. For example, w bsite usability has been indicated 
as one of the determining factors in the positive assessment of website credibility and 
trustworthiness [67]. Therefore, understanding of the users and of the context of use is 
necessary to understand not just emerging, actual security problems, but also users’ per-
ceptions, because both can affect adoption.  
In this context, the problem of understanding the eff cts of novel technologies be-
comes central. The research community needs to produce techniques for probing the per-
ceptions, desires and behaviors of users that are reliable, accurate and cost-effective.  
1.2.2 Are Design Methods Worth The Hassle? 
Lack of understanding of users and the novelty of this design space may explain 
in part why design methods and frameworks have beenhard sells to the designer commu-
                                                
 
 
7 This is readily observed by comparing the different scope of and the role of government 
in US data protection legislation, such as HIPAA [10] and FERPA [9], with EU Data 
Protection Directive 95/46 [1], the UK Data Protection Act [7] and the German Federal 
Data Protection Act. 
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nity. However, proponents of design techniques or approaches must consider numerous 
inherent issues as well. Perceived effectiveness is a primary concern because demonstrat-
ing the effectiveness of a design method, in terms of the increased number and quality of 
design features or problems solved, is a very difficult proposition. As far as I am aware, 
very few design methods or frameworks for security and privacy have been validated in 
the context of ubicomp design. Even if validation were to occur, cost considerations may 
kill any such proposal. In a recent workshop, Saadi L hlou (responsible for the develop-
ment of an experimental ubiquitous “office memory” project at Electricité De France’s 
Laboratory for Design for Cognition) commented that security guidelines are unhelpful to 
designers because they are often negative in nature (e.g. “allow access on a need-to-know 
basis”) and thus represent roadblocks to design, instead of facilitating it.8 Lahlou further 
suggested that expressing guidelines in positive terms might be more useful to designers.9 
This comment, made as a sideline to a privacy workshop, captures the point of the prob-
lem. The design of new technologies is a complex, expensive and often idiosyncratic 
process, which relies on trade knowledge and establi hed practices as much as on indi-
vidual ability of the designer. Therefore, attempts to prescribe additional steps or analysis 
requirements incur a natural resistance. Coupled with doubts about the effectiveness of 
the design methods proposed to date, cost considerations make adoption of novel design 
techniques a rarity.  
                                                
 
 
8 September 11th, 2005. Workshop “Privacy in Context” at Ubicomp 2005. This is my 
recollection and interpretation of Lahlou’s words. 
9 Patterns offer such positive guidance, but suffer from being difficult to generate in 
young design domains such as this. 
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1.3 Thesis Statement 
The thesis statement is preceded by three definitions. The six thesis claims are 
evaluated in Chapter 5. 
Definitions 
Proportionality design method: a design method intended to aid the design of se-
cure and privacy-preserving ubiquitous computing applications, based on the evaluation 
of the desirability of application goals, the appropriateness of the technological imple-
mentation and the qualities of salient aspects of the application interface and information 
policies.  
Generality across individuals of the proportionality method: the structure of the 
design process and the research questions suggested by the proportionality method are 
independent of the individual applying it.  
Acceptable cost of the proportionality method: applying the proportionality design 
method causes at most an acceptable increase of design and development costs (in terms 
of design time) compared similar design tasks done without the method.  
Thesis 
The proportionality design method 1) can be employed in the design of ubiquitous 
computing applications, to 2) support requirements analysis by indicating pertinent re-
search questions targeted at improving the understanding of applications and their usage 
context; 3) select the most appropriate alternative among design options, 4) in a way that 
is general across individuals, 5) carries acceptable cost and 6) leads to identify more pri-





In this thesis, I argue that the scope and complexity of people’s motivations and 
behaviors, cultural and temporal differences in the adoption of IT, the rapid change of 
technology, and structural issues with design practice are some of the reasons why a gen-
eral understanding of the acceptance of ubiquitous computing applications and systems 
eludes us and design techniques targeted at solving the related security and privacy prob-
lems lack adoption.  
As discussed in the preceding paragraph, design methods are not enough for gain-
ing a comprehensive understanding of the problem and the users, and are, at any rate, dif-
ficult to impose on designers. These two points have driven the research efforts docu-
mented in this thesis. To address them, I propose a d sign method that focuses on gener-
ating design questions, rather than a complicated procedure intended to provide answers. 
This method is complemented by individual design techniques that can be used to answer 
specific questions about security requirements raised upfront or later during design. 
Summarizing, this work contributes in two major ways to the state of the art in the field 
of ubicomp security and privacy. First, I propose th proportionality method. Second, I 
show how this method can be used within an experimental procedure.  
1.4.1 Design Method 
The proportionality method is based on salient question  inserted in an iterative 
design process, complemented by practical suggestions on how to use it. Specifically, the 
purposes of this design method are to: 
– structure the design and evaluation process of the privacy- and security-
related aspects of the ubicomp application or system; and 
– support compelling arguments about the quality of the resulting design. 
In view of the current published literature, this method constitutes a valuable con-
tribution to the research in the field. The proposed d sign method can provide useful 
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guidance to designers and is more attuned than other surveyed design techniques to cur-
rent design and evaluation practices, as conducted both in the industry and in the legal 
and DPA communities. The design method is introduce in Chapter 4 and its evaluation 
is presented in Chapter 5. 
1.4.2 Design Tools and Practical Application  
The proportionality method itself is similar to a scaffolding structure, in that it 
provides a framework for organizing the design of ubicomp applications, in terms of bal-
ancing competing needs with security and privacy concerns. However, it does not pre-
scribe how to conduct such design in practice.  
The second contribution of this work is the application of the proportionality 
method in practice to inform the development of new applications. I discuss some design 
and evaluation techniques to address the security and privacy issues induced by ubicomp 
applications, and of how to integrate these techniques within a larger design process.  
In Chapters 4 and 6, I examine the relative merits of different techniques, how to 
define questions deriving from the proportionality method into questions amenable to be 
researched in user studies, and the integration the results back into a global proportional-
ity evaluation.  
I do not intend to provide an exhaustive discussion of user-centered design for 
ubicomp security and privacy. Rather, I offer examples of how targeted user studies can 
answer to specific, relevant questions raised by the design method and the results can be 
fed back into the design process. In this process, de igners can select what aspects of the 








This thesis is divided in seven chapters. 
Chapter 2 introduces the normative and social context of security and privacy as it 
relates to ubicomp technology. 
Chapter 3 surveys existing approaches for designing for security and privacy in 
the context of multilateral security and user-centered design. 
Chapter 4 describes the proportionality design method and its relationship with 
User-Centered Design and Multilateral Security. It also describes its application to two 
case studies, a personal memory aid called the Personal Audio Loop and a location-
enhanced person-finder called Reno. 
Chapter 5 documents the evaluation of the design method, including the pilot 
study performed in the Spring of 2005 and the design method evaluation conducted in the 
Fall of 2005. 
Chapter 6 documents three design tools that I have used over the past few years to 
tackle specific privacy questions in mobile and ubiq itous applications: one diary study 
and one survey regarding the Personal Audio Loop; and the deployment study of Reno. 
Chapter 7 concludes by reviewing design principles, guidelines and design meth-
ods as complementary instruments. It also synthesizes some challenges facing ubicomp 




THE SOCIAL AND NORMATIVE CONTEXT OF SECURITY AND 
PRIVACY IN UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING 
 
This chapter and the next provide background information and a discussion of re-
lated work. The present chapter includes some social and normative issues that affect pri-
vacy and security in ubicomp and that have motivated nd influenced the development of 
the proportionality method. The next chapter contains an overview of the most relevant 
related work in the technical literature, specifically focusing on how the ubicomp com-
munity approached privacy and security issues within t e design process.  
This chapter is organized around several observations and comments on specific 
issues of interest. In Section 2.1, I claim that the complexity of ubicomp systems, their 
pervasiveness and interrelationship with social practices require designers to approach the 
development of new technology with heightened attention to and scrutiny of the potential 
implications of the technology. I also point out that many observers have recognized that 
technological evolution does not always follow causal patterns.  
In Section 2.2, I propose a characterization of privacy that is slightly different 
from the typical characterizations used in the ubicomp community. This characterization 
of privacy is used throughout this dissertation.  
In Section 2.3, I describe some aspects of the debate around privacy and surveil-
lance that are particularly interesting for this thesis because some of the applications con-
sidered in this work directly resemble surveillance systems. 
Finally, in Section 2.4, I point out the importance of considering security and pri-
vacy management at the time of design; this theme has been overlooked by much ubi-
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comp research due to various reasons and I believe it will become increasingly important 
in the near future. 
2.1 The Need for Comprehensive and In-depth Analysis  
Personal privacy has represented a concern in the ubicomp research community 
from the very beginnings of the field [178]. The rapid development of IT between 1960 
and 2000 has highlighted the risks caused by the changing technological landscape, such 
as new crimes enabled by the collection of personal information (e.g., identity theft, mis-
use of personal health information). Understandably, the development of ubicomp appli-
cations has caused concern in the research community and among IT manufactures, mo-
tivated both by the risk of acceptance failure (thus undermining manufacturers’ and ser-
vice providers’ revenue), as well as by the potential social and economic liabilities of 
ubicomp systems, and by their impact on society.  
Information security has also come increasingly to the forefront as a topic of re-
search in ubicomp. This interest is in part fueled by high-profile security problems afflict-
ing present-day networked systems, especially on public networks such as the internet 
(viruses, email scams, worms, etc.). The concern is that these problems may also plague 
future ubicomp systems, with the added complexity of ubicomp systems’ automatic, un-
supervised and largely un-auditable operation. Moreover, ubicomp technology often in-
terfaces with the physical world (e.g., actuators controlled by computing devices) and 
may thus introduce further risks.  
To understand how high-level security and privacy concerns relate to the goals of 
designers, we must analyze them within the broader picture of the discourse within the 
legal, regulatory and design communities, as well as within society at large. 
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2.1.1 Stating the Case for a Preventive Attitude towards Technology 
In this changing and unstable landscape, designers cannot afford to ignore social 
and legal constraints in IT design. Not only do legal requirements and social concerns 
have direct and significant consequences on technology design, but in-depth knowledge 
of these concerns may help prevent costly mistakes. 
In a recent special issue of Human and Ecological Risk Assessment prepared by a 
Swiss Federal Laboratory and dedicated to ubicomp, Claudia Som et al. argue that devel-
opers of potentially disruptive technologies such as those in ubicomp should adopt a pre-
ventive attitude towards technical development [159]. As a guiding principle, they pro-
pose the Precautionary Principle, which is used to perform policy determinations with 
strong unknowns at the national and international levels (e.g., policy decisions involving 
the natural environment). They argue that designers mu t consider two kinds of uncer-
tainties in technical development: uncertainties about the acceptance of technology and 
uncertainties about its social, health and environme tal impact. 
Designers might not be in the position of deciding o  these issues—in many cases 
they rest in the hands of policymakers, courts and Data Protection Authorities (DPA), 
with the final judge being market acceptance. However, I believe that designers need to 
address these issues, if for no other reason than to increase profitability and hedge indus-
trial liability. Increasing designers’ awareness of the motivation and potential impact of 
novel computing systems may contribute to development patterns that are less technol-
ogy-driven and oriented instead towards users’ and stakeholders’ needs. This focus on 
user needs is one of the driving motivations for the proportionality method and will be 
discussed in more detail below. 
Understanding these issues is not a straightforward task, and to avoid naïve con-
clusions, it is necessary to state clearly the boundaries of the arguments within this thesis. 
In addition, motivations, causes and consequences of socio-technical development cannot 
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be viewed in a mechanical manner. To illustrate these difficulties in practice, I will cite 
three issues which designers should keep present while designing and testing ubicomp 
technologies. These closely related issues include the contradictory effects of technical 
development; the co-evolution of social practice and technology; and the contradictory 
effects of legislation on technical development. 
2.1.2 The Contradictory Effects of Technical Development 
A general point worth mentioning is the potentially contradictory effects that 
technology can have on social practice. The same artifact may produce apparently oppo-
site consequences. For example, Arnold argues that cell phones both increase social con-
nectedness, by enabling distant friends and acquaintances to talk more often and in a 
more unplanned way than previously possible, and also raise barriers between physically 
co-present individuals, creating, so to speak, “bubbles” of private space even in a very 
public and crowded space such as a train compartment [22]. 
Giddens writes in similar terms when he lists the “dilemmas of the self” brought 
on by mediated communications [76]. According to Giddens, modern technology has 
both a unifying and fragmenting effect on social practices: it unifies people and events 
happening in distant corners of the world, while fragmenting individuals who may share a 
common physical space but be engaged in highly individual activities that exclude the 
other people present.  
Giddens’ work is very broad, encompassing social structures, power organizations 
and the marketplace. Considering all these aspects would not fit with the scope of the 
present work. However, his work suggests that effectiv  analysis of novel technology 
must proceed along multi-dimensional lines, and it must consider potentially conflicting 
effects. In this perspective, ubicomp design becomes an exercise of systematically recon-




2.1.3 Socio-Technical Co-evolution 
In the past few decades, many ubicomp technologies have enjoyed mass adoption 
within a rapidly changing social and normative landscape. The introduction of ever more 
sophisticated applications (e.g., location technology based on cell phones, portable cam-
eras) happened alongside the gradual introduction of legislation aimed at regulating their 
use [3, 8, 12]. At the same time, heightened awareness of information security risks has 
prompted legislation requiring certain measures of information security in certain do-
mains, such as healthcare, financial services and corporate governance [11, 66, 174]. 
Legislation may be viewed as a symptom of the need to curtail actual or potential 
abuse, while granting legal status to mainstream uses of a technology or application. In 
such a model, legislative change occurs after a technology has begun penetrating the 
marketplace. As such, it follows, in part, the evoluti n of social norms and practices, 
which change based on technical development. On the other hand, there are many cases 
of existing legislation influencing technical development. In some cases, specific legisla-
tion has even been enacted preempting technical development. For example, digital sig-
nature legislation in European countries was enacted well before the technology reached 
mass-market. Some argue that this preemptive legislation may have in fact slowed 
development and adoption. 
It is often difficult to tease cause and effect apart: whether legislation and legal 
case history or social practices drive the development of technology or vice-versa. Many 
observers have noted that the relationship between social constructs and technology can 
be better described as co-evolution. For example, Latour talks of socio-technological hy-
brids, undividable structures encompassing technology as well as culture—norms, social 
practices and perceptions [118].  
It is not in the scope of the present discussion to describe the co-evolution of so-
cial norms and technology, a task best left to sociol g sts and philosophers. However, 
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where appropriate, I will point out the relationship between social and legislative struc-
tures and a technological instance. 
2.1.4 Interpreting Legislation 
The scope and frequency of regulatory action in the IT domain has greatly in-
creased over the past 30 years, to the point that it is impossible today to ignore legislation 
in ubicomp design. In the context of this thesis, it is particularly interesting to study how 
courts have interpreted legislation in practical cases. Below, I briefly overview specific 
cases in which privacy legislation was interpreted an  applied by Data Protection Au-
thorities and Courts. 
2.1.4.1 The Role of DPAs in Interpreting Regulation 
A vast body of knowledge regarding the impact of technology on individual pri-
vacy rights has grown over the past century in rulings and opinions issued by courts and, 
more recently, Data Protection Authorities (DPA)—supervisory entities with regulatory, 
oversight, ombudsman and enforcement powers on data protection matters.10 In fact, 
some regulators have interpreted existing legislation for new technology. Their work of-
fers interesting insight to designers for understanding where regulatory and legislative 
efforts are headed. In the past few years, the data protection community in Europe has 
been active with regards to video,11 telephone and email surveillance in workplaces [163] 
                                                
 
 
10 DPAs are sometimes called Information Commissioners. In the United States, the FTC, 
the DHHS and the DHS are assigned some of the responsibilities of European DPAs 
within specific regulatory frameworks (respectively, internet privacy policies and finan-
cial regulation, HIPAA, law enforcement databases). For example, the FTC regulates the 
financial sector in connection to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and other regulation, and 
leads enforcement activities related to privacy policies for internet web sites. 
11 Surveillance technology is used in this thesis as a benchmark because it is representa-
tive of both the technical properties and information flows of many ubicomp systems 
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and CCTV systems in public space [171]. In the United States, the governmental agen-
cies’ leeway in interpreting regulation dealing with privacy is more limited. For example, 
the FCC has maintained a relatively hands-off approach on the management of location 
data from cell phones.  
The European Commission’s Article 29 Working Party (an appointed body of the 
European Commission that functions, roughly speaking, as an EU-wide DPA) has pro-
vided opinions on applications of automated sensing technology, e.g., video surveillance 
on commercial premises and private dwellings [61], and biometric technology in both 
governmental and commercial settings [62]. In these r ports, the Working Party cites ex-
amples of actions taken by national DPAs in specific ases of the application of data pro-
tection legislation, pointing out advantages and deficiencies of specific approaches. The 
Working Party also suggests some specific examples as best practices. For example, in 
the report on video surveillance, the Working Party discusses the positioning and operat-
ing modes of a surveillance camera at the entrance of an apartment. In the report, an 
analysis is made of how detailed design parameters (the cone of the camera, its orienta-
tion, the resolution of the resulting video) affect other dwellers and passers-by. In the US, 
the General Accounting Office (GAO) has published a report on the use of CCTV for 
surveillance of federal property in the Washington, D.C. area, analyzing the boundaries 
of the observed areas and the management structures behind two large surveillance opera-
tions in the capital city [173]. 
The British Institute of International and Comparative Law compiled a summary 
of DPA rulings on video surveillance across the EU [40]. These comparative studies are 
extremely interesting for designers of applications with cross-boundary markets because 
                                                                                                                          
 
 
(which collect, store and use data from environments), and because it typifies many of the 
risks and concerns commonly associated with ubicomp. 
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they bring to bear subtle differences in national contexts, even within a supposedly uni-
form regulatory space (the EU). In a similar way, comparative studies in the US have in-
dicated differences across state regulations that affect the collection of information from 
environments, such as surveillance videos or audio rec rdings [150]. This literature can 
provide valuable advice to designers and justification for defining application parameters 
and operating modes.  
The work by DPAs on this topic is particularly interesting because the principle of 
proportionality proposed in this thesis is directly inspired by their approach to privacy 
and security problems. For example, in the discussion of the video camera installed at the 
apartment entrance mentioned above, a tradeoff is made by the regulator between the 
need for capturing the faces of people at the door while being minimally invasive of the 
rest of the space around the entrance, so that unrelated individuals can walk by unob-
served [61].  
The need for balancing competing needs in IT has also been stated by influential 
scholars and observers of technology policy. In his renowned book The Limits of Privacy, 
Amitai Etzioni shows how needs for protecting collective welfare may be opposed to 
principled privacy concerns [60]. His arguments specifically relate to US public policy 
and to public uses of technology—personal ID cards, HIV testing and video surveillance, 
but his point can be extended to some of the ubicomp applications examined in this the-
sis, which have less apparent public and private benefits. Etzioni adopts a pragmatic 
stance towards privacy and advocates setting up a regulatory system not unlike that pre-
sent in the European Union, balancing competing safety, security and privacy needs with 
a pragmatic, case-by-case approach in addressing privacy concerns. The theme of balanc-
ing stakeholders’ needs is central to this dissertation and will be discussed further below. 
In fact, Etzioni’s analysis routinely draws from the three questions embedded in the pro-
portionality method—desirability, adequacy, and appro riateness. 
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2.1.4.2 The Role of Courts  
Court rulings also provide valuable input and a baseline for this work. Although 
the following list is by no means comprehensive, I wish to detail three points affecting 
the present dissertation. 
 The United States Supreme Court provided opinions nvolving the “chilling” ef-
fects on First Amendment rights of surveillance in public space (e.g., during public dem-
onstrations) [30, p. 168]. In that case, a tradeoff was made between the protection of free 
speech and the need for preventing criminal activity by the use of sensing technology in 
public space. Similarly, in a case of illegal over-the air wiretapping of cell phone conver-
sation (Bartnicki v. Vopper, 2001, cited by Terrel and Jacobs [164]), the Supreme Court 
considered the tradeoff between the need for the public to learn about allegedly criminal 
conduct of a public official and the breach of his privacy when a cell phone conversation 
involving him was illegally broadcast by a radio station. 
The concept of reasonable expectation of privacy in the face of rapidly improving 
sensing technologies has been developed by the US Supreme Court in Katz v. United 
States, 1967 [5]. This case is relevant because it provides a baseline of the court thinking 
concerning surveillance technologies. Although the case specifically involves Fourth 
Amendment rights, and thus is targeted at the relationship between individuals and gov-
ernment, some of the conclusions could be applied to person-to-person interaction. These 
opinions and rulings are not always directly applicable for our purposes and must be 
therefore accurately characterized and employed, in a predictive, rather than prescriptive 
manner. 
Only recently have specific technologies been systema ically analyzed by legal 
scholars to address the policy issues induced by them. For example, Zarski addresses the 
issues related to data mining, and claims that data sensed from physical environments are 
primary sources of risk [184]. Terrell and Jacobs discuss a case in which advanced sens-
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ing technology has been used to examine the interior of a dwelling in a criminal investi-
gation [164]. In that case, Kyllo v. United States, 2001 [6], the Court argued that the rea-
sonable expectation of privacy depends, in part, on what technology is commonly avail-
able.12 This argument has profound impact on technological development and on adop-
tion, because it bases the legitimate use of a technology on the knowledge that the public 
may have about it. This point will arise again when discussing user studies of ubicomp 
technology, adoption and future avenues of research. 
2.1.5 The Ultimate Judge: Adoption 
In the Kyllo case, legality of a technology was tied to the concept of commonly 
available—adopted—technology. It follows that understanding and predicting adoption 
patterns should concern the designer of novel technologies. Adoption is important be-
cause security and privacy requirements often are influenced by the level of acceptance 
and awareness that the users and the public have of a certain application. Influential au-
thors have pointed out that understanding and predicting adoption has a significant eco-
nomic impact as well. 
For example, in the book The Invisible Computer, Norman introduces the concept 
of IT-centric devices that he calls ‘information appliances,’ single purpose, self-
contained, networked, task-oriented ubiquitous computing applications (a typical exam-
ple would be the Apple iPodTM). He describes their development in terms of an estab-
lished segmentation of product lifecycle (introduction to market, revenue generation and 
decline). Norman notes that different types of users ( arly adopters, mainstream, late 
adopters) relate to technologies in different ways t different stages of their lifecycle, and 
                                                
 
 
12 In the case considered, a thermal imaging sensor was used to trace heat levels emanat-
ing from a private dwelling, which suggested the prsence of high-powered lamps inside 
the home, used for the cultivation of marijuana. 
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suggests that the market success of new technologies would benefit from intentionally 
leveraging these relationships [138]. Norman also cites information privacy as one of the 
threats to the widespread success of information appliances. Christensen et al., in the re-
cent book Seeing What’s Next, propose an analytic framework for predicting market ac-
ceptance of novel technologies [44].13 
Both books use the telecommunications industry as a case study and characterize 
the telephone as a disruptive technology, with profound implications on society, in a way 
that is strikingly similar to how ubicomp is characterized by its proponents. It is not sur-
prising that both Norman and Christensen et al., who belong to very different communi-
ties of interest (respectively, human factors and business management), assert that under-
standing the market is paramount to influence acceptance and that an adoption strategy 
must be part of the overall development strategy for new technologies. 
2.1.6 Summary 
The examples reported above should convince the reade  of the complexity of the 
social context of this thesis. The obvious need for addressing security and privacy issues 
of ubicomp applications in a user-centered manner iduces the designer to test the limits 
of existing normative, social and regulatory environments. Furthermore, security and pri-
vacy concerns are just some of the elements in the much wider discourse regarding the 
adoption of disruptive technologies. These concerns often have subtle effects, but are 
rarely the only or primary cause of the success of failure of a given technology.  
In the remainder of this Chapter, I expand on some aspects of privacy and security 
that are relevant to this thesis and are rarely mentioned in the community’s literature. 
                                                
 
 
13 I limit these citations to authors who have examined mass-market adoption as opposed 
to adoption within organizations. The MIS and CSCW communities provide numerous 
accounts of the latter (e.g., Venkatesh [175], Markus [126]). 
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2.2 Characterizing Privacy 
The experiences of European DPAs and Courts in the United States are very dif-
ferent not only in terms of the conclusions they reach, but also in the legal and constitu-
tional underpinnings. In the present section, I explain another difference, relevant to my 
work, in how privacy is perceived and addressed in ifferent societies and legal frame-
works. Other authors describe various flavors of privacy (specifically, in the ubicomp 
community, Langheinrich [116] and Boyle and Greenberg [39]), using categories such as 
Privacy as an Interpersonal Process, Privacy as Need, Right, Freedom, or Privacy as 
Balancing Act. I do not intend to replicate their work and refer to these articles and to 
their references for more information on these useful characterizations of privacy.  
There are, however, two points that are rarely stated clearly in the literature and 
that are important in the context of this thesis. The first relates to the perceived differ-
ences between approaches to privacy in two of the most significant markets for upcoming 
ubicomp applications—Europe and the United States. The second issue relates to the dif-
ference between Data Protection and Personal Privacy. 
2.2.1 Europe vs. United States 
Attitudes towards privacy are quite variable across national and cultural bounda-
ries. A classic argument made at workshops and confere ces on privacy opposes the 
“European” centralized, highly regulated approach to privacy with a laissez-faire attitude 
adopted in the United States, especially in relation o corporate entities collecting per-
sonal information. Proponents of this distinction note that data protection regulation is 
much more developed and comprehensive in Europe, following early action by individual 
nations, such as Germany [127] and the enactment of blanket regulation at the EU level, 
including EU-wide legislation (e.g. Directive 95/46 [1]).  
Although, as a first approximation, this characterization may hold, at a deeper 
look, it is overly simplistic. This view does not take into account a growing case history 
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of US court rulings on matters directly affecting privacy, the increasing calls for the en-
actment of privacy legislation,14 and the voluntary initiatives directly taken by service 
providers, especially mobile telecommunication operators, in managing personal infor-
mation deriving from mobile and ubiquitous computing systems. 
In fact, the success and acceptance of technologies that resemble surveillance in 
workplaces and in public space, varies on factors that are more fine-grained than national 
legislation, such as local regulation, unions’ influence, organizational culture and indi-
viduals’ opinions. This is also true when considering applications for consumers outside 
of formal organizational structures. Consequently, analysis that takes into account only 
differences between regulatory regimes in different countries is too blunt to provide ef-
fective design guidance. This point arises again in the following section, when talking 
about design and inquiry tools for answering specific questions about privacy in design.  
One example of how US data protection laws are similar to those in the EU is 
FERPA, the US Federal Education Rights and Privacy A t. This federal law imposes 
strong safeguards and access rights on the personal data of pupils collected in federally 
funded schools. FERPA adopts the Fair Information Practices (FIPS) and effectively con-
stitutes data protection legislation in the style of similar European laws. The relevant dif-
ference is not between the American and the European approaches, but between data pro-
tection and personal privacy. 
A symmetric argument is often made by researchers with relation to personal pri-
vacy, especially with respect to the relationship between individuals and the government. 
Common opinion asserts that Americans are more jealous of their personal space than 
Europeans, backed by strong protection originating from the US Constitution’s Fourth 
                                                
 
 




Amendment. However, the recent spread of CCTV system  in US urban areas [173] and 
discussion about widespread domestic surveillance [106] mirror similar trends in the 
European Union (e.g., CCTV and telecom data retention), suggesting that US and Euro-
pean preferences on personal privacy, if they existd in the past, may be progressively 
converging. 
2.2.2 Personal Privacy vs. Data Protection and Informational Self-Determination 
A misunderstanding of the mutual relationship betwen personal privacy and data 
protection often confounds the discussion on privacy. The distinction is important not just 
on theoretical grounds but also for practical reasons f system design. Personal privacy 
relates to the way we arrange space and behavior to project a certain image of ourselves 
and to protect ourselves from the invasiveness of others. Irwin Altman’s classic descrip-
tion of how people manipulate their privacy in social and physical space is a prime ex-
ample of this concept. Altman characterizes personal privacy as an ongoing exercise of 
“setting boundaries” between the individual and the external world [20]. Altman’s work 
is in part inspired by Goffman’s work on social and i terpersonal relations in small 
groups [77]. 
The second concept, data protection, relates to the management of personally 
identifiable information. Here, the focus is on protecting such data at a social level by 
regulating how, when and for what purpose data can be collected, used and disclosed. 
The origin of this concept stems from the work by Alan Westin and others on the Fair 
Information Practices [172, 180], and on the subsequent embodiment of these practices at 
the international level [142] and in national legislation (starting with data protection laws 
in Germany’s State of Hessen in 1970 and Sweden in 1973 and the US Federal Privacy 
Act of 1974). 
Both aspects of privacy have deep legal and social ramifications and both are af-
fected by, and affect, ubicomp technology. However, their legal and ethical grounds are 
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distinct and the techniques and methods for tackling them are very different. Data protec-
tion calls for increasing trust in the effectiveness of the organizational and regulatory en-
vironment, the state and public opinion; it applies to the relationship between individual 
citizens and large organizations; to use a blunt expression, the power of knowledge here 
lies in quantity. Personal privacy, instead, decreases the need for trust by reducing com-
munication and denying access; its major influence is felt in personal, one-to-one rela-
tionships; here power lies in i timacy. Bruce Schneier makes a similar distinction, be-
tween targeted attacks to privacy and data harvesting [157, p. 29]. 
Although much discussion in the ubicomp community has addressed one side of 
the issue (namely physical privacy), only recently have researchers started thinking of 
how data protection laws already in place affect the ubicomp design space, let alone ac-
tual implementations. At a recent workshop on ubicomp privacy, Günter Müller ex-
pressed a similar point, stating that the data protection approach is about informational 
self-determination,15 i.e., allowing individuals to choose how others can use th ir 
personal information, whereas the personal privacy approach is about setting a boundary 
around one’s “personal space” [131]. This distinction will arise repeatedly in the discus-
sion below. 
In the remainder of this section, I will explore how different actors—civil liberties 
organizations, Data Protection Authorities (DPAs), courts, etc.—have addressed their 
                                                
 
 
15 The term informational self-determination was first used in the context of a German 
constitutional ruling relating to personal information collected during the 1983 census. In 
that occasion, the German Federal Constitutional Court ruled that: “[...] in the context of 
modern data processing, the protection of the indivdual against unlimited collection, 
storage, use and disclosure of his/her personal data is encompassed by the general 
personal rights of the [German Constitution]. This basic right warrants [...] the capacity 
of the individual to determine in principle the disclosure and use of his/her personal data. 
Limitations to this informational self-determination are allowed only in case of overrid-
ing public interest.” [13] 
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concerns about advanced IT, including some ubicomp applications, and how their work 
relates to this thesis. 
2.3 The Debate on Privacy and Surveillance 
One important component of many ubicomp systems is the capture of multimedia 
information from environments of human action. This information can be stored and 
made available for a variety of functions, including supporting human activity (e.g., to 
aid the memory of specific events), for driving theoperation of computing systems (e.g., 
to support natural interaction with humans), and facilit ting communication among peo-
ple (e.g., increasing awareness of each other when not co-located). For example, early 
ubicomp systems were developed for the latter purpose and used in workplaces.16 In work 
environments, social dynamics may resist the introduction of technologies resembling 
surveillance [103]. Expectedly, much of the initial analysis of these applications drew 
from that of surveillance technologies, with a focus on privacy [31].  
Below, I summarize part of the debate on surveillance, using the example of sur-
veillance cameras in urban centers as case study.  
2.3.1 Social Critique of Surveillance 
Social critique has long highlighted the negative impact of technology on society 
and their co-evolving nature. The media has followed these discussions at a very high 
                                                
 
 
16 There is no specific date that marks the beginning of ubicomp as a research field—
embedded systems being an example of computing devices installed in everyday artifacts 
long before Weiser spelled out the vision of ubiquito s computing [178]. However, some 
of what are now considered among early ubicomp applications, such as the RAVE system 
developed at EuroPARC in the late 1980’s–early 1990’s, were deployed in the context of 
workplaces. RAVE used audio and video feeds, among ther purposes, to increase 
awareness of remote co-workers [72]. 
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level, without addressing the nuances of technological and organizational details affect-
ing the use and effects of the technology.  
Surveillance technologies have been the topic of critics, legal researchers and civil 
liberties groups [32, 48, 145]. An interesting example is provided by the gradual evolu-
tion of the use and purposes of a set of surveillance cameras installed in central London. 
In this section, I do not intend to replicate the heated debate on surveillance technologies 
and civil liberties; rather, my goal is to show how technological and organizational de-
velopments affect the characteristics of transportati n security and may affect the role of 
designers. 
In 1993, city authorities installed CCTV cameras at all entrance points into a 1 sq. 
mi. area of central London (the “City”) as a preventive measure. Later, additional cam-
eras were installed to prevent and detect traffic violations; in 1996 the system of nearly 
700 cameras was enhanced with automatic license plac recognition, which was used for 
automatic violation enforcement. In 2003 the system was connected with an automatic 
toll collection system, also based on license place re ognition [140]. Finally, in 2003, au-
thorities revealed that the array of cameras would be used in conjunction with pattern 
matching technologies (occupants’ face recognition) for crime prevention and anti-
terrorism purposes [166]. 
2.3.2 Progressive Redefinition of Purposes and Feature Creep 
Critics of the London surveillance system highlight a trend toward centralization 
and integration of these infrastructures. Once the physical capture network (the cameras 
and associated telecommunication lines) is in place, dditional capture devices can be 
introduced inexpensively; supervisory and monitoring functions can be allocated to opti-
mize organizational and economic constraints; the same system can be used for different 
purposes. In addition, critics have objected to expanding the purposes of the surveillance 
system; indeed, uncontrolled ‘feature creep’ can result in a system very different from 
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what was initially agreed to by stakeholders. These trends are at odds with the traditional 
approach of DPAs, in that their balancing assessment assumes single-purpose systems 
and upfront analysis. This observation will be discussed in further detail in the section on 
DPA practice, and when discussing some of the assumptions of the proportionality design 
method. 
2.3.3 Automatic Operation 
One of the characteristics of ubicomp technology is its unsupervised and auto-
matic operation. This feature introduces complex and potentially opposite ramifications. 
Automatically operating systems are already in use in some countries. The Auto Inci-
dent Recording System (AIRS) developed by Northrop Grumman, for example, is de-
ployed at intersections and stores a certain number of minutes of video prior to an event 
signaling a potential accident, such as a loud crash or sharp braking sound [141]. Under 
ordinary conditions, the system discards recordings  a loop, similar to the Personal Au-
dio Loop application described in this dissertation. This system provides useful informa-
tion without employing humans, further reducing deployment costs, but with an uncertain 
effect on privacy. 
Automatic operation is an important element in the debate on trust in technology, 
which has been very active among both scholars and DPAs in the recent past [140]. Data 
protection law was introduced in part to reduce the risk of automatic systems taking deci-
sions affecting individuals without human supervision. EU Directive 95/46 mandates that 
no decision impacting the legal rights of or “significantly affecting” a data subject should 
be taken solely by automatic means based on his or her personal information [1, §15]. 
The intent was to protect people from malfunctioning technology, by having a human in 
the loop for all discriminations based on collected personal information. On the other 
hand, recent studies have showed that video surveillance systems are particularly prone to 
misuse caused by wrong perceptions and preconceptions of those (very human) individu-
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als in charge of supervising the system. For example, Norris’ ethnographic study of sur-
veillance operators in England shows that members of ethnic minorities, foreigners and 
people perspicuously dressed are more often targets of surveillance than typical people 
[140]. Critics have observed that this practice may increase the number of incidents 
traceable to these minorities and ignores non-minorit es, effectively creating a double po-
licing standard. Current trends in the surveillance community favor using image process-
ing and machine learning techniques to automatically identify events requiring attention 
without operator intervention (e.g., individuals moving erratically or loitering). Automa-
tion moves the issue of discrimination from the operator to the developer of the system, 
arguably facilitating policy formulation and compliance.  
All this amounts to a contradictory (or ambivalent, i  Arnold’s words [22]) effect 
on privacy: automatic technology increases risks to individuals, if it takes wrong deci-
sions without the possibility for recourse; it decreases other risks, making it simpler to 
define upfront, during design, specific operating policies. 
2.3.4 Beyond Surveillance 
Although the discussion above centers on surveillance technologies, ubiquitous 
computing includes other technologies that have been th  topic of critical research and 
legislative action as well, such as location sensing [47], RFID tagging [70], and portable 
digital cameras [12]. Surveillance systems can be generalized in a class of technologies 
that is sometimes defined as capture and access technologies by Abowd and Mynatt [14]. 
This term is commonly used to indicate systems that cap ure information from environ-
ments of everyday action, such as video/audio feeds, store it and make it available to 
other applications or subjects for later consumption [169]. One of the applications dis-
cussed in this thesis, the Personal Audio Loop, can be characterized as a capture and ac-
cess application. The architecture of capture and access systems proposed by Truong 
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[169] is interesting because it provides a general t chnical description of surveillance sys-
tems that can be used for systems analysis [96]. 
2.4 Security in the Context of Ubicomp 
In this section, I briefly mention some effects of security legislation and manage-
ment on ubicomp applications. I also claim that security management has not been a topic 
of much research in the ubiquitous computing community to date. Management concerns 
may not have had time to surface, given the lack of large deployments of ubicomp appli-
cations (cellular phones being one notable exception). However, the heightened aware-
ness of security in the media and the introduction of legislation mandating security re-
quirements should prompt researchers to consider secu ity legislation and management as 
primary elements of the design process of ubicomp technology. 
2.4.1 The Impact of Security Legislation on Ubicomp Technology Management 
Legislation directly addressing IT security has been late in coming. Until the 
1970’s, security was a topic of practical concern mainly in governmental, military and 
large private organizations. However, recent high-profile security breaches [114, 177, 
186], the increasing economic impact of security failures [65], and increased awareness 
among software manufacturers (e.g., Microsoft [71]), have prompted the attention of the 
media and lawmakers. This has prompted researchers to tackle security issues in mobile 
and ubiquitous computing applications as well (.g., fixing security issues in 802.11 wire-
less networks). 
Information security requirements have been introduce  with legislation address-
ing data protection, digital signatures and corporate governance. For example, legislation 
on corporate accountability imposes strong security requirements on data that may affect 
corporate performance [11]. Legislation on electronic health-related transactions imposes 
security requirements on personal information [10].  
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Other legislation relates to telecommunications in ge eral and thus directly affects 
the design of security in ubicomp systems and applications. This legislation includes tele-
communication laws that safeguards users’ location and transaction information (e.g., EU 
Directive 2002/58 [3], the US Electronic Communications Privacy Act [8]) and laws on 
wiretapping and surveillance, which relate to the capture and safeguarding of environ-
mentally sensed information. 
In general, legislation is quite generic on the specific details of security, leaving 
implementation to regulation codes. For example, th Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1999 (HIPAA) indicates some gneral security goals, but specific 
guidelines are provided in the Code of Federal Regulations that has been written with the 
collaboration and feedback of health service providers (the entities regulated by HIPAA) 
[174]. The reason for this separation is to make updating technical requirements simpler, 
by decoupling legislation goals and general mandates from the evolving nature of techni-
cal issues. Therefore, researchers seeking legal guidance on design issues must consider 
implementation regulations as well as legislation. 
When legislation commits to one specific technological solution, this may jeop-
ardize its effectiveness. For example, the EU Directiv  1999/93 on electronic signatures 
[2], while retaining a two-tier goals/implementation structure, has been criticized for sug-
gesting one specific technological approach to electronic signatures (i.e., the use of digi-
tal certificates) [26]. This criticism is particularly relevant for ubicomp development, as 
legislation may impose specific technological choices that may or not be optimal from a 
technical or user perspective. 
2.4.2 Ubicomp Security Management—A Contradiction in Terms? 
Information systems management currently represents one of the main challenges 
to IT security, and has recently gained much attention from industry and academia. De-
spite this trend, there are very few accounts of how advanced IT systems (such as ubi-
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comp systems) are managed in practice, due to various easons, including lack of experi-
ence in industry, resistance to publicize internal organizational matters, and lack of atten-
tion from the academic community.  
The surveillance literature represents an exception in this landscape, and includes 
accounts on how CCTV systems are operated and managed on a day-to-day basis [140, 
173]. However, to my knowledge there are no systemaic, published accounts of how in-
tegrated surveillance systems employing advanced technology such as pattern matching 
are used and managed. As a result, security management in ubicomp systems is largely 
uncharted territory. However, the need for exploring this territory is pressing: the kind of 
information handled by ubicomp applications and their social setting of use suggest that 
these technologies will present significant security management challenges.  
Standardized security management guidelines have been d veloped over the 
course of the past 30 years and have been widely adopte  by organizations seeking cost-
effectiveness and simplification. This trend towards standardization is visible in the pub-
lication of guidelines (e.g., the Rainbow Series reports by NIST [134]), best practices 
(e.g., the Generally Accepted Information Security Practices [102]) and international 
standards on the topic (e.g., IS17799 [104]).  
Ubicomp technologies bring a new scale to the management problem, which is al-
ready a difficult challenge for traditional computing systems such as PCs and corporate 
information systems. Security management typically rests on assumptions that are not 
necessarily verified in ubicomp systems. These assumptions include: 
– sufficient resources and competent personnel to imple ent and overview 
security controls; 
– user interfaces to inspect and audit system performance and operation; 
– effective regulation and policy enforcement.  
Whether security management standards and guidelines developed for traditional 
IT can be transferred to ubicomp is not clear.  
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Although security management is not directly within the scope of this thesis, one 
of the goals of the proportionality method is to prvide suggestions for security manage-
ment as part of the design process, thus bridging product design with post-deployment 
everyday use. This observation will be made again in the context of future work and 
when talking about “designing for management.” 
2.5 Conclusions 
In this Chapter, I demonstrated how legal and social forces interact with the de-
velopment of ubicomp technology. This is not a one-way process: technical change 
causes social and legal action and legislation affects technical development. For example, 
given enough momentum, the designers of a new system might be able to change legisla-
tion: wireless regulation on location information being an example.  
I further argued that it is important for developers of ubicomp applications to un-
derstand the process of adoption, in part because assessments used in the legal commu-
nity in reference to privacy (such as “technology in common use”) are based on public 
awareness of technology, in part because of marketplace performance. Moreover, I high-
lighted the challenges facing security management in the context of ubicomp applica-
















 SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING  
 
In this Chapter, I provide a background on technical work that focuses on the de-
sign of privacy-respecting and secure ubicomp applications. In this Chapter, my goal is to 
develop two arguments that support my proposal of the proportionality method as a rele-
vant and timely contribution to the state of the art in the field of ubicomp security and 
privacy. 
First, the field of ubicomp security and privacy is still very young. It is hard to 
pinpoint exactly what a “secure” and “privacy-respecting” ubicomp application or system 
is supposed to provide in terms of security requirements or behaviors visible to the user. 
Except for some intuitions by the technical community and legal constraints, the issues at 
stake are relatively ill-defined. Consequently, I claim that prescriptive design methods 
may not provide as much flexibility and relevant guidance as design processes based on 
iterative development and repeated evaluation. 
This argument points to the second part of this Chapter. That is, while there have 
been numerous attempts to model specific privacy and security concepts, principles and 
requirements, there is still a lack of understanding of user needs in specific applications 
and contexts. The analytic frameworks proposed in the li erature reflect engineers’ under-
standing of the problem domain, but it is not clear to what degree they match user needs 
and are able to satisfy user requirements. That is, nalytic approaches have not been vali-
dated in practice, and, in fact, most proposed frameworks do not indicate how to connect 
user experience with system analysis. 
A skeptical reader may ask why security and privacy in ubicomp are challenging 
design problems. There are at least two arguments to address this doubt. First, there is 
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relatively little documented experience related to the creation and the use of this type of 
IT applications. The most widely used ubicomp applications, such as military and logis-
tics applications, originate from corporate R&D and are poorly documented in open lit-
erature. Research systems built in academic environments, while better documented, do 
not enjoy real-world adoption and represent thus an untrustworthy base for reflecting on 
and improving design practice. Applications of mobile phones are one notable exception 
to this, and, in fact, mobile telephony is used repeatedly in this thesis as a source of ex-
perience and as a benchmark. The second reason why security and privacy in ubicomp is 
a complex problem is that the design space is more c mplex than that of many other IT 
applications. Security and privacy refer to non-functional requirements which are diffi-
cult to verify in any given product. Furthermore, the effects of design failures in this do-
main are difficult to assess because they mix with the effects of cultural conditions, mar-
ket acceptance, pricing, and other ill-understood scio-technical variables. Moreover, in 
many cases, the increasing number of computing devices and of their interaction patterns 
makes it difficult to trace effects back to a specific artifacts. 
In the remainder of this Chapter, I summarize the most prominent technical work 
in the domain of ubicomp privacy and security. I then summarize some efforts of solving 
security and privacy issues by improving the design of ubicomp systems. In particular, I 
focus on: 
– Early work on awareness and location systems in workplaces. 
– Guidelines and frameworks (methodological frameworks, analysis tools 
and procedures, and modeling frameworks). 
– Design and development techniques. 
– Work in the security community addressing similar design problems. 
3.1 Hot Issues in Ubicomp Security and Privacy 
This thesis focuses on understanding what people exp ct from ubicomp technolo-
gies and what the security and privacy problems are, r ther than providing specific solu-
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tions to these problems. However, technical solutions to security and privacy problems 
are one of the cornerstones of building secure and privacy-respecting ubicomp applica-
tions. Therefore, in this section, I list some techni al work on the topic of ubicomp and IT 
security and privacy. I will not provide a complete catalog of technical work, but merely 
pointers to work the reader might want to survey personally for more information. The 
purpose is to map the most relevant themes of research in the field, not that of providing a 
comprehensive background. Specific technical work will be cited in the following chap-
ters when discussing the case studies and the applic tion of the proportionality method.  
There are other good sources for overviews of this body of research. In the first 
two chapters of his Master’s thesis, Scott Lederer p ovides a nice summary of research in 
the field, up to December 2003, focusing on how interaction with ubicomp applications 
can affect user privacy and security [119]. The January 2003 issue of IEEE Pervasive 
Computing magazine provides a broad overview of the general topics researchers are 
working on in the field. These articles include networking security work (Kitsos et al.), 
authentication methods to be used in untrusted enviro ments and terminals (Pering et al.), 
advances in biometric authentication (Yongsheng t al.), and a discussion of location pri-
vacy (Beresford and Stajano, Myles t al.).  
In 2003, Frank Stajano, a researcher at the University of Cambridge, UK, pub-
lished the book Security for Ubiquitous Computing. In this book, he listed several techni-
cal security issues and techniques targeted at ubiquitous computing applications, includ-
ing trust systems, networking security and anonymit [160]. The book is roughly divided 
in two sections. The first section focuses on the history of ubiquitous computing and 
mentions some of the most relevant work in the research community. The second part of 
the book discusses several advanced security techniques for addressing the three classic 
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aspects of security—confidentiality, integrity and availability17—along with anonymity 
and authentication. Besides indicating some techniques that may be useful to solve some 
ubicomp security problems, Stajano was not able to provide much insight, partly due to 
the lack of deployment experience with real-world ubicomp applications. Although it was 
a commendable effort, the book was premature when it was published and, therefore, did 
not have a strong impact on the research community. 
The proceedings of the workshops on privacy and security at premier conferences 
on ubicomp18 also document work on topics ranging from secure networking to protect-
ing location privacy. These conferences have published technical work on location pri-
vacy (e.g., work by Duckham and Kulik at Pervasive 2005 [59]) as well as more user-
centered research (e.g., Kindberg et al.’s work on trust in ubicomp in e-commerce set-
tings [111]). The problem of trust is deep and multi-faceted, because it requires to com-
bine mechanisms for establishing trust between people and computing systems (e.g., au-
thentication  mechanisms) with the social, physical and other conditions that influence 
trust.  
A specialized conference, Security in Pervasive Computing, held in 2003 and 
2005, published work on infrastructure for physical/virtual interaction, authentication, 
access control, information flows and location privacy. More work has been published at 
security, networking and systems conferences. For example, Covington has published 
work on generalized access control and identification [52] at the Annual Computer Secu-
rity Applications Conference.  
                                                
 
 
17 “IT security means, confidentiality—prevention of the unauthorized disclosure of in-
formation, integrity—prevention of the unauthorized modification of information, avail-
ability—prevention of the unauthorized withholding of information or resources.” [50] 
18 See Appendix A for a list of these conferences and workshops. 
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Two strands of research are particularly interesting in the context of this thesis: 
location privacy, which generalizes to the issue of securing context information, and cap-
ture and access applications security and privacy. Below, I discuss these two topics in 
more detail. 
3.1.1 From Location Sensing to Context 
The interest for location privacy was in part motiva ed by the debate caused by 
location-based services (LBS) and the introduction of location-based emergency systems 
on cell phones (E911 in the US and E112 systems in Europe). The collection and storage 
of location information raises a complex set of concer s and potential risks, involving 
individuals, service providers, telecom operators, governments and law enforcement. One 
obvious concern is that organized crime, corporate en ities or governments may be able to 
reconstruct the physical whereabouts of individuals covertly or for illegitimate purposes. 
At the interpersonal level, the concern might be that technology enables disruptive and 
undesired practices, among acquaintances and between people who do not know each 
other (e.g., stalking). Given the commercial interests involved, many researchers have 
concentrated on securing the use of location information. Proposed solutions to these 
concerns include using anonymity techniques. Networking protocols such as MIX net-
works and onion routing19 have been proposed to decouple location information fr m the 
identity of the user [34]; information-theoretic approaches such as k-anonymity sets20 
                                                
 
 
19 MIX networks and onion routing allow communicating partners to exchange messages 
without revealing their identity to each other and the existence of communication to third 
parties [43, 79].  
20 k-anonymity is a technique that can be used to release public information, while ensur-
ing both data privacy and data integrity [162]. 
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have also been proposed to help modulate the disclosure of location information to 
achieve untraceability of location information [81]. 
One of the problems with solutions based on ‘hard’ nonymity is that in many 
cases the complexity of the anonymization technologies may curtail commercial viabil-
ity.21 For this reason, Trusted Third Parties (TTPs) have been proposed for acting as in-
termediaries in the collection and management of context information. Using TTPs to 
protect private information appears to be more feasible from technical and organizational 
standpoints, and reflects the status quo of current location-enhanced services. In the do-
main of location information, telecom operators areobviously in an advantageous posi-
tion to become brokers of context (location) information. Telecom operators can manage 
user’s relations with value-added service providers while preserving user anonymity. 
This point is made succinctly by Böhm et al. [37]. This model also strengthens the link 
between customer and telecom provider, with potential commercial returns for the pro-
vider. In fact, Rannenberg points out that providers can expand their brokering capabili-
ties to include other facets of service provision, such as service payment and privacy 
management, effectively leading to comprehensive customer ‘identity management’ 
[151]. 
                                                
 
 
21 This claim is supported by the lukewarm market acceptance of anonymity services 
such as ZeroKnowledge and Freenet [185]. It should also be noted that governments have 
attempted to test the legal limits of surveillance of privacy-enhancing technologies in 
several occasions (e.g., early anonymous remailers like Penet.fi [89], and dvanced ano-
nymizing proxies like JAP [28]); this may have discouraged organizations and individu-
als from providing these services. However, tacit agreement in the privacy community is 
that the mere existence of advanced, albeit commercially implausible anonymity systems 
is more important than their widespread adoption. This is because the technical feasibility 
of such systems contributes to the policy debate around privacy and technology in several 
ways. For example, the fact that offenders may circumvent telecommunications wiretap-
ping by governments by employing these systems helps disproving the case for increas-
ing widespread surveillance capabilities. 
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The issues related to location privacy can be generaliz d in the problem of context 
sensing.22 Context sensing is one of the main themes of ubicomp, as ubicomp systems 
need information about the user and the user’s enviro ment to operate autonomously and 
proactively. Collecting contextual information about individuals, such as the identity of 
devices neighboring the user’s phone, engenders social and interpersonal risks similar to 
those mentioned above with relation to location sensing. Architectural solutions have 
been proposed to address these risks. For example, the ConFab system by Hong and Lan-
day permits application designers to collect and use context data without disclosing in-
formation that can identify individuals [91]. K-anoymity has been suggested to control 
the disclosure of context information so that application goals can be achieved while pre-
venting user identification [74]. 
As a side-note, context is not only an asset requiring protection but also a resource 
usable in security-relevant decisions. Covington, fr example, shows how context infor-
mation about the location of people in a home can be used to drive a Generalized Role-
Based Access Control (GRBAC) monitor that grants or prevents access to ubicomp ser-
vices (e.g., denying access to the intelligent mixer to a child if a parent is not in the 
kitchen) [52]. Context information is used in the Trust Context Spaces framework by 
Robinson and Beigl for similar purposes [154]. In these cases, securing context informa-
                                                
 
 
22 The term context is used in the ubicomp community to indicate information about the 
user’s physical environment and state that can be used to drive the operation of IT appli-
cations. Dey et al. define context as the computing environment (availble processors, 
devices accessible for user input and display, network capacity, connectivity, and costs of 
computing) the user environment (location, collection of nearby people, and social situa-
tion) and the physical environment (lighting and noise level) [55]. Other authors have 
suggested including also socially negotiated and historical knowledge in the definition of 
context [42, 57], but for the purposes of this dissertation, I will consider only the context 
as defined by Dey et al. 
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tion requires the designer to consider the classic problems associated with protecting se-
curity infrastructure, including ensuring reliability and integrity. 
3.1.2 Security Issues of Environmental Capture and Access 
The security and privacy issues of context sensing are closely related to those of 
capture and access systems. Capture and access systems support the collection, st rage, 
processing and distribution of information from environments of human action, specifi-
cally, multimedia information such as video and audio [169]. Capture and access soft-
ware infrastructure (e.g., the InCA system developed by Truong [168]) supports applica-
tions in domains such as the home [167], classrooms [168], and portable devices (e.g., the 
PAL device described later in this thesis).  
There is a conceptual affinity between context sensing and capture and access, 
because both collect and use information from the user’s physical environment. However, 
the focus of capture and access systems is on collecting human experiences (audio/video 
depicting the users or their environment) for later use by humans [88]. Context sensing is 
somewhat more implicit and is often used by ubicomp ap lications to drive interaction or 
to mark up captured media.  
Securing multimedia information captured from physical environments presents 
similar challenges as those described in the previous chapter with relation surveillance 
systems. One important difference is that in surveillance systems captured data is rarely 
used and stored past a certain retention time (e.g., 30 days, depending on the local pol-
icy). Capture and access systems may be used for storing video and audio for much 
longer time and are designed with integrated information retrieval tools, explicitly facili-
tating access and further use of the captured material. Storage can introduce security li-
abilities. For example, the use of meeting capture systems in large commercial organiza-
tions may have been curtailed by concerns about the permanent storage and availability 
of recorded material to unauthorized parties [130]. 
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Technical solutions for limiting access to information collected in capture and ac-
cess applications include limiting access through control mechanisms that reflect the 
physical and social conditions in which the collection occurs (such as limiting access to 
the individuals who were present at its original capture) [98]. An alternative is that of de-
ploying these applications in tightly controlled organizations or very public spaces where 
access control can be in part foregone (e.g., classrooms). 
Other solutions include the establishment of “physical privacy policy” spaces. 
Hewlett Packard has proposed, for example, a system that disables cameraphones in envi-
ronments where a no-photography policy is posted, using short-range Bluetooth to signal 
the policy [146]. To avoid relying on the user terminal to comply with the policy, which 
raises issues related to technology control and trusted IT, Truong et al. have proposed a 
technique that prevents the use of cameras in certain environments, by beaming targeted 
light to the camera sensors, effectively blindfolding them [170]. In that paper, more tech-
niques for preventing capturing images of physical spaces are cited. 
3.2 Design Practice 
It should be clear at this point that the security and privacy issues of collecting 
context and multimedia information about individuals re not limited to the technology 
(e.g., the solutions for securing location information based on TTPs as opposed to ano-
nymity systems). The larger social and economical environment directly affects the de-
sign and implementation of successful measures to ensur  the security and privacy of 
ubicomp applications.  
Along with technical solutions, several efforts have targeted the problem of de-
veloping design methods for identifying and solving security and privacy problems in 
general. These efforts recognize the difficulty of identifying and prioritizing issues and 
risks, and reflect the consciousness that technical solutions targeting individual security 
problems may not be sufficient without considering the broader social and technical envi-
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ronment of use. In citing related work, I will attempt to delineate the evolution of re-
search on the design of ubicomp systems, specifically related to the development of de-
sign guidelines, design methods and analytic frameworks. 
The proportionality method proposed in this thesis is positioned as a complemen-
tary contribution to other related efforts in the fi ld of ubicomp security and privacy. In 
this thesis, when comparing other design approaches with the proportionality method, I 
suggest how my approach could be usefully employed within a larger integrated design 
practice, alongside, or instead of, other approaches. It should also be noted that the work 
cited below is limited to published, mostly academic, research and does not mention 
commercial systems which are often undocumented in the public domain. 
3.2.1 Early Work: Privacy and Social Dynamics 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, some early ubicomp applications were awareness and 
video media spaces (VMS) deployed in the context of workplaces, where social dynamics 
may resist the introduction of technologies resembling surveillance. Hence, analysis has 
extensively drawn from that of surveillance technologies, with a focus on privacy. On the 
contrary, security in ubiquitous computing has not been a topic of research early on.  
3.2.2 From Awareness Applications to Evaluating Design Alternatives 
Bellotti and Sellen published work on privacy in the context of VMS providing 
“awareness” and videoconferencing services. This work was in part based on the experi-
ence of the RAVE media space system at EuroPARC [72]. By using RAVE, remote co-
workers could communicate directly even if not co-present, or simply “see” each order 
through the audio-video link, supposedly increasing opportunities for communication. 
Reflecting on this experience, Bellotti and Sellen developed a framework for addressing 
privacy issues in media spaces. According to their framework, the system should provid-
ing appropriate feedback and control structures to users [31]. Feedback and Control are 
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described by Norman as basic structures in the use of artifacts [137], and are reflected 
also in the concepts of information and choice in the FIPS privacy principles. Bellotti and 
Sellen suggest devising appropriate mechanisms for feedback and control in four areas: 
capture, use, access and purpose for use. 
Bellotti and Sellen also propose to evaluate alternative design options deriving 
from the analysis of feedback and control structures using a QOC (Questions, Options, 
Criteria) [123] evaluation process based on 8 question  and 11 criteria. Table 3.1 lists the 
questions on feedback and control proposed in this framework and the related evaluation 
criteria. Some of these criteria are similar to those employed in Heuristic Evaluation 
[136], a well-known discount usability technique for evaluating user interfaces. (Criteria 
that match Heuristic Evaluation criteria are marked with an asterisk *.) Among the crite-
ria unique to Bellotti and Sellen’s framework are those most closely related to security 
evaluation such as trustworthiness, and criteria that try to address the problem of security 
cost (ideally, security should come at no additional cost to the user): unobtrusiveness, low 
effort, low cost. The evaluation of alternatives is common to several privacy frameworks, 
and is characteristic of design methods targeted at tough design problems that do not en-
joy an established design practice.  
Another early ubicomp system was an infrastructure s d for locating people 
within an office complex called Active Badge and developed at Olivetti Research by 
Want et al. [176]. The system was installed in several research labs worldwide and was 
used for several purposes including call routing. I an evaluation of the system, Want et 
al. consider the privacy concerns ensuing from the system, including both general obser-
vations on privacy in workplaces and a discussion of the specific relationship between the 







Table 3.1: Bellotti and Sellen’s Questions and Evaluation Criteria for VMS. 
Questions 
 Feedback about Control over 
Capture When and what information about me 
gets into the system. 
When and when not to give out what informa-
tion. I can enforce my own preferences for 
system behaviours with respect to each type of 
information I convey. 
Construction What happens to information about me 
once it gets inside the system. 
What happens to information about me. I can 
set automatic default behaviours and permis-
sions. 
Accessibility Which people and what software (e.g., 
daemons or servers) have access to in-
formation about me and what informa-
tion they see or use. 
Who and what has access to what information 
about me. I can set automatic default behav-
iours and permissions. 
Purposes What people want information about me 
for. Since this is outside of the system, it 
may only be possible to infer purpose 
from construction and access behaviours. 
It is infeasible for me to have technical control 
over purposes. With appropriate feedback, 
however, I can exercise social control to re-
trict intrusion, unethical, and illegal usage. 
Evaluation criteria 
Trustworthiness: Systems must be technically reliable and instill confidence in users.  
Appropriate timing : Feedback should be provided at a time when control is most likely to be required. 
Perceptibility *: Feedback should be noticeable. 
Unobtrusiveness: Feedback should not distract or annoy.  
Minimal intrusiveness: Feedback should not involve information which compromises. 
Fail-safety*: The system should minimise information capture, construction and access by default. 
Flexibility *: Mechanisms of control over user and system behaviours may need to be tailorable. 
Low effort : Design solutions must be lightweight to use. 
Meaningfulness*: Feedback and control must incorporate meaningful representations. 
Learnability *: Proposed designs should not require a complex model f how the system works.  




Both the RAVE and Active Badge experiences exposed th  delicate balance be-
tween privacy concerns and application usefulness. After the early work cited above, the 
interest in security and privacy in ubicomp generally subsided until the second half of the 
1990’s, when much of the security community’s attention was drawn to other fields (the 
internet), and the ubicomp community was busy creating the first working implementa-
tions. 
3.2.3 The Tradeoffs of Privacy, Control and Disruption 
Recently, Lederer et al. have reiterated that successful designs must make infor-
mation flows visible, provide coarse-grain control, enable social nuance, and emphasize 
action over configuration [120]. Fine-grained feedback about and control over informa-
tion disclosure introduces an implicit design tensio : more security implies increased 
administrative burden on the user who is called to oversee ever-increasing flows of in-
formation. This balance has been inquired specifically for context-aware technology by 
Barkhuus and Dey, who have suggested that people are willing to forgive some control 
over their personal location information to trusted in ividuals [25]. On the other hand, 
one of the conclusions of my own evaluation of a location-based application (the Reno 
application, discussed in Section 4.3.2) suggest that users do not desire automatic disclo-
sure of location information—what Barkhuus and Dey term “active context-
awareness”—in part due to potential sensing and interpretation errors that could mislead 
the recipient of the communication. 
Privacy in media spaces is a recurring theme in ubicomp research. Hudson and 
Smith explored the privacy issues in awareness space  [93] and proposed video manipu-
lation techniques for reducing the invasion of one’s personal space while providing others 
with cues about the activities that are happening there (e.g., by using clever blurring algo-
rithms). They point out that privacy cannot be considered in the abstract but is inevitably 
linked to other concerns including awareness and disturbance.  
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The tradeoffs between management and control are also discussed by Boyle and 
Greenberg in a comprehensive journal article that summarizes research on privacy in me-
dia spaces and attempts to provide a coherent framework to the problem [39]. They point 
out that in these applications, designers must consider: 
– Deliberate privacy abuses. 
– Inadvertent privacy violations. 
– Users’ and nonusers’ apprehensiveness about technology. 
Boyle and Greenberg thus introduce the factors of acceptance and perception 
management in the picture, pointing out that technical issues weigh heavily on potential 
deliberate privacy abuses, while human behavior and performance affects inadvertent 
privacy violations. They also propose to deconstruct the far-reaching concept of privacy 
into three aspects: solitude (“control over one’s interpersonal interactions”), confidential-
ity (“control over other’s access to information about oneself”), and autonomy (“control 
over the observable manifestations of the self”).23 After having described how these con-
cepts can be used to analyze specific design questions in VMS, Boyle and Greenberg 
point out that there is still insufficient knowledge about the users to answer many of these 
decisions in a conclusive way. More than that, the authors point out the inadequacy of the 
analytic tools currently employed for mapping system functions with individual prefer-
ences and actions. 
3.3 Turning to Experience and Practice in Related Fields 
Given these pressing needs, recent work has continued generalizing the experi-
ence gained with the first working systems and has attempted to find solutions drawing 
from proven practice in related fields. 
                                                
 
 
23 Quotes from Boyle and Greenberg [39, p. 348]. 
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3.3.1 The Fair Information Practices and Their Limitation s 
Langheinrich has proposed adapting the Fair Information Practices (FIPS) for 
driving the design of ubicomp applications [116].24 The OECD’s version of the FIPS is 
listed in Figure 3.1 [142]. Heeding this suggestion, Garfinkel has applied the FIPS to the 
analysis of RFID technology [69]. Patrick and Kenny report that a similar approach was 
used in the requirements analysis of an application developed by the EU PISA (Privacy 
Incorporated Software Agents) project [144]. Another way of using the FIPS would be as 
criteria in a QOC process framework (such as Bellotti and Sellen’s). 
While clearly still useful, today the FIPS are no longer sufficient for providing 
comprehensive design guidance. The FIPS reflect the top-down way in which system 
analysts designed potentially intrusive IT in the Seventies. Specifically, they only suggest 
evaluating if data collection is commensurate with the goal of the application. Using the 
FIPS requires the designer to have accepted a positive value judgment on the IT applica-
tion at hand. It also requires the designer to have developed a thorough analysis and de-
sign of the data processing system. The FIPS do not address the fundamental concern of 
desirability of novel applications with open-ended t chnical designs—they just suggest 
how to approach the design once the application goals and their implementation have 
been selected. 
 
                                                
 
 
24 The FIPS were initially developed following work by Westin. They were adopted by 
the US Department of Health and Human Services as a basis for the ‘fair’ use of personal 






There should be limits to the collection of personal data and any such data should be 
obtained by lawful and fair means and, where appropriate, with the knowledge or con-
sent of the data subject. 
Data Quality Personal data should be relevant to the purposes for which they are to be used, and, to 




The purposes for which personal data are collected should be specified not later than at 
the time of data collection and the subsequent use limit d to the fulfilment of those pur-
poses or such others as are not incompatible with those purposes and as are specified on 
each occasion of change of purpose. 
Use Limitation Personal data should not be disclosed, made available or otherwise used for purposes 
other than those specified in accordance with Paragr ph 9 except:  
a) with the consent of the data subject; or  
b) by the authority of law. 
Security Safe-
guards 
Personal data should be protected by reasonable security safeguards against such risks 
as loss or unauthorised access, destruction, use, modification or disclosure of data. 
Openness There should be a general policy of openness about developments, practices and poli-
cies with respect to personal data. Means should be readily available of establishing the 
existence and nature of personal data, and the main purposes of their use, as well as the 
identity and usual residence of the data controller. 
Individual Par-
ticipation 
An individual should have the right:  
a) to obtain from a data controller, or otherwise, confirmation of whether or not the data 
controller has data relating to him;  
b) to have communicated to him, data relating to him within a reasonable time; at a 
charge, if any, that is not excessive; in a reasonable manner; and in a form that is readily 
intelligible to him; 
c) to be given reasons if a request made under subparagraphs(a) and (b) is denied, and 
to be able to challenge such denial; and  
d) to challenge data relating to him and, if the challenge is successful to have the data 
erased, rectified, completed or amended. 
Accountability A data controller should be accountable for complying with measures which give effect 
to the principles stated above. 
Figure 3.1: The FIPS (OECD version). 
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Furthermore, the FIPS were thought specifically for the management of large da-
tabanks of personal information, such as health records, financial institutions or govern-
mental records. Consequently, they may not be easily pplicable in situations where 1) 
technology mediates relationships between individuals as opposed to between individual 
and organizations and 2) data is not structured and application purposes are ill-defined. 
Both are recurring characteristics of ubicomp applications. Consequently, the FIPS may 
fail the analyst in understanding whether an application is useful, acceptable to its stake-
holders, and commensurate to its perceived or actual unwanted impact in the first place, 
especially when precedent lacks. 
These principles provide guidelines to inform design but their generality and the 
lack of a design process model constrain their applicability. The proportionality method 
attempts to fill this gap by providing process guidance to reflect how people think about 
technology affecting everyday life. In some cases, the perceived usefulness of an applica-
tion may convince people to adopt a technology that m y be otherwise considered need-
lessly invasive, as reported, for example, by user studies by Barkhuus and Dey [25] and 
Melenhorst et al. [128]. 
3.3.2 Social/Technical Theories as Lenses for Interpreting Design Problems 
The concept of feedback, highlighted by Bellotti and Sellen is also central to 
Palen and Dourish’s description of interpersonal privacy as a continuous negotiation 
process [143]. Palen and Dourish apply to IT the theories on interpersonal privacy de-
scribed by Altman [20] (in turn influenced by Goffman’s work on individuals’ behavior 
in social settings [77]). This work demonstrates that uman and social factors may affect 
privacy as much as technology and that the boundary setting dynamics described by the 
social sciences can be applied to IT-mediated interpersonal relationships as well. One of 
the conclusions of their work is that applications must be carefully designed to enable 
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such dynamics. Furthermore, they point out that indiv duals’ expectations about the per-
formance and retention of information in computer ntworks may not match reality.  
3.3.3 Economic Frameworks May Be Difficult To Apply 
A different approach is proposed by Jiang et al. in their Asymmetric Information 
Flows (AIF) framework. Drawing from economic theories and from an economic inter-
pretation of personal information [155], Jiang et al. apply the Principle of Minimum 
Asymmetry to ubicomp design: 
“A privacy-aware system should minimize the asymmetry of information 
between data owners and data collectors and data users, by decreasing 
the flow of information from data owners to data collectors and users and 
increasing the flow of information from data collectors and users back to 
data owners.” [110] 
The principle of minimum asymmetry should help reduce externalities, i.e., the 
situation in which the parties benefiting from a trnsaction are not those carrying the as-
sociated risks. To implement this principle, the authors propose a three-pronged strategy. 
First, personal information should be managed by modulating and enforcing limits on the 
persistency (retention time), accuracy (a measure of how precise the data is) and confi-
dence (a probability measure that the data is corret) of information within an informa-
tion system. Second, the personal information lifecycle should be analyzed according to 
the categories of collection, access, and second use. Third, at each of these stages, the 
system should provide ways to prevent, avoid, and detect the collection, access and fur-
ther use of personal information. 
While eclectic and interesting in its theoretical approach, this model has a number 
of limitations. First, the authors have used AIF as an analytic tool, but to my knowledge, 
AIF has not been used to date as a design model. Moreover, potentially serious conflicts 
exist between this approach and data protection legislation in certain jurisdictions. For 
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example, there are strong objections, both ethical and practical, to treating personal in-
formation (PI) as intellectual property. In some jurisdictions, privacy is considered an in-
alienable right and the sale of rights over PI is not foreseen. A practical problem with the 
idea of modulating confidence and accuracy of PI is that data protection legislation re-
quires data controllers to guarantee the integrity and correctness of the data they are en-
trusted with, which is incompatible with the idea of data “decay” proposed by the AIF 
framework. 
3.4 Elicitation and Design Techniques 
The theme of design methods for tackling security and privacy in ubicomp sub-
sided after the work of Bellotti and Sellen, mentioed above. However, recently, several 
researchers have attempted to further the state of the art in this domain by proposing al-
ternative design techniques. These attempts are in part a response to the complexities of 
the design space, and reflect a need for reducing the cost of analysis and design, which in 
QOC processes can be relatively high. 
3.4.1 Reducing Costs Using Patterns 
Chung et al. have applied the concept of design patterns to privacy problems in 
ubicomp [45]. The privacy patterns used in that study are listed in Table 3.2. Chung et al. 
evaluated their method using a design exercise in which both students and experienced 
designers used the patterns to perform an assigned design task. The authors point out that 
the privacy design patterns were not used in any meaningful way by the test designers; 
also, expert reviewers did not evaluate the designs produced by those using the patterns 






Table 3.2: Chung et al.’s Privacy Patterns. 
Pattern Description [46]. 
Fair Information Prac-
tices  
The Fair Information Practices are a set of privacy guidelines for companies 
and organizations for managing the personal information of individuals. 
Respecting Social Or-
ganizations  
If [members of] the organization […] [do] not trust and respect one another, 
then the more intimate the technology, the more problems there will likely be. 
Building Trust and 
Credibility  
Trust and credibility are the foundation for an ongi  relationship. 
Reasonable Level of 
Control  
Curtains provide a simple form of control for mainti ing one’s privacy while 
at home.  
Appropriate Privacy 
Feedback  
Appropriate feedback loops are needed to help ensur people understand what 
data is being collected and who can see that data. 
Privacy-Sensitive Archi-
tectures 
Just as the architecture of a building can influence how it is perceived and 
used, the architecture of a ubiquitous computing system can influence how 
people’s perceptions of privacy, and consequently, how they use the system. 
Partial Identification  Rather than requiring precise dentity, systems could just know that there is “a 
person” or “a person that has used this system before.” 
Physical Privacy Zones  People need places where thy feel that they are free from being monitored. 
Blurred Personal Data  […] Users can select the levl of location information disclosed to web sites, 
potentially on a page by page basis. 
Limited Access to Per-
sonal Data  
One way of managing your privacy with others is by limiting who can see what 
about you.  
Invisible Mode  Invisible mode is a simple and usefl interaction for hiding from all others. 
Limited Data Retention  Sensitive personal information, such as one’s location and activity, should only 
be kept as long as needed and no longer. 
Notification on Access 
of Personal Data  
AT&T Wireless’ Find Friends service notifies your friend if you ask for his or 
her location. 
Privacy Mirrors  Privacy mirrors provide useful feedback to users by reflecting what the system 
currently knows about them. 
Keeping Personal Data 
on Personal Devices  
One way of managing privacy concerns is to store and present personal data on 




My experience suggests that, while patterns are helpful in established areas [19], 
it may be premature to apply them in the ubicomp domain (Chung et al. acknowledged 
this mismatch by terming their patterns “pre-patterns.”) In situations of exploratory de-
sign practice, only thorough analysis on a case-by-case basis can provide strong argu-
ments for an application’s acceptability. As suggested below, the proportionality design 
process attempts to be more flexible by describing design features as elements that can be 
composed with one another. 
3.4.2 Striving for Completeness: Goal-Driven Analysis 
A recent design method developed at our institution by Jensen et al. is STRAP 
(Structured Analysis Framework for Privacy). STRAP can be used to derive privacy vul-
nerabilities from a goal-oriented, iterative analysis process, and is composed of three suc-
cessive steps: vulnerability analysis, design refinement and evaluation [108]. Although it 
is not tailored specifically to ubicomp applications, STRAP may be used to identify 
vulnerabilities and inform design decisions. Initial analysis of STRAP’s performance, 
through design exercises, suggests that designers using STRAP identified more privacy 
issues, and more quickly than a control group (which used a variation of Bellotti and Sel-
len’s framework). The evaluation of the STRAP method and of the design patterns by 
Chung et al. is interesting in the context of this thesis because I adopted a similar evalua-
tion technique for the proportionality method. 
3.4.3 The Tension between Quantitative and Qualitative Risk Analysis 
Hong et al. propose a risk analysis approach for studying privacy in ubicomp ap-
plications [92]. Their process enhances standard risk analysis by providing sets of social 
and technical questions to drive the analysis, and heuristics to drive risk management, all 
tailored for ubicomp applications. The questions Hong et al. propose are listed in Table 
3.3. The authors propose a semi-quantitative risk evaluation framework, suggesting to act 
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upon each identified risk if the standard “C < LD” equation is satisfied.25 To evaluate the 
variables in this formula, the authors propose a set of risk management questions, listed 
in Table 3.4. The authors point out that quantitative evaluations are difficult to make in 
most cases and should in any case only be used for prioritizing risks and corrective ac-
tion. In particular, it is difficult to estimate the economic impact of unwanted disclosures 
of personal information especially when they occur in interpersonal settings. In addition, 
critics of quantitative approaches also point out that quantitative assessments may prove 
misleading, failing to consider user perceptions and opinions. The risk analysis frame-
work, though originating from the authors’ extensive experience in the field of ubicomp 
design, has not been evaluated to verify its effectiv ness.26  
One substantial problem lies in identifying risks correctly and exhaustively—
which calls for investigating users’ opinions and perceptions. Chapter 6 provides an ex-
tended discussion on the problems of user inquiry in ubicomp. Although risk analysis is a 
fundamental component of security engineering, many aspects of design in this domain 
cannot be framed in a quantitative manner, and a qualitative approach may be necessary. 
An interesting qualitative approach to risk analysis for ubicomp is provided by Hilty et 
al., who suggest using a risk analysis process based on risk screening and risk filtering 
[90]. In the screening phase, an expert panel identifi s relevant risks for a given applica-
tion (thus using the expert’s experience directly, instead of the social and technical ques-
tions suggested by Hong). 
 
 
                                                
 
 
25 C = cost of adequate protection; L = the likelihood that an unwanted disclosure of per-
sonal information occurs; D = the damage that happens on such a disclosure. 






Table 3.3: Hong et al.’s Risk Analysis Questions. 
Social and Organizational Context 
Who are the users of the system? Who are the data sh rer , the people sharing personal information? Who
are the data observers, the people that see that personal information? 
What kinds of personal information are shared? Under what circumstances? 
What is the value proposition for sharing personal i formation? 
What are the relationships between data sharers and data observers? What is the relevant level, nature, and 
symmetry of trust? What incentives do data observers have to protect data sharers’ personal information (or 
not, as the case may be)? 
Is there the potential for malicious data observers ( .g., spammers and stalkers)? What kinds of personal 
information are they interested in? 
Are there other stakeholders or third parties that might be directly or indirectly impacted by the system? 
Technology 
How is personal information collected? Who has control over the computers and sensors used to collect 
information? 
How is personal information shared? Is it opt-in or is it opt-out (or do data sharers even have a choice at 
all)? Do data sharers push personal information to da a observers? Or do data observers pull personal in-
formation from data sharers? 
How much information is shared? Is it discrete and o e-time? Is it continuous? 
What is the quality of the information shared? With respect to space, is the data at the room, building, 
street, or neighborhood level? With respect to time, is it real-time, or is it several hours or even days old? 
With respect to identity, is it a specific person, a pseudonym, or anonymous? 











Table 3.4: Hong et al.’s Risk Management Questions. 
Managing Privacy Risks 
How does the unwanted disclosure take place? Is it an accident (for example, hitting the wrong button)? A 
misunderstanding (for example, the data sharer thinks they are doing one thing, but the system does an-
other)? A malicious disclosure? 
How much choice, control, and awareness do data sharers have over their personal information? What 
kinds of control and feedback mechanisms do data sharers have to give them choice, control, and aware-
ness? Are these mechanisms simple and understandable? What is the privacy policy, and how is it commu-
nicated to data sharers? 
What are the default settings? Are these defaults useful in preserving one’s privacy? 
In what cases is it easier, more important, or more c st-effective to prevent unwanted disclosures and 
abuses? Detect disclosures and abuses? 
Are there ways for data sharers to maintain plausible deniability? 
What mechanisms for recourse or recovery are there if th re is an unwanted disclosure or an abuse of per-
sonal information? 
 
Then, risks are filtered according to qualitative risk prioritization based on the fol-
lowing criteria, derived from work in the German risk assessment community: 
– Socioeconomic irreversibility (Is it possible to restore the status before the 
effect of the technology has occurred?) 
– Delay effect (is the time span between the technological cause and the 
negative effect long?) 
– Potential conflicts, including voluntariness (Is exposure to the risk volun-
tary?) and fairness (Are there any externalities?) 
– Burden on posterity (Does the technology compromise the possibilities of 
future generations to meet their needs?) 
The authors use this framework for analyzing a number of risks of ubicomp tech-
nologies, including risks deriving from wireless communications’ radiations, the social 
effects of the technology and its environmental impact. However, while their heuristics 
are adequate for analyzing macro-social risks, theyma  not be adequate for risks arising 
at the interpersonal level. 
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3.4.4 Multilateral Security and the Problem of Brokering Competing Needs 
The concept of multilateral security has influenced much of my research in secu-
rity and privacy over the past several years. Multilateral security was developed for ana-
lyzing systems with multiple competing security threats. The theoretical background and 
methodological approach of multilateral security stems from research done in the German 
e-commerce and data protection communities during the 1990’s [132, 153].  
One of the innovations of multilateral security is that it frames privacy require-
ments and solutions as security requirements. According to multilateral security, security 
and privacy are different expressions of the same balancing process among contrasting 
interests within a system or application. The purpose f this balancing is that of achieving 
technological solutions that are acceptable to users, while being at the same time profit-
able for manufacturers and service providers. 
Multilateral security asserts that designers must account for all stakeholders’ 
needs and concerns, by considering and negotiating co flicting requirements, respecting 
individual interests, and supporting user sovereignty. Consequently, it highlights the role 
of designers in producing equitable technology, andthat of users who are to be empow-
ered to set their own security or privacy goals.  
The multilateral security framework was applied to several case studies, including 
a prototype mobile application for mobile “reachability” management (i.e., brokering 
availability to incoming phone calls). In that case study, Rannenberg documented how 
user studies can help design mobile applications with multilateral security requirements 
in workplaces [152]. 
The determination of a compromise between competing needs in the design space 
is one of the cornerstones of the design method I propose. Requirements compromise is a 
long-standing issue in software engineering research nd several techniques have been 
used for making such determinations. For example, Boehm et al. describe the WinWin 
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requirements negotiation model [36]. That model’s purpose is to broker among require-
ments that are competing because of cost constraints nd is thus eminently quantitative. 
In our design space, it may not be possible to negotiate requirements in a purely quantita-
tive manner, due to the impossibility of associating a value function to the design options 
and consequences on stakeholders. However, the spirit of this balancing process is 
somewhat similar to our case. Prioritization techniques used in qualitative risk analysis 
and mentioned above may aid the designer in selecting which competing requirements 
must overrule others, especially if individual requirements cannot coexist in a design so-
lution.  
However, even risk analysis may be an inadequate tool for deciding between 
competing requirements, because design decisions may interact with issues that cannot be 
modeled as risks, both internal (e.g., application usefulness), and external (e.g., regula-
tory requirements) as pointed out in work by Hudson and Smith [93] and Barkhuus and 
Dey [25] mentioned above. 
3.5 Rationale as an Answer to Uncertainty in Design 
The design method proposed in this thesis advocates r ful evaluation of the de-
sign space and the reasoned justification of competing design choices. Reasoned docu-
mentation of design choices is one way in which the design and software engineering 
communities have approached hard, undefined problems in the past. For example, in De-
sign Rationale work of the late 1980’s, MacLean et al. suggest that documentation of de-
sign choices (through a QOC process) does not only provide record of the design deci-
sions taken but is integral part of the design process itself and can improve the quality of 
such process [124]. MacLean et al.’s interest was in the development of user interfaces, 
but they acknowledged that Design Rationale could be used for other domains as well. 
Approximately at the same time of the Design Rationale work, the security com-
munity was also grappling with similar design documentation issues. The complex re-
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quirements space of security-critical IT products requires rigorous justification and the 
traceability of design choices for evaluation purposes. The Common Criteria for IT Secu-
rity Evaluation and Certification, developed starting in the early 1990’s to facilitate the 
evaluation of security in IT products, mandate the us of Protection Profiles for achieving 
this goal [105]. Protection Profiles are documents that trace functional security require-
ments back to security objectives, and these in tur to security threats. At each step, the 
author of the Protection Profile uses design rationles to prove the relations between 
threats, objectives and requirements. These rationales must be argued more or less 
tightly, based on a claimed Evaluation Assurance Level (increasingly high Assurance 
Levels require progressively stronger rationales, from informal justifications up to 
mathematical modeling and proofs).  
The market success of the Common Criteria has been arguably limited by the high 
costs associated with their use. Moreover, while Protection Profiles must include a thor-
ough rationale to guarantee that system analysts have exhausted the design space, the re-
quirements set proposed by the standard is fixed. A fixed set of requirements makes the 
standard apt for well-understood applications for which a “best practice” design solution 
is available, and to traditional systems that do not present competing security require-
ments. By contrast, the unique problems of the ubicomp domain demand more flexible 
solutions, which can broker competing requirements in atypical applications.  
3.5.1 Prescriptive vs. Generative Design Methods 
Above, we compared the merits of the different design techniques, namely design 
patterns, AIF, FIPS-based design guidelines, QOC analysis, and Design Rationale. It 
emerges from this discussion that prescriptive approaches to solving ubicomp security 
and privacy problems may not provide sufficient guidance to designers. This is a recur-
ring theme in this thesis and will be further discused in Chapter 6. 
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First, the design space is too large and ill-defined to support prescriptive ap-
proaches such as patterns, which base their validity in deep, long-standing design practice 
(e.g., Alexander’s The Timeless Way of Building). The observations documented by 
Chung et al. with the use of privacy patterns to design ubicomp ap lications supports this 
claim [45].  
Prescriptive guidelines based on the FIPS, such as tho e proposed by Lang-
heinrich [116], may also fail to provide detailed design guidance. For example, several 
researchers have pointed out that in interpersonal rel tions, the identity of the individual 
receiving personal information is a primary factor influencing the disclosure preferences 
and behaviors (e.g., work on location disclosure by Consolvo et al. [51] and on multime-
dia communications by Adams and Sasse [18]). This factor is not taken into account by 
the FIPS. As yet another example, design guidelines such as “Access and Recourse,” 
while applicable to the relationship between indiviuals and organizations, may be diffi-
cult to apply to interpersonal communication.  
If we accept these observations, it follows that it m ght be more effective to 
search for solutions in non-prescriptive or generative design methods, such as those em-
bodied in QOC or Design Rationale and risk analysis. By generative, I mean design 
methods that help generate the relevant design questions, rather than provide guidance on 
solutions. Plain QOC leaves the designer, however, with the problem of asking the right 
questions. Likewise, risk analysis presents the problem of identifying the relevant risks. 
Once questions are asked and risks are identified, t is necessary to prioritize the risks and 
reach reasoned answers to the design questions. All this requires designers to go to the 
source and study the intended users of the systems under consideration. The last part of 
this chapter will investigate this problem, which turns out to be much more subtle than 
just applying established user-centered design (UCD) practice. 
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3.5.2 Understanding Stakeholders’ Concerns 
Analyzing privacy and security issues in ubicomp aplications presents numerous 
challenges to effective user-centered design (UCD). Some of these challenges are general 
and derive from the nature of ubicomp systems. Understanding usage environments re-
quires designers to step out of the lab and follow people where they use these applica-
tions—on streets, in shopping malls, homes and wherever else they might go. Further-
more, evaluation must also occur in a “situated” setting in order to account for physical 
and social interaction, disruptions, variations in cognitive load, and other environmental 
factors that can profoundly impact the usability and usefulness of mobile applications 
[14]. 
Probing users’ opinions and preferences about IT security also represents a hard 
problem. Identifying security requirements has been a traditionally difficult problem that 
has prompted the development of security standards such as the Trusted Computing Se-
curity Evaluation Criteria [53] and, later, the Common Criteria. In most cases, security 
requirements are non-functional and most people mayhave difficulty expressing their 
needs and concerns in a way that can be fed into a requirements engineering process. Se-
curity requirements elicitation represents a research field in itself.27 
Multilateral security suggests that when seen from the user’s perspective, many 
privacy requirements can be reinterpreted as user-centered security requirements. How-
ever, probing privacy introduces further challenges. For example, people often take a de-
ontological stance when artificially probed on opinions and preferences on privacy, both 
in reference to organizations [33] and in interpersonal relations. Everyday behavior may 
differ from stated preferences for many reasons, including insufficient informational 
                                                
 
 
27 For example, a Software Engineering for Secure System  workshop was recently held 
in conjunction with a major Software Engineering conference. 
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awareness (ignoring the fate of collected information), overriding primary goals (getting 
a transaction done), or carelessness (not wanting to bo her with evaluating every ex-
change of information), as pointed out by Acquisti and Großklags [16]. On the other 
hand, people have a very refined sense of privacy blance in interpersonal relations, as 
described by Altman [20], and may choose certain paths of behavior to avoid conflict or 
in response to overriding social goals.  
It follows that abstract or purely self-reflective surveys may be insufficient for 
probing privacy concerns. This observation applies in general to all those situations in 
which people may be unable or unwilling to verbalize their behavior abstractly, from 
complex social constructions, as pointed out by Goffman [78], to the formulation of pro-
cedural plans as noted by Suchman [161]. In addition, people may be unable to grasp 
immediately the effects on their socio-technical practices of new technologies being in-
troduced in familiar settings. 
In the past few years, several researchers have attempted to study users’ needs and 
concerns in the domain of privacy and security in ubicomp. Particularly interesting pro-
jects include Beckwith and Lederer’s interviews with elder-care residents and caregivers 
[29], Consolvo et al.’s experience sampling surveys to probe privacy requi ments in a 
situated setting [51], Barkhuus and Dey’s work on lcation technologies on a US univer-
sity campus [25] and Kindberg’s work on trust in m-commerce payment systems [111]. 
Moreover, work in the HCI community has started to focus on in-the-field prototyping to 
address the challenges related to testing and evaluating ubicomp applications: the concept 
of Experience Prototypes described by Buchenau and Suri [41] and the use of Wizard-of-
Oz techniques in mobile settings [58, 122] are aimed at evaluating mobile technologies 
within iterative development processes. However, more work is needed to develop reli-




3.6 Beyond Design Techniques 
In this chapter, I have argued that the most effectiv  design techniques for tack-
ling security and privacy problems in ubicomp may be case-by-case, labor-intensive 
methods based on the evaluation of alternative design options and risk analysis. Prescrip-
tive design tools, such as design patterns have not been very successful. Also, general 
design guidelines have proven of difficult applicaton and of uncertain effect. This sug-
gests that the field is still in its early stages and it may be premature to propose ‘short-
cuts’ or simplified guidelines or patterns for addressing these problems. These ap-
proaches may be more appropriate for disciplines with an established practice. Generative 
design and risk analysis are appropriate instruments for not-well known fields. In particu-
lar, Bellotti and Sellen’s approach uses design questions to address security and privacy 
issues. Hong et al. have attempted to facilitate risk analysis by providing a set of ques-
tions relevant to the ubicomp domain that can be used to identify risks. An integrated ap-
proach should include an end-to-end way of thinking about the problem, including ap-
propriate requirements analysis and design tools. Such an integrated approach will be 


















THE PROPORTIONALITY DESIGN METHOD  
 
In Chapters 2 and 3, I argue that attempts to manage the privacy and security im-
plications of ubicomp technology have not been very successful. Although there have 
been numerous proposals to model security and privacy concepts, principles and re-
quirements, there is still a lack of understanding of specific applications and contexts. For 
example, the Asymmetric Information Flows framework proposed by Jiang et al. pro-
poses to reduce the asymmetry in knowledge between individuals by modulating three 
properties of information—persistency, accuracy and confidence [110]. Ignoring the 
technological and legal obstacles mentioned in Chapter 3, the AIF framework suggests a 
way of achieving certain privacy goals, but does not help in understanding what these 
goals are. Nor do design principles, such as Information Minimization28 help to define 
these goals. As pointed out in Chapter 3, by the tim  the designer can apply these princi-
ples, he or she has already accepted a positive value judgment on the IT application at 
hand. My conclusion is that there is a need, within e community of researchers and de-
velopers of ubiquitous computing technologies, to step back and reconsider what we want 
to achieve with each of these technologies. 
When using these privacy frameworks and design princi les, the designer still 
faces the challenge of deciding whether the application is desirable and acceptable for the 
                                                
 
 
28 Information Minimization: a principle derived from ilitary need-to-know policies and  
used in the privacy community whereby the collection of personal information is strictly 
limited to the minimal amount sufficient for enabling the delivery of the related services. 
Information Minimization is not included in the FIPS. OECD’s version of the FIPS only 
call for a weaker ‘limitation’ of collection and use [142]. 
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intended market. It should be noted that this is hardly a novel problem in IT development. 
Over the years, the scope of IT development has expanded repeatedly to encompass or-
ganizations, users, their concerns and motivations, f r example in terms of User-Centered 
Design (UCD) in the 1980’s [139], or, more recently, with Value-Sensitive Design [68]. 
Therefore, I view this work as providing some suggestions on how to approach security 
and privacy issues, in the long-standing tradition of UCD. The novelty of my work con-
sists in the specific application of UCD to problems in the ubicomp domain that have 
been approached traditionally as merely technical issues. 
In light of the discussion in Chapter 3, a user-centered approach to security and 
privacy issues in ubicomp must consider both the macroscopic and microscopic levels. At 
the macroscopic level, a general approach is needed for tackling security and privacy is-
sues in ubicomp. At the microscopic level, it is necessary to gain a better understanding 
of users’ concerns and needs in relation to specific applications. 
As a final remark, I would like to point out that I am intentionally avoiding an 
ethical discussion on privacy and security. While I acknowledge the importance of adopt-
ing an active stance towards privacy protection and increasing information security, I also 
believe that many other authors have stated the ethical, as well as economic and social 
case for developing IT that is both more privacy-sensitive and secure and that there is no 
need for replicating such discussion (e.g., Lessig [121], Etzioni [60], and governmental 
reports [148]). 
An initial step in accomplishing the first part of the research program outlined in 
the Introduction is represented by my proposal of the proportionality design method [97], 
presented in the remainder of this Chapter. In Chapter 5, I describe an initial validation of 
the design method in two design experiments. The second part of the research program, 
documenting UCD techniques for probing privacy and security concerns in ubicomp ap-
plications, constitutes the main topic of Chapter 6. 
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4.1 The Principle of Proportionality 
A vast body of knowledge regarding the impact of technology on privacy has 
grown over the past century in rulings and opinions issued by courts and, more recently, 
Data Protection Authorities (DPA)—supervisory entities with regulatory and enforce-
ment powers on data protection matters. Among the tools developed by these communi-
ties to tackle socio-technological problems, the principle of proportionality has been used 
repeatedly in reference to privacy and security. In this thesis, I develop the idea of pro-
portionality into a design method that can provide guidelines for the design of secure and 
privacy-preserving ubicomp applications. In this context, I define the principle of propor-
tionality as follows:  
Any application, system or process should balance application goals with 
the privacy and security concerns of all involved stakeholders. 
The above definition is rather general and DPAs have typically interpreted pro-
portionality in a rather narrower fashion, as a balance of application usefulness with pri-
vacy rights. For the purpose of this work, I would like to maint in a more vague defini-
tion of the principle, leaving specific details to the method description given below. 
This very general principle may resemble one of the Fair Information Practices, 
namely Data Quality.29 As noted above, however, proportionality differs in one important 
aspect from Data Quality, because it establishes a balance between the goals of the con-
sidered application and its effects on privacy, whereas the FIPS only impose conditions 
on the collection and use of information in relation t  the data subject’s consent, and to 
the needs of the application. In this sense, the FIPS reflect how system analysts designed 
                                                
 
 
29 Data Quality: “Personal data should be relevant to the purposes for which they are to 
be used, and, to the extent necessary for those purposes, should be accurate, complete and 
kept up-to-date.”  [142, §8]  
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potentially intrusive IT in the Seventies, while pro ortionality reflects how people might 
think about technology affecting everyday life (e.g., Barkhuus and Dey report that users 
of location systems are willing to forgo a degree of control on their location information 
if this enables useful services [25]; Melenhorst et al. report that the invasiveness of home 
monitoring systems for the elderly may be acceptable in the face of an increased percep-
tion of security [128]). 
Recent data protection regulation has specific provisi ns for proportionality be-
tween utility of data collection and its burden on data subject’s privacy. European Union 
Directive 95/46/EC (the baseline for all EU Members’ data protection laws) states that 
“personal data may be processed only if … processing i  necessary for the purposes of 
the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by the third party or parties to whom 
the data are disclosed” [1, §7(f), italics by the author]. In this case, assessing legitimacy 
requires a balance between benefit of data collection and the interest of the data subject 
(the person to whom the data refers) in controlling the collection and disclosure of per-
sonal information. European DPAs have expanded and clarified the proportionality prin-
ciple by providing opinions on applications of automated sensing technology mentioned 
in Chapter 2 [61, 62]. 
This balancing of interests is, of course, not uniqe to the European data protec-
tion community. For example, opinions involving the “chilling” effects on First Amend-
ment rights of surveillance in public space in the US (e.g., during public demonstrations) 
[30, p. 168] point out a balancing between the interest of preventing crime and individu-
als’ rights to free expression. The Bartnicki v. Vopper case of 2001, cited in Chapter 2, 
shows that arguments on the impact of technology on privacy are based on balancing of 
privacy rights with the public’s right to know. Furthermore, the concept of reasonable 
expectation of privacy (Katz v. United States, 1967 [5]) implies a proportionality judg-
ment on the perceptual qualities of sensing technologies. 
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It is safe to say that the principle of proportionality is widely used across legal 
contexts to balance technology and privacy.30 However, court rulings and DPA opinions 
are extremely general and do not provide operative guidance to designers, because they 
emphasize summative and technology-neutral critique. The contribution of this work 
consists of a structured, flexible design method for ubicomp applications, inspired by le-
gal and technology policy evaluation and based on the experience gathered developing 
and evaluating ubicomp applications, and observing other deployments. The design 
method is intended to be helpful to IT developers and researchers. In particular, the ob-
jective of the design method is to: 
– structure the design of ubiquitous computing applications based on the 
evaluation of their impact on stakeholders’ privacy nd their usefulness; 
– compare alternative designs (user interface options and information poli-
cies) within the design space to maximize adherence to stakeholders’ re-
quirements (by compromising among competing requirements if neces-
sary). 
Two observations are necessary at this point. First, I ecognize that it may be im-
possible to achieve unanimity among the users and designers of any one application. The 
purpose of this design method is not that of achieving ‘objective,’ unanimous results, be-
cause many of the decisions involved in the application of the method are inherently sub-
jective and based on heuristic value judgments. I do not seek utopian agreement by all 
users and designers involved in ubicomp applications with security and privacy implica-
tions; more realistically, I strive to ground design on convincing and comprehensive rea-
soning based on user and social understanding, legal precedents, and industry best prac-
tice. The proportionality method invites designers to approach design with a critical eye 
                                                
 
 
30 This analysis is limited to EU and US laws because the abundant and easily accessible 
literature and reflective stance adopted in these jurisdictions provide useful insight. Pri-
vacy laws in many other parts of the world resemble either model.  
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open to alternative solutions, in the conviction that a rigorous stance to privacy does not 
curb development, but increases the chances of acceptance and of success. 
Second, the ‘balancing’ of privacy and usefulness does not necessarily imply a 
quantitative assessment. The social practices and design requirements associated with 
privacy and IT security are much more complex and nuanced than a reductive quantita-
tive approach would assume. While certain design parameters may be quantified and ma-
nipulated to meet user requirements (e.g., retention time), this is not true in general. In 
fact, my experience shows that, in many cases, quantitative tradeoffs are not appropriate 
to represent or model user needs. The balancing should be viewed instead in a more gen-
eral manner, as trying to achieve a coherent and succe sful design in situations where 
there might be contrasting needs and concerns between multiple stakeholders and or even 
just one stakeholder. 
4.2 From Principle to Design Method 
The definition of the proportionality principle provided above is simple, but it 
does not translate well into a process for building applications. Design is about making 
decisions, progressing from a problem statement to a s lution. In attempting to cast the 
principle of proportionality within a design framework, therefore, it is necessary to ac-
count for that decision process. My method begins with the driving motivation from the 
principle of proportionality, the establishment of a design balance among competing 
needs, and proceeds toward a systematic refinement to whittle down design alternatives 
in the face of security and privacy considerations.  
Before applying the method, the designer must identfy the relevant stakeholders, 
and select a small number of application goals that form the characteristic kernel of the 
application. There are many ways to express these goals, including stating abstract re-
quirements, describing usage scenarios, or providing a high-level description of a system. 
Specifying the application goals very precisely may result in more accurate conclusions, 
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but the design space may be constrained needlessly. In the two case studies reported in 
this Chapter (the Personal Audio Loop and Reno), application goals are stated through a 
high-level design description, because I entered th process at a stage in which an initial 
design had already been developed.  
The design method is divided in three stages (see Figure 4.1) [97]: 
– Desirability—Establish that the application goals would meet the needs 
for the intended user population.31 
– Appropriateness—Recommend the best technological (or non-
technological) implementation solution. 
– Adequacy—Within a given technology, identify the parameters that can be 
adjusted, and examine them to justify proper use. 
In very blunt terms, desirability and appropriateness are typical of the structure of 
the analyses performed by DPAs and courts, while ad quacy refers to the fine-grained 
activity of interface and system designers. Desirabil ty and appropriateness, as defined 
above, are questions of social relevance often overl oked by designers and researchers 
who may be driven by the immediate benefits of novel applications.  
The design method is simple, in order to be integrat d within a traditional UCD 
development process. In fact, the intention is thate proportionality method should be 
used to generate relevant questions that must be answered within UCD by using appro-
priate tools and techniques. The iterative nature of the design method is shown Figure 
4.1, reflecting what is commonly considered the best practice development model by the 
UCD community.  
 
                                                
 
 
31 In previous publications, this step was named legitimacy. It was renamed esirability to 
avoid implying a direct reference to legislation and a mechanical and “economic” view of 




Figure 4.1: The proportionality design method at a glance. 
The process starts with the definition of application goals and continues through succes-
sive refinement of design issues and solutions. The box s list analysis techniques that I 
have found useful at each stage of the analysis process for generating and verifying  re-
quirements and design constraints. 
Desirability 
Does the application meet 
stakeholder needs? 
Appropriateness 
Is the application built with the  
proper technology? 
Adequacy 
Is the technology built properly? 
Inputs / 
analysis techniques 
• legal reference 
• social studies 
• user inquiry: surveys,  





• legal reference 
• social studies 
• architectural properties 
• cost, practicality 
• user inquiry: ethno-
graphic, deployment, 
focus groups, surveys 
Inputs / 
analysis techniques 
• legal reference 
• social studies 
• user psychology 
• cost, risk analysis 
• designers’ decisions 






Such an iterative depiction does not imply, however, a commitment to one spe-
cific development model (e.g., spiral vs. waterfall), nor a ‘continual improvement’ ap-
proach to design. Designers should tailor the length and number of iterations to the spe-
cific development environment and application at hand. 
Below, I provide a short description of each stage. This discussion is not intended 
to be exhaustive. Rather, my goal is to suggest how t e three stages can be approached 
and to note which sources and techniques I found useful in making design decisions at 
each stage. I have applied the proportionality method to an application developed within 
our research group (the Personal Audio Loop, a mobile short-term audio memory aid 
tool) [87] and to Reno, a mobile application used to disclose the user’s location, devel-
oped at Intel Research [158]. 
4.2.1 Desirability 
The first step in the proportionality method requires the designer to assess 
whether the potentially conflicting needs of the stakeholders are met. For a given applica-
tion (e.g., a home security system), one must demonstrate that the interest in using it for a 
specific purpose is compatible with stakeholders’ concerns (e.g., about their personal pri-
vacy or security) and other externalities (e.g., the concerns of unrelated passersby, visi-
tors). In many cases, DPAs and courts address the issu  by structuring the problem along 
the following three questions: 
– What is the purpose of the application? 
– What are the advantages gained? (e.g., expressed in reduction of risk, or 
economic benefit.) 
– What is the imposed security or privacy risk? (e.g., in terms of changes of 
behavior, “chill effect,” or other social costs.)  
Answering these questions requires the designer to ngage in a documented and 
justifiable design process. The purpose of use of an application is closely related to its 
intended benefits, and thus is integral to the desirabil ty assessment. For example, the 
 
 78 
French DPA allowed a video surveillance system with license plate recognition at border 
crossings to increase customs control accuracy and throughput. In contrast, the DPA did 
not allow a very similar system, intended for increasing quality of service on motorways, 
because the benefits (improved congestion management) w re not deemed to outweigh 
the potential effects of large-scale tracking of private vehicles on internal motorways 
[40]. 
Identifying the advantages gained might be as simple as reviewing the application 
motivation, although emergent use adds uncertainty to such determination. Identifying 
imposed burden may be more difficult. A multilateral security threat analysis can yield 
comprehensive answers, although characterizing threats might prove difficult. Although 
risk analysis may be used to identify threats (Hong et al. specifically proposed using risk 
analysis for ubicomp privacy [92]), more qualitative arguments are often the only viable 
option. Various methods can be employed for gathering qualitative evidence, including 
standard legal priority determinations (e.g., economic advantage is subordinate to free-
dom of speech), judgments made by courts on similar applications, and industry best 
practices and guidelines. 
Defining stakeholders’ needs in terms of benefit and burden (and the design proc-
ess as a balancing act) does constrain the breadth an  depth of the analysis and design 
spaces because it projects all design variables on a e-dimensional scale.32 As men-
tioned above, this formulation is typical of courts and DPAs, and is particularly fit for 
applications, such as surveillance, which can hardly be maneuvered, after deployment, by 
concerned individuals to achieve social goals. However, the case studies below demon-
strate that the balancing process is not necessarily one-dimensional, but involves several 
competing stakeholders at the same time. In fact, many ubicomp applications demand a 
                                                
 
 
32 P. Dourish, personal conversation, April 2005. 
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more flexible design approach, capable of dealing with, for example, the boundary setting 
process involved in the management of personal privacy (or, in multilateral security 
terms, “empowering” users) and in the management of the practical security features of 
the application. This increased flexibility is also needed to support the view of ubicomp 
as a set of environments with potentially multiple uses, rather than as a colle tion of dis-
crete single-purpose applications. 
4.2.2 Appropriateness 
Once the need or desirability of a certain application has been established, the ap-
propriateness of the alternative implementing technologies or techniques must be evalu-
ated. Cost and practicality are obviously important co-determinants in this assessment. 
Moreover, it may not be possible to select a technology for a certain application disjoint 
from individual needs (that is, appropriateness and desirability may be indivisible), espe-
cially in cases where design is driven by technology as opposed to by users’ needs. 
Therefore, the distinction of these two phases should not be considered dogmati-
cally, but rather as an artifact useful for certain ki ds of applications, in which goals and 
technology can be analyzed separately.  In brief, th  main questions of an appropriateness 
determination are: 
– Do the cost and quality of the selected technology justify the potential in-
vasion of privacy with respect to alternative soluti ns? 
– Does the technology pose the risk of being abused or employed with fur-
ther security or privacy implications? 
– Can the application goals be reached by other means (including non-
technical)? 
Note that there is a similarity between these question  and the SE concept of vali-
dation. Although different technologies can be used to atain an application goal, not all 
technologies have the same effects on privacy. As a practical example of this, consider 
security systems: audio recording is in many cases con idered more invasive than photo-
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graphs. This thinking is mirrored by a 2002 opinion given by the Swedish DPA that disal-
lowed an in-vehicle security system in taxis employing audio recording, whereas it per-
mitted digital pictures of passengers to be taken at the moments when they entered and 
left the car [40].  
Technological choices are influenced not only by the technical merits but also by 
their wider social ramifications. For example, in an ethnographic study of video surveil-
lance operators, members of ethnic minorities and conspicuously dressed people were 
more often targets of surveillance than ordinary looking people  [140]. Furthermore, de-
signers often overlook non-technical solutions for meeting a certain goal. For example, 
research conducted in the 1980’s and 1990’s on graffiti and vandalism prevention strate-
gies showed that the installation of surveillance cameras is not necessarily the only or 
best solution: cleaning graffiti promptly or enacting prevention programs instead provides 
equally good results [73]. 
The selection of the appropriate technology might contrast with the designer’s 
preference in terms of implementation cost, and might also reduce flexibility for future 
development. Moreover, emergent uses may unsettle a d licate design balance. In this 
perspective, the desirability and appropriateness dterminations should not be viewed just 
as a mechanical selection of a technology that reaches specific goals. Rather, the process 
is also meant to result in the definition of management, deployment, and usage condi-
tions, of corrective or balancing measures, and in the revision of the application goals in 
order to curb undesired effects. 
4.2.3 Adequacy 
As the design process deals with increasingly fine-grained aspects of the applica-
tion, the third stage of the design process examines th  qualities of the chosen application 
and technology, which must be adequate to the application goals and acceptable to all 
stakeholders. This stage bears resemblance to the SE practice of verification. 
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Arguing the adequacy of specific design choices can become very laborious, be-
cause the design space can expand to include many interdependent features, such as user 
interface affordances, information policies and inter al parameters. Further, while tradi-
tional IT security and privacy benefits from a long experience of regulation and industry 
best practice, the ubicomp design space has many more “degrees of freedom.” In addition 
to retention time and disclosure policies typically used in traditional data protection, the 
ubicomp design must also account for  proxemics, architectonic features (enclosure, de-
limitation, etc.), and social variables (e.g., artifact ownership, whether it is a public space 
or not). 
Interface and cognitive affordances, sensing modes and management policies are 
fundamental for the adequacy test. For example, the Article 29 Working Party (the Euro-
pean advisory body on data protection) discusses th case of a doorbell camera, used to 
identify visitors standing at the door. Here, the fundamental features are the shot angle 
and cone and activation mode of the camera [61]. A narrow-angle lens, pointed at space 
outside the path of unrelated passersby, and activated by the visitor pressing the doorbell, 
is acceptable in most social settings. Indeed such installations are deemed legitimate and 
appropriate. Conversely, a remotely controlled system, capturing an ample portion of the 
street or corridor, does not provide a satisfactory compromise of benefit and burden, be-
cause it collects much unnecessary information. 
The analytic technique to use for this assessment dpends on the technology as 
well as the deployment setting. I present here a very simple procedure, inspired by multi-
lateral security and WinWin requirements engineering models [36], which is based on the 
five steps of Figure 4.2.33 This method was used in the two case studies below. Prelimi-
                                                
 
 
33 I do not claim that this is the only or best way of performing this analysis. In fact, this 
analysis has several drawbacks (for example, it ignores temporal and cultural variables). 
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nary experience in its application within the development process suggests that it im-
proved understanding of the associated uses and risks, and of the corrective actions nec-
essary within the deployment environment. More work would be necessary to verify this 
procedure’s effectiveness with other types of ubicomp applications. 
The characteristics identified in step 1 in Figure 4.2 include a very wide assort-
ment of design features. Privacy principles such as the FIPS can be used to generate 
guidelines and identify relevant design features specific to the application at hand. Here I 
list five types of features that have been particularly relevant in my experience: 
– Quantitative measures of sensor precision. In the case of location sens-
ing, for example, lower resolution is associated with greater uncertainty, 
which increases plausible deniability, and thus indirectly, user privacy.  
– Quantitative measures of sensor reach. For example, the range of a mi-
crophone can be modulated responding to information minimization prin-
ciples.  
– Interface affordances for data retrieval. Access cost to collected infor-
mation (e.g., required time, whether access attempts are made public) can 
1. What are the characteristics of the privacy- or security-impacting design features? E.g., im-
pacted spatial area (e.g., microphone range or lens angle), measurement resolution, level of 
aggregation of data, aspects of the user interface (data access interfaces and operation mode). 
2. How are design features described as variables? By type (e.g., discrete or continuous) and 
range (e.g., minimum and maximum, selection of choices), considering the characteristics of 
the employed technology. 
3. What are the values or ranges of each variable critical to the success of the application? E.g., 
the accuracy of a location technology. 
4. What are the values or ranges of each variable which impact on the privacy and security of 
all stakeholders? 
5. What compromise is possible between the requirements of steps 3 and 4, considering their 
relative validity?  
Figure 4.2: Simple Adequacy Process. 
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be considered in an adequacy assessment. As access cost increases, the 
number of accesses decreases, increasing privacy.  
– Technology visibility. Understandable cues of personal data collection in-
crease privacy by enabling knowledge (thus supporting informed consent 
dynamics and self-restraint). 
– Preexisting understanding of the used technology and metaphors. Cul-
tural baggage can reinforce or interfere with the understanding of technol-
ogy’s properties and operation. 
In step 2, the identified characteristics must be described by indicating their vari-
ability range, and whether there are relationships amongst them (e.g., design tradeoffs, 
cost tradeoffs, or external bounds). Clearly, design characteristics are not always amena-
ble to such a reduction; although a quantitative description of design features simplifies 
the subsequent proportionality arguments, the design r must be prepared to consider 
more complex, or non-quantifiable, characteristics. It hould however at least be possible 
to determine the bounds of the design space.  
In step 3, the designer must select which characteristics and values are critical to 
the success of the application: what characteristics are hard as opposed to soft require-
ments. Similarly in step 4, the relationship between d sign characteristics, their values 
and the privacy burden to all involved stakeholders is evaluated. These determinations 
can be reached through a vast mix of design tools, provided that an adequate rationale is 
provided. The confidence that these tools provide is key to the adequacy process at this 
stage. Deployment, usability studies, interviews and alytic tools provide the firmest 
grounds to determine appropriate ranges for design variables. However, any design proc-
ess is permeated by countless decisions made by the designer which cannot all be conclu-
sively accounted for. What the proportionality method calls for is that these judgments be 
made explicit and used as afforded by the value of and confidence in the supporting evi-
dence. 
Finally, in step 5, these assessments are compared, nd individual proportionality 
judgments are made for each variable. The determination of a compromise in the design 
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space constitutes the kernel of the design method. Various techniques can be used for 
making such determinations, e.g., requirements negotiation models such as WinWin [36]. 
For simplicity, I do not discuss how to manage mutual effects between individual ade-
quacy judgments. There are several possible options in case the ranges identified in steps 
3 and 4 clash.  
– It might be necessary to decrease the success requirements of step 3.  
– The designer might reconsider privacy goals identified in step 4 (by yield-
ing to the other party’s interests).  
– It might be possible to reconsider any specific application goal that is 
bound to requirements that cannot be satisfied (in extreme cases, the de-
signer might resort to abandoning the specific application altogether).  
– The designer may choose a different technology for meeting the same ap-
plication goals.  
The case studies below illustrate both cases in which requirement negotiation was 
straightforward, and cases in which reaching a compr ise required to modify success or 
privacy requirements.  
4.3 Examples of Applying the Proportionality Method 
The aim of this work is that of developing design guidance for the development of 
ubicomp systems and applications. To achieve this goal, reference to working applica-
tions is essential. Over the course of the past two years, I studied several ubicomp sys-
tems, both developed at this Institute and externally. These systems include the Personal 
Audio Loop, a personal, portable, audio memory aid device [87] and Reno, a peer-to-peer 
mobile, location enhanced messaging application [51, 99, 158].  
These case studies were selected for several reasons. B th applications are likely 
to expose security, privacy and control issues of interest because they are based on the 
collection and use of personal information. In both cases, the collection and disclosure of 
information can occur without explicit interaction r oversight. 
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Moreover, these applications originate from needs and goals that are independent 
of this work, and thus provide a more realistic test bed for the design method.34 In both 
cases, I was able to influence the design of the system based on considerations originat-
ing from the proportionality method during subsequent design iterations.  
The ability to study exogenous projects enables access to a very large design 
scope. In particular, deployment-quality software requires significant resources, which 
only the collaboration of large research and development teams can provide. This model 
results in increased efficiency, as I concentrate only n the specific aspects of interest 
(privacy, security, and the design method). In the Personal Audio Loop study, software 
development and execution of user studies were in large part performed by others. Reno 
was largely developed by a team of programmers at Intel Research.  
The two case studies also target different user groups. The Personal Audio Loop 
is a personal, portable device that records rich information (audio conversations) for a 
short period of time; it impinges principally on the privacy of the secondary stakeholders 
of the application. The Personal Audio Loop is an example of capture and access ys-
tems, which are at the base of many ubicomp applications [169].  
Reno is a personal location disclosure application targeted at small social groups 
that handles semantically dense information (the user’s location). It is a peer-to-peer mes-
saging application, in which information is not captured and stored, but can be transmit-
ted to other individuals. 
                                                
 
 
34 The Personal Audio Loop originated from an idea by Truong and Abowd, and was de-
veloped and evaluated through a collaborative effort involving Hayes, Patel, Kientz, 
Farmer and me. Reno was a design originally proposed by Smith, Consolvo and others at 




4.3.1 Personal Audio Loop 
I describe here how the proportionality method aided the development of the Per-
sonal Audio Loop (PAL), a personal, portable, audio memory aid device. An overview of 
the design process is available elsewhere [87, 101]. The main characteristics of this 
application and case study are the following:  
– PAL is a personal and portable capture and access applic tion. 
– PAL may impinge on the privacy of secondary stakeholders (the conversa-
tion partners of the user and unrelated passersby), leading to adjudication 
issues. 
– The proportionality method helped identify further r search questions, and 
provided guidance at specific moments during design. 
4.3.1.1 Design 
PAL was motivated by the everyday experience of conversational breakdowns, as 
people try to remember something that was said in the recent past, such as the topic of a 
conversation before being interrupted, or a name or number briefly heard in situations of 
high cognitive load. The device (Figure 4.3) allows the user to replay, at any moment in 
time, any sound that was heard in the recent past, up to a defined maximum time span, or 
buffer length (for example, up to 1 hour in the past). Sound is stored in a circular buffer: 
audio older than the buffer length is overwritten automatically and cannot be replayed. 
PAL is integrated onto a cell phone, but the device only records sound from the environ-
ment, and not phone conversations. Users can replay recordings, rewind and fast forward 
through them or jump to bookmarked positions (“earmarks”). The stored audio can be 
heard either through the loudspeaker on the phone, or through the external speaker/mike. 
When the device is recording, a red LED lights up on the front of the phone casing. 
4.3.1.2 Analysis 
Our own experience and informal conversations with ot ers suggested that this 
service could be helpful in numerous everyday situations to various categories of users, 
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such as busy professionals. The designers were also acutely aware of the potential con-
cerns people could raise, knowing that a device was con tantly recording their conversa-
tions. 
We thus set out to analytically study how the service would be used and its poten-
tial adoption issues through 1) a laboratory study to probe interface usability, 2) a diary 
study targeted at understanding why, when and how people would find PAL useful, fol-
lowed by interviews and targeted surveys, 3) a legal survey, 4) a deployment over several 
weeks and 5) a survey of communication partners’ reactions.  
While I am not in the position of providing legal opinions on this design, I men-
tion that a preliminary assessment found that PAL falls into a gray area of EU data pro-
tection law (Directive 95/46/EC), and might comply with it given a favorable DPA opin-
ion, whereas strict interpretation of surveillance and wiretapping legislation in states of 
the US with “two-party consent” (i.e., all parties present at a recording must consent) 
might directly challenge the application’s legality. Clearly, these results are inconclusive: 
to reach more reliable assessment of the acceptability of PAL, information from more 
focused user studies is necessary, as discussed below. Specifically, legal analysis sug-
gested to focus on notification mechanisms and on expectations of privacy. 
         
(Figure by S. Patel). 
 




In the following analysis, I adopt a utilitarian (as opposed to principle-driven) 
stance towards design [164]. Moreover, I assume that the implementation is trusted, i.e., 
that the implementation addresses standard security issues such as tampering with appli-
cation code or installing unauthorized software. 
Desirability 
This analysis was approached at two levels: the usefulness of the memory aid was 
assessed by deploying a diary study; these results were confirmed during a brief deploy-
ment. The diary study results suggested that participants would use the application often 
(avg. 3.5 times per week) and for relevant purposes (the top three being to remember for-
gotten details of conversations, replaying conversations to their conversation partners, 
and recovering the topic of a conversation after an interruption), with a significant and 
positive effect on their daily activities.  
The deployment of four PAL prototypes confirmed that p rticipants used PAL 
approximately as often as they had indicated in the diary study. Moreover, they reported 
adopting self-regulating behaviors (e.g., disabling the device in specific circumstances.) 
Questions were raised during early design regarding the burden imposed on con-
versation partners and third parties; during deployment, in most cases, conversation part-
ners did not object to the use of PAL after the user explained its purpose and characteris-
tics (i.e., the limited retention time). However, users also reported not always informing 
conversation partners of the presence of PAL, to avoid explaining its features repeatedly. 
In some social settings, they both avoided mentioning and using the device altogether, or 
they turned it off spontaneously, while in other cases they used it but did not discuss it.  
Users may adopt reasonable self-regulating behaviors with regard to their conver-
sation partners’ privacy. However, the small scale of the deployment left open two fun-
damental questions of adjudication raised by the desirability and appropriateness analyses 
of the proportionality method. The first question relates to whose interests should prevail. 
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The primary stakeholder (the user) of the application may have a legitimate interest in 
using PAL, for example due to a memory dysfunction or simply because of cognitive 
stress imposed by his or her occupation. This interes  may be opposed to that of secon-
dary stakeholders or third parties (who might not want to be recorded, even if only tem-
porarily). The second adjudication question relates to the proportion of individuals op-
posed to the application. If only a small minority of secondary stakeholders and third par-
ties oppose PAL and the vast majority does not care, should we yield to the contrary mi-
nority and curtail a large market potential?  
In this case, to make any such determination we needed to understand to what de-
gree, and in what situations secondary stakeholders are most likely to object to the use of 
a device that can potentially cause the recording of their conversations (i.e., are objec-
tions unqualified or do they depend on the location, on the topic, on the identity of the 
conversation partner, or on the perceived confidentality of the conversation?) 
Limitations of the prototypes prevented us from thoroughly investigating these 
questions through a long-term deployment that may have provided strong qualitative and 
quantitative evidence. Therefore, we organized an eve t-contingent Experience Sampling 
Method (ESM)35 study to probe this question, in which three investigators asked all their 
conversation partners, during the course of their daily activities, to imagine that the inves-
tigator had been using PAL, and to state their opini n and feelings about this use [101]. 
This study was called the PAL Proxy study. In the PAL Proxy study, human ‘proxies’ (of 
the researchers) administered short questionnaires to the people with whom they talked 
during their ordinary daily activities. The questionnaires asked conversation partners to 
                                                
 
 
35 Experience Sampling is a self-reported inquiry technique, that has been used within 
behaviorism, medicine, and industrial psychology starting in the 1960’s [181]. There are 
many variations, but the basic idea is that a participant is asked to keep track of his or her 
feelings or behaviors, at specific times, normally during a time span of days to weeks. 
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suppose that  the ‘proxies’ had been using PAL in the preceding conversation, and to re-
spond to a short set of Likert questions on the acceptability of the application from their 
points of view. The questionnaires could be completed instantly or mailed to the investi-
gators later (see Figure 6.2 for a photograph of the Proxy questionnaire). 
The participants of that study expressed a desire to b  informed and asked permis-
sion before using PAL. Yet, in most cases, they report d not being likely to ask the user 
to erase the recording after the fact. I concluded that PAL would pass a desirability judg-
ment, if the user had a need for a memory aid, the setting of use could sustain the residual 
risk of misuse, and, most important, if the secondary stakeholders had sufficient aware-
ness of this application. 
Appropriateness 
I claim that the proposed technical solution (i.e., open mike audio recording on 
mobile device) is the most cost-effective. I considered alternatives such as: 
– installing microphones in the environment and transmitting digital audio 
wirelessly for recording on devices worn on the user’s body and  
– fully infrastructural, off-body, recording and storage.  
Furthermore, continuous operation is necessary becaus  PAL, as a memory aid, is 
useful exactly when one does not expect it; if the us r had to trigger the recording inten-
tionally, then PAL would not be any different from a pocket tape recorder, and it would 
not provide the unique benefit that users found so compelling. 
The application is not modifiable by the user and does not allow the storage of the 
recording past the buffer length time. During deployment, we discovered that users had 
found a way around the retention time limitation by indefinitely pausing the recording. 
This emergent use showed that the users had a strong need for a audio notepad, in addi-
tion to a memory aid; however, consistent with the proportionality assessment, I asked 
that this re-purposing feature be removed from the final version of the device. We also 
discovered that participants were using PAL to relay information between different con-
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versation partners, and for proving points in discus ion (e.g., “you said that…”); in my 
opinion, these unexpected and potentially disruptive uses could be curbed by a combina-
tion of social pressure and retention time reduction. These observations in my view con-
firm that real-world evaluation of ubicomp technologies within a cyclic development 
process is indispensable for controlling emergent or co-evolved behaviors, on legal and 
ethical grounds. 
A technical analysis aimed at finding alternatives for reducing the burden on con-
versation partners’ privacy did not provide any furthe  solutions. In addition, I did not 
find a way, with a comparable cost and effort, of achieving the same application goals 
without employing a technological solution. 
In summary, I assessed that the selected technical solution would be appropriate 
for meeting application goals, although our observations raised the issue of trust between 
the user and his or her conversation partner with respect to an invisible technology. 
Adequacy 
A list of relevant interface affordances and information policies was derived 
through iterative analysis by three expert designers (see Figure 4.4). 
For each feature, I identified acceptable design ranges according to steps 3 and 4 
in the adequacy process (see Table 4.1 and Figure 4.2), along with the affected stake-
holder and a justification. The table shows the compro ise reached between the success 
criteria and stakeholders’ privacy concerns, and is the outcome of design iterations aimed 
at justifying a value for each variable. Italic font is used to indicate the relevant stake-
holder. Justifications are provided in parentheses. Some features can be adjusted within 
constraints (e.g., feature 1), while others are fixed due to the limitations of the selected 
technology (e.g., feature 3). Moreover, features can be expressed in different ways: mi-
crophone range can be measured in meters, but for this purpose it is more helpful to use 
 
 92 
proxemics categories (i.e., intimate, personal, social, public [84]) or to refer nce human 
sound perception. 
This analysis raised a fundamental question of contextualization, which is a gen-
eral problem for technologies operating in an automatic fashion. The question is whether 
and how the social and technical environment can affect the use of the application. If dif-
ferent privacy requirements could be associated to specific circumstances (e.g., when 
driving alone), and at least part of these circumstances could be detected by a recogniz-
able context, this could bring about significant design implications, as suggested by the 
work of Hong and Landay [91]. This observation led to investigating what application 
parameters (e.g., retention time) we could adjust to meet a compromise between the in-






1. Microphone range; expressed as a spherical space whi h can be modulated in continuous manner 
(characterization is indicated in short form below). 
2. Buffer length and retention time (in PAL the two variables are joined); continuous variable, in 
time units. 
3. Access and browsing facilities; selection of (tape-like browsing, skimming, i.e., replaying at 
faster speed). 
4. Audio output channel; selection of (headphone, external loudspeaker). 
5. Ability to set “bookmarks” at significant moments in time to facilitate search; selection of (yes, 
no). 
6. Permanent audio storage; selection of (yes, no). 
7. Activity notification cue to the conversation partner; selection of (visual, audio, none). 
8. Placement of the microphone relative to the user; selection of (any location where the device can 
be attached to the body or clothing, or headset connected to device; headset in clothing or ap-
parel). 
9. Appearance of the mobile device; selection of (any mobile recording device). 






Table 4.1: PAL Adequacy Analysis. 
Feature Critical success range (step 3) Privacy desirable range (step 4) 
1  
mic. range 
arm’s length, i.e., approx. 1m (from 
diary study and deployment) 
conversation partners and unrelated individuals: 





10min – 1hr (from diary study and 
diary study participants survey) 
conversation partners: 15min (the experience sam-
pling privacy survey suggested that re ention time 
could be much longer, up to a week or more) 
primary user: 1hr (designers’ choice: this time is 
sufficiently short to reduce risk of abuse in case of 




tape recorder-like browsing (lab user 
study and deployment show that 
skimming is impractical due to de-
vice performance limits, that brows-
ing is efficient enough and that there 
is no desire for visual search) 
conversation partners: tape-like browsing (this is a 
designers’ choice: tape-like browsing is the method 
that requires most effort to access stored informa-
tion. By increasing access cost, access is reduced, to 




headphone and external loudspeaker 
(this is a forced choice: technical 
limitations do not permit to block 
headphone use with PAL) 
conversation partners: only external loudspeaker 
for sound output; this increases visibility and thus 
participation and enables consent dynamics.  
primary user: headphone or external loudspeaker 
(the user wants to listen without other people over-
hearing the recording) 
5  
bookmarks 
no (deployment shows that book-
marks are not essential for using the 
application) 
conversation partners: no (designers’ choice: 
bookmarks would allow users to access stored in-




no (deployment shows that users use 
the application even without perma-
nent recording features) 
conversation partners and unrelated individuals: no 
(designers’ choice: allowing permanent archival 




visual (this is a non-intrusive cue, 
and it has been shown to be accept-
able by users during the deployment) 
conversation partners: visual (this is designers’ 
choice which has not been verified with an actual 
user study. However, designers assume that an 




speakerphone microphone and cell 
phone unit worn on belt clip (this is 
one of numerous locations used by 
participants in the deployment of the 
device) 
conversation partners: in a visible position (this is a 
designers’ choice not verified with an actual study. 
As with feature 7, the visibility of the device is sup-




cell phone (device must be mobile, 
and users do not want to carry an 
extra device) 
conversation partners: audio recorder (cell phones 
are not associated to recording functions);  
deployment condition: the user is ultimately respon-






In the Proxy study mentioned above, we asked participants to indicate for how 
long they would allow the user of PAL to retain the conversation’s recording (i.e., to es-
timate its retention time). Participants stated that they would allow the usr of PAL to re-
tain their conversations for much longer than we had expected (“at most one week” or “as 
long as they need it” in most cases). However, theystrongly asserted their desires to be 
asked permission before the user replayed the conversation to another person or copied it 
to another recording device. These results suggest that the participants did not express 
their concerns and needs in terms of retention time, but rather that the focus was on mis-
use and social appropriateness. In this case, a straightforward, quantitative “balancing” of 
retention time might not represent an acceptable solution. 
4.3.1.3 Policy and Management Provisions 
A variety of security management options can be adopted by the manufacturers or 
service providers of PAL. I consider three such options: increasing knowledge about the 
application36, limiting use to specific user groups and deciding not to market the applica-
tion. 
Previous research has suggested that the use of privacy-invasive technologies, es-
pecially between individuals, fits within a boundary negotiation process [143]. This nego-
tiation does not need to be explicit, but may take the form of self-restraint, and is mean-
ingful only if all individuals are aware and knowledgeable of the device. Consider feature 
9: on the one hand, PAL users do not want to carry extra devices; on the other hand, cell 
phones are not usually associated with audio recording. The case is similar to the recent 
appearance of “camera-phones.” Unable to reach a compromise over this design variable, 
                                                
 
 
36 This mirrors one of Altman’s conclusions in the book The Environment and Social 
Behavior [20, p. 213]. This point also affects the legal test of “technology in common 
use” adopted by the US Supreme Court in the Kyllo case. 
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I derived a deployment condition from feature 9 (“the user is ultimately responsible for 
its appropriate use”) that should be assessed throug  s mmative evaluation. 
A second option for reducing the potential negative implications of applications 
such as PAL is that of limiting its use to certain categories of users. Given that PAL may 
be mostly useful for people with memory disabilities, a certification of such disability 
might be required for acquiring and using this application. While this happens with nu-
merous other technologies (e.g., operating vehicles) the administrative costs imposed by a 
licensing scheme would most probably be excessive, in r lation to the potential harm that 
this application may pose, and the profits generated. 
Finally, manufacturers may opt not to deploy certain pplications at all, in an ef-
fort to reduce liability risks. In the case of PAL, this choice may be exceedingly precau-
tious, given that audio recording devices are readily available, which are much more in-
vasive than PAL. 
4.3.1.4 Contribution of the Proportionality Method 
The proportionality method benefited the analysis of PAL in four ways. First, it 
provided a reasoned basis for discussing a very controversial application. Applying the 
proportionality design method to this application allowed us to formulate a solid argu-
ment in favor of the usefulness and acceptability of PAL, given specific safeguards and 
conditions on its use (i.e., public awareness and strong need). This result was not granted 
from the beginning: the initial proposal for this application was met with much skepti-
cism by other researchers, both regarding its legality nd user acceptance. 
Second, the proportionality method offered a detaild analysis of application ac-
ceptability in the absence of regulatory guidance. Legal analysis was prompted in the 
quest for answers to issues raised during design. Legal analysis, while failing to provide 
conclusive guidance, indicated potential pitfalls and liability concerns for this application. 
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Third, it gave an indication of what research steps to conduct further. After the 
initial evaluation, a specific study evaluating the acceptability of PAL by conversation 
partners was performed (the PAL Proxy study mentioned above).  
Fourth, the proportionality assessment did influence the definition of application 
requirements (such as buffer length, or the need for a visible indicator light) and indicated 
how designers should react to unexpected adoption eve ts, such as the case of the users 
finding a way to extend the retention time: that feature was removed from the design as it 
was deemed incompatible with the assumptions justifying the proportionality argument. 
4.3.2 Reno 
In this section, I present an analysis of Reno according to the proportionality 
method. The characteristics of Reno are the following: 
– Reno is a symmetric, peer-to-peer application; 
– Reno is a social mobile application, designed for small social groups; 
– Reno has an intentional control structure (except for the automatic func-
tions). 
Specific decisions regarding the design of Reno and the questions to probe with 
the user study were driven by the considerations of desirability, appropriateness and ade-
quacy. These decision points are highlighted below. 
4.3.2.1 Design 
Reno is a location-enhanced application that allows the user to request the loca-
tion of other users and to reveal his/her location o them. The application runs on Nokia 
6600 phones. Before using Reno to disclose a location, the user must define place names 
(e.g., “School” or “Home”) and assign them to physical locations. When a place name is 
defined by the user, it is associated with the current location, sensed using cell tower 
connection patterns, similar to the technique described by Laasonen et al. [115]. The pro-
gram will offer the name each time the user subsequently visits that location, to relieve 
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the user from typing it again. When sending a locati n, either as a reply to a request or by 
the user’s initiative, Reno offers a selection of nearby place names, as computed by the 
location algorithm. Reno also provides a customized, pre-defined list of activities that 
may be used instead of place names for replying to messages as a fallback option (in the 
figure: “Driving,” “Shopping,” “Relaxing”). As a privacy-enhancing feature, the physical 
location (cell tower) of the user is never sent by Reno: only the user-defined place name 
is sent (Figure 4.5). 
Reno has two automated features: the Instant Reply List and Waypoints. The for-
mer causes Reno to reply automatically with the current most likely location to any re-
quest coming from a person on the Instant Reply List (a user-defined list). If the location 
is undetermined, Reno transmits “Unknown Location.”  
Waypoints cause Reno to trigger a location disclosure when the user enters a spe-
cific, pre-defined location. To set up a Waypoint the user must indicate both the location 
of interest (e.g., “Office”) and the recipient of the message (e.g., “Bob”). Each time Reno 
senses that the user arrives at the “Office,” it will send a notification to “Bob.” To avoid 
bursts of messages when the user briefly leaves and returns to the same location, there is 
 
(Drawing by K. Truong) 
Figure 4.5: Usage Scenario for Reno. 
The application presents a list of likely locations and a static list of activities when reply-





a two-hour timeout. Users can view a list of how many times Reno disclosed their loca-
tion automatically using an audit tool called the Activity Report. 
Reno uses SMS messages to communicate. The messages consist of two parts: a 
human-readable sentence, followed by compressed information, a checksum and a 
‘magic’ string used for message recognition. Human-readable messages increase the op-
portunities for using the application with people not using the software. 
4.3.2.2 Analysis 
The requirements analysis of Reno exposes information management issues typi-
cal of the management of personal privacy, which were identified early by the designers 
of the application. These include: 
– prevent unauthorized parties from obtaining users’ location information; 
– prevent the disclosure when the user is in certain locations (e.g., locations 
that are ‘undesirable’); 
– prevent disclosure under other conditions (e.g., time of day, frequency of 
requests); 
– avoid disturbing the user with disruptive messages; 
– limit the management burden of configuring and auditing automatic func-
tions. 
These privacy goals were considered during the design and evaluation of Reno. 
The design alternated two design cycles with three user studies: an Experience Sampling 
Method (ESM) study, a pilot study and a longer deployment with external users. 
The ESM study was performed prior to the design of a first version of the applica-
tion. The goal of that study was to understand to wh m people were willing to disclose 
their locations and at what levels of detail [51]. Participants shared different levels of de-
tail about where they were, based on: who was asking, what the participant was doing, 
and why they thought the requester wanted to know. Furthermore, they did not ‘blur’ 
their locations (i.e., share a level of detail that is true but vague, sch as the city name in-
stead of the street address) in an effort to protect their privacy. And finally, participants 
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expressed a need to be able, on occasion, to “stretch the truth” about their locations, for 
various reasons. All these findings suggested to allow user-selected names for location, 
instead of geographical coordinates.  
Following that study, an initial application prototype was developed and a short 
pilot study was conducted with the same researchers to inquire the usage patterns of the 
application [158]. The prototype used in this pilot study did not include the Instant Reply 
List and Activity Report features described above, but did include Waypoints. Partici-
pants used location as a proxy for many other things (i.e., revealing location information 
carries contextual knowledge, regarding the person’s activity, plans and movements). So, 
in the second design of the application, I suggested introducing the ability of sending an 
activity (e.g., “driving”) instead of a location. This feature has repercussions on informa-
tion control and privacy. Also, automatic features, if they are employed at all, must be 
designed very carefully (the Waypoints in this version of Reno suffered from excessive 
false positives).  
With the experience gained from the pilot study on h w participants used location 
to communicate plans and activities, I structured a second deployment to address the pri-
vacy questions raised by the proportionality method. The version of Reno used in the 
second study incorporated all the automatic features described above, including the In-
stant Reply List and the Activity Report (the audit system for the automatic functions). 
Proportionality suggested probing two issues of relevance:37 
– Given that the purpose of automatic features (Waypoints and Instant Re-
plies) is to minimize disruption and management burden, what is the de-
sign balance with the loss of control ensued by these f atures? 
                                                
 
 
37 These two research questions were chosen as the result of an iterative selection proc-
ess, from a dozen issues of relevance, and a shortli t f four (management burden; per-
formance of automatic disclosure mechanisms; support for plausible deniability and de-
ception dynamics; use of Reno as a tool enabling high-level activities.) [95] 
 
 100 
– Is the documented need to tailor location disclosure  (and potentially de-
ceive) supported by the application [54, 85]? 
This deployment involved two groups of teenage and dult participants. These us-
ers were selected to expose potential tensions between practical dependence and aspiring 
independence of teens in relation to their parents [109, 113]. I identified three stake-
holders in this application: the disclosing party or user, who operates Reno to disclose his 
or her location; the requesting party, and the locati n service provider (I ignored the tele-
communications operator in this analysis). 
Desirability 
Assessing the desirability of this application rests on the observation of similar 
applications already in the marketplace, such as AT&T Find People Nearby [24] and 
Dodgeball [4], as well as market research data [165] suggesting that people find this kind 
of application useful. These systems are already in use, so privacy risks are not so grave 
as to prevent deploying the application, contrary to the PAL case. Existing applications 
attest to the application’s purpose (i.e., being able to ask others for their geographical lo-
cation). In addition, experimental data collected in the three stages of this study allows us 
to make some stronger claims about the usefulness and privacy concerns. 
Although the ESM study was not planned following the proportionality method, 
the research questions addressed within that study allowed the researchers to gather valu-
able information for making an argument about the us f lness of a location disclosure 
application. Specifically, the questions of how people decide whether to disclose their 
location, and what to disclose relate to the needs of the disclosing party (see Table 4.2). 
The question about the usefulness of the application to the requesting party was ad-
dressed in the study by asking participants, in a subset of the ESM samples, whether they 
would have liked to know others’ locations at that moment. These results should be taken 
with caution, since the simulated requests were not initiated by the user and lacked social 
consequence, but they constitute an indication of the times the users might have used the 
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system for requesting other’s locations. Such indication was confirmed during deploy-
ment. 
Evidence from the ESM study supports the desirability of this application, as long 
as the user is informed that location information is being collected and disclosed about 
him/her. Clearly, this condition directly pertains to the issue of automatic disclosures, as 
discussed below.  
Appropriateness 
Recall that the appropriateness stage requires to assessment whether a specific 
technological implementation meets the best compromise of cost, privacy and security 
risks and performance, whether it can be misused and if the same application can be ac-
complished without the technology. There are several ways location information can be 
communicated between individuals.  
The purpose of Reno is to lower the cost of revealing location in a mobile setting, 
streamlining communication. The version of Reno described above is a peer-to-peer sys-
tem using cell phones that communicates via SMS messages. An alternative option is a 
Table 4.2: Reno ESM study research questions and mapping with legitimacy. 
Proportionality ESM Research Questions ESM Results 
What are the needs of the 
disclosing party? 
Do people want to disclose their 
location? 
How do people decide whether to 
disclose their location? 
What do people want to share 
about their location? 
Yes 
 
Users decide based on who is asking, 
and the reason for the request. 
Users disclose either the most useful 
information or nothing. 
What are the needs of the 
requesting party?  
Do participants want to know 
about the location of others? 
Participants would have liked to know 
another person’s location approx. 1.6 
times a day. (They were asked this 




server-based system that uses cell phones as terminals (AT&T Find Friends and Dodge-
ball are both in this category, although with different architectures); this introduces, how-
ever, a third stakeholder with potential multilaterl security implications.38 Yet another 
option would be to use a different location or communication technology altogether, 
similar to child-tracking devices that use GPS and operate without control by the user; 
this kind of surveillance however was deemed too invasive and costly. Overall, Reno’s 
peer-to-peer architecture seems to provide a good security compromise. A second issue is 
whether to disclose the user’s location automatically, without his or her knowledge. To 
answer this question, I specifically designed the third user study to probe whether auto-
matic disclosures are acceptable and can be used with audit mechanisms to curtail misuse 
of location information. These participants did not display a strong need for automatic 
functions, and this induced us to question the need of automatic disclosures. 
Message traffic between mobile phones could be intercepted by eavesdroppers 
and telecommunication providers. Based on mainstream security assessments, I assume 
this risk to be low; telecommunication providers are considered trusted for the purpose of 
this application, given specific legislation protecting the confidentiality of communica-
tions. The software used to generate and transmit the location descriptions runs on the 
user’s phone and is always under his/her physical control. Also in this case, I assumed a 
                                                
 
 
38 The question is whether service providers need to process or retain records of the loca-
tion information of users of a system like Reno. In this case, thanks to the great interest in 
Location-Based Services (LBS) in the past few years, legislation provides strong guid-
ance. EU Directive 2002/58  permits storing the user’s location only if the information is 
necessary for providing specific services to the usr [3, §9], and requires informed con-
sent. In the US, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) [8] and FCC regula-
tion requires informed consent for the disclosure of location information to third parties 
and for its use for value-added services [64]. Therefore, if location information is man-
aged by the service provider, informed consent and specific security safeguards are re-
quired in both major markets. The peer-to-peer archite ture of Reno reduces data protec-
tion and management costs for the service provider. 
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reasonably trusted software implementation. Reno could be abused by third parties who 
repeatedly query the user’s location, with the objectiv  of “stalking” him or her. This 
concern might be especially problematic in the case the disclosing party feels compelled 
to reply due to social pressure (.g., the requesting party exerts some form of social au-
thority). However, in our deployment, participants indicated that they would expect oth-
ers to conform to self-regulating social practice in requesting locations, especially be-
cause requests would be visible to the disclosing party, and did not express such concern. 
Currently, individuals communicate their locations while mobile by phone or 
SMS. Reno is intended to replace potentially lengthy and disruptive phone calls, and 
hard-to-type SMS messages. Non-technical solutions  this application problem were not 
identified. Technical alternatives included SMS templates. However, templates are much 
more cumbersome than Reno because the user would have to type the location manually. 
Concluding, a peer-to-peer system that operates with the knowledge of the disclosing 
party seems to provide a reasonable compromise. 
1. Visibility of location requests in Reno’s main screen; selection of: (visible, non visible). 
2. Instant Replies, i.e., Reno responds automatically to requests; selection of: (implemented, not imple-
mented). 
3. Restriction of Instant Reply to specific individuals; selection of: (none, buddy list). 
4. Waypoints; selection of: (implemented, not implemented). 
5. Configurability of IRL, based on selection of: (location, time of day, date, none). 
6. Configurability of Waypoints, based on: selection of: (time of day, date, none). 
7. Are instant replies are sent from locations thatare not labeled; selection of: (do nothing, send a message 
with “Unknown Location”). 
8. Where to put audit information about disclosures R no sent automatically; selection of: (main screen, 
separate screen, none). 
9. Type of location information transmitted; selection of: (geographical coordinates, urban coordinates, 
user-defined label, centrally defined label). 
10. Ability of transmitting activity as well as location; selection of: (yes, no). 




Table 4.3: Reno adequacy analysis. 




disclosing party: no constraint (the de-
ployment suggests that the amount of 
requests visible on main screen is not 
excessive) 




disclosing party: not implemented 
requesting party: not implemented (de-
ployment participants indicated lack of 
confidence in automatically disclosed 
information) 
disclosing party: not implemented (automatic 





disclosing party: no constraint (see vari-
able 2)   
disclosing party: yes (designers’ choice—avoid 
risk of unauthorized disclosure) 
4  
waypoints 
disclosing party: not implemented (de-
ployment participants did not indicate 
strong need for, nor confidence in, way-
points) 
disclosing party: not implemented (deployment 
participants indicated that the waypoint feature 
might result in unintended disclosures, and 




disclosing party: no constraint (see vari-
able 2)   
disclosing party: time-of-day, location (this is a 
designers’ choice: this configuration options 




disclosing party: no constraint (see vari-
able 2)   
disclosing party: time-of-day (this is a design-
ers’ choice: this configuration option increases 






requesting party: yes (this is a designers’ 
choice: providing a message in unknown 
locations would improve the disclosing 
party’s visibility and perceived reliabil-
ity of the application) 
disclosing party: no (this is a designers’ choice: 





disclosing party: separate screen (this is 
a designer’s choice: this information 
may clutter the application main screen) 
disclosing party: main screen (deployment par-






disclosing party: no constraint 
requesting party: no constraint 
disclosing party: user controlled label (deploy-
ment suggests that participants liked the freedom 




disclosing party: yes (deployment study 
participants reported that it was useful to 
communicate their activity instead of 
their locations) 
requesting party: no constraint 
(this is a designers’ choice) 
disclosing party: yes (deployment study partici-
pants suggested that more flexibility supports 







The design features impacting the privacy of Reno’s disclosing party emerged 
during the design process, in the form of decisions we had to make during design (see 
Figure 4.6). In a similar fashion to the discussion of the Personal Audio Loop, acceptable 
design ranges according to steps 3 and 4 in the adequ cy process were identified (Table 
4.3). The stakeholder are indicated in italics and the related justifications are in parenthe-
ses. It should be noted that design features 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8 became irrelevant once a de-
termination was made to forego automatic functions. 
4.3.2.3 Contribution of the Proportionality Method 
The application of the proportionality method resulted in two significant contribu-
tions and highlighted potential challenges. First, it suggested research questions probing 
the acceptability of automatic disclosures and whether he application could be used in 
dynamics of denial and deception. Although proportionality suggested to probe these 
questions, the outcomes of the study did not coincide with our expected hypotheses. Re-
garding the first question, we had hypothesized that participants would have managed to 
handle well the automatic features. Instead, these participants indicated that automatic 
functions were in fact not very useful to them. Although participants did not cite privacy 
as the primary concern affecting their need of the automatic functions, the results tipped 
the balance of usefulness and privacy towards the prot ction of privacy. The second ques-
tion we probed, that deception and denial practices could occur with this application, was 
supported by direct observations made during the deployment and by evidence that par-
ticipants would have been able to exercise plausible deniability if necessary. These find-
ings provided solid grounds for increasing control over location disclosure and preserving 
the abilities of users to label their own locations. Thus, specific design and evaluation de-
cisions were made within the proportionality process. The development of social mobile 
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applications at Intel Research has continued with a map-based version of the application 
[100]. 
Second, this case study showed that even in cases in which the method is applied 
late in the development process of an application, it still can be valuable. I entered the 
project after the second study, and proposed several suggestions both for the application 
design and for future evaluation steps. I integrated evidence gathered by user studies that 
were not planned as part of the proportionality design method. I used evidence from those 
studies to argue about user needs and drive successive evaluation and design. Thus, it is 
not necessary to plan an entire process according to the proportionality method; data al-
ready collected can be integrated into an assessment according to the proportionality 
method, along with information collected for that specific purpose.  
Deciding what application should be the target of the evaluation with the propor-
tionality method is a challenge tightly connected with the relationship of summative and 
formative evaluation in exploratory design. There atwo methods to select an applica-
tion target of an evaluation. The first method is to select the broadest option that supports 
the application goals; this should be used for exploratory designs. In the case of Reno, 
this would have described the application as a locati n-enhanced messaging system, 
without further constraints. The second method of selecting technologies is that of select-
ing one specific design, as was done in this case. For example, I described Reno as an 
application that can automatically respond to others’ with the user’s location and that en-
ables users to define and label their location (as opposed to sending geographical coordi-
nates). This more detailed description of the application allows designers to reach more 
precise assessments, but constrains the design space (i.e., the scope of the appropriateness 
judgment). 
Finally, this case study also hinted at the potential limits of interpreting design as 
a tradeoff between burden on privacy and application benefits. While such tradeoff is 
typical of legal and policy analysis, it does not fit well for applications, like messaging 
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systems, based on intentional interaction. For example, while the automatic features in 
Reno can be analyzed using a benefits/burden approach, the effects on interpersonal 
communication (including privacy and security) of other design features such as the sub-
jective labeling scheme of locations are not so quite straightforward to evaluate using 
simply benefits and burden.  
4.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I introduced the principle of proportionality and the design method 
I developed from the principle, to aid the analysis of security and privacy issues in ubi-
comp applications within a user-centered approach. I showed how the proportionality 
method has been used for analyzing two different applications, and how it contributed by 
leading the designer to further evaluation question, specific design choices and the 
evaluation of broad alternatives. An obvious question at this point is whether the propor-
tionality method helped the analysis of these applications or whether the determining fac-
tors were the knowledge and experience of the person applying it, i.e., me. I investigate 


























THE DESIGN METHOD EVALUATION 
 
The experience gained in the two case studies of Chapter 4 suggests that the pro-
portionality method may increase the coverage of security and privacy requirements 
analysis and improve overall design quality. To understand whether the design method is 
usable by others and whether it provides an actual benefit in terms of design quality, I 
tested the method with other designers. The evaluation of the method’s performance 
sheds some light on these questions, and shows where research in this field might pro-
ceed next.  
Evaluating the performance of design methods is inherently imprecise, because, 
even with large pools of participants, it is difficult to control external variables such as 
prior experience and spur-of-the moment insight. Designing artifacts is one of the most 
intellectually challenging and idiosyncratic of activities: the difficulty of proving a design 
methods’ effectiveness and utility may explain in part why these tools rarely enjoy wide-
spread popularity, even in well-established fields.  
Over the past few years, there have been several attempts at creating methods or 
guidelines to addressing the privacy and security of design ubicomp applications. Some 
of these methods have been mentioned previously, including Jiang et al.’s proposal of 
using economic and information theories to modulate flows of personal data [110], Bel-
lotti and Sellen’s framework of feedback and control [31], Hong et al.’s risk analysis 
process for ubicomp [92] and Chung et al.’s set of design patterns for ubicomp [45]. To 
my knowledge, Bellotti and Sellen’s framework has not been formally evaluated in the 
 
 110 
domain of ubicomp, nor has Hong et al.’s.39 Only Chung et al.’s design pre-patterns have 
been evaluated, albeit unsuccessfully. Their design pre-patterns were developed through 
iterative refinement and tested in a design study involving both experienced and inexperi-
enced designers. Among general patterns were also 15 patterns specifically aimed at the 
privacy issues in ubicomp. However, Chung et al. reported that the evaluation partici-
pants did not use the design pre-patterns in any meaningful way to complete the design 
exercises that were proposed. According to these rea chers, this might have happened 
because the proposed patterns were too abstract, privacy issues were not emphasized 
enough in the design exercises’ briefs, and in general because patterns might not be 
suited for addressing non-functional requirements such as privacy [45]. Learning from 
their experience, I attempted to test specific procedural guidelines and to focus on the 
evaluation of privacy and security. 
This Chapter includes the evaluation of the proportionality method, which first 
involved six volunteer graduate students in the Information Security Policy class held at 
this Institute during Spring 2005 (the Pilot Study). Then, a larger-scale evaluation involv-
ing 48 graduate students in the Introduction to HCI class held in Fall 2005 was conducted 
(the Design Method Evaluation Study). In the second evaluation, I chose to evaluate the 
proportionality method against two methods cited above, namely Hong et al.’s Risk 
Analysis and Bellotti and Sellen’s Feedback / Contrl framework. 
5.1 Pilot Study 
The pilot study was performed to evaluate the comprehensibility, usability and 
stability of the proportionality method across designers and to test the evaluation process 
in view of a larger study. The study was conducted with six graduate students. Students 
                                                
 
 
39 J. Hong, personal conversation. 
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were given the option of using the proportionality method for completing a semester-long 
design exercise. They were asked to design a ubiquitous computing application of their 
choice amongst two options. I analyzed their written d liverables using quantitative met-
rics and conducted follow-up interviews. Results suggest that the proportionality method 
is comprehensible and usable by inexperienced design rs. Participants commented that 
the method may help especially in the design of exploratory applications with diverging 
stakeholders, broadening the coverage of the design process and generating stronger ra-
tionales for design decisions. Also, the results suggest that the proportionality method 
may increase the thoroughness of requirements analysis. 
5.1.1 Hypothesis and Experimental Procedure 
The objective of this study was that of verifying the following two hypotheses: 
1. the proportionality method is understandable to andusable by inexperi-
enced designers.  
2. Inexperienced designers reach similar conclusions as experienced design-
ers. Specifically, they identify the same main design issues and reach simi-
lar conclusions on these issues as the expert designer (me). 
I recruited three groups (of two students each) of volunteer Master’s students in 
the CS6725 Information Security Policy class at our institution. I asked these participants 
to perform a design exercise using the proportionalty method as their semester-long pro-
ject assignment for the class. Emails of the descriptions of two projects were sent to the 
whole class, prior to a lecture in which the actual recruitment was made (this material is 
provided in Appendix B). 
During that lecture, I introduced the general domain of ubicomp, its security and 
privacy challenges, described the design method and relevant bibliographic and legisla-
tive resources. The stated project goals were to design (but not implement) their choice 
between two ubicomp applications with known privacy nd security issues. Participating 
students were asked to take on this assignment as their main semester-long project. Par-
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ticipants formed three groups of two individuals. I chose to have small groups instead of 
individuals due to the potentially complex and unfamiliar problem domain and large 
amount of effort necessary to complete the assignments.  
The first proposed project was to design a mobile person finder running on a cell 
phone, similar to the Reno application, discussed in Section 4.3.2. This application allows 
users to ask the location of others and respond to location requests. The application sup-
ports users in meeting, either in person or by phone, assessing the availability of the other 
persons, or coordinating joint activities. The project brief (provided in Appendix B) 
stressed the use of the tool for personal use, as opposed to location systems for commer-
cial settings such as logistics. Students were provided some references to relevant re-
sources, including existing systems such as AT&T Find People Nearby and legislation 
regulating location-enhanced wireless services. Groups 1 and 2 chose this project. 
The second application was a system to record behavioral data (including audio 
and video) of a child in a primary school setting. The system’s purpose is to support 
teachers and other school personnel in recording observations about a child before, dur-
ing and after critical incidents (e.g., escaping the classroom, temper tantrum). This sys-
tem is loosely inspired by a system currently being designed by Hayes et al. [86]. Group 
3 chose this project. 
Each group was asked to design (not to implement) the information management, 
organizational policies and privacy- and security-sensitive aspects of the user interface of 
a system to support the respective application. The groups were asked to justify their 
technical and organizational design choices and to reference legislation, local regulation, 
and other policies as appropriate. In addition, they w re encouraged to follow the propor-
tionality design method for the analysis of security and privacy requirements. I provided 
the participants with the CHI 2005 paper describing the proportionality method [97]. Use 
of the design method was not mandatory; participants were asked to justify their choices 
if they opted not to use the method.  
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Demographic data was collected from participants at the beginning of the study, 
including their experience with requirements engineering techniques, information secu-
rity standards, IT legislation and the general ubicomp domain. 
Participants had approximately two months to complete the assignment. After one 
month, each group was asked to make a short presentation (20 minutes) in class about 
their project progress. They also turned in an intermediate report (mid-project milestone), 
which was not graded nor analyzed but helped ensure that students would be on track 
with the assignment. Participants were asked to include in the mid-term presentation and 
deliverables: an initial review of design options, relevant literature, legislative and other 
resources, and all stakeholders of the application. During their presentations, students 
also received feedback from other students in the class, the instructor and me.  
At the end of the second month, all groups completed a final deliverable in which 
they were asked to include at least the following items: 
– regulatory constraints; 
– experience from similar applications; 
– description of system design; 
– information management policies; 
– technical safeguards for securing data and people, including relevant as-
pects of the user interface (.g., how the system is operated, accessed, 
etc.); 
– organizational measures to be adopted contextually with system use. 
I evaluated the design products, by comparing the design documents produced by 
the students with “expert” reference designs. These expert reference designs were pro-
duced by me using design material derived from the developers of the specific applica-
tion. In the case of Reno, I used the basic Reno applic tion, modified after the deploy-
ment and my own proportionality analysis. In the case of CareLog, the reference design 
consisted of the outcome of my analysis of an application similar to the CareLog applica-
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tion concept developed by Hayes t al. [86]. These reference designs were written before 
participants completed any project deliverables. 
After the end of the course, I interviewed participants to understand how they had 
used the proportionality method. This semi-structured interview included questions per-
taining to the understandability of the description of the design method (i.e., the pub-
lished paper [97]); its application (including a subjective assessment of time required to 
complete the assignment and the impact on the quality of the end product); the resources 
they had accessed during the design, and questions on specific design choices. The inter-
view lasted between 30 and 45 minutes and was condute  one group at a time. It was 
audio-recorded and subsequently transcribed. The partici tion in the interview was vol-
untary and separate from the rest of the study (all six participants chose to take part in the 
interview). Because the interview did not provide cr dit for the class curriculum, each 
participant received a USD10 gift card for participat ng. 
5.1.2 Demographics 
Participants did not have professional experience i ubicomp design. Some par-
ticipants in Groups 1 and 3 had some professional experience with information security 
issues. All participants were students of the Information Security MS program at Georgia 
Tech. Most participants had a technical background, except for one participant in Group 
3, who had a technology policy background.  
5.1.3 Results 
I identified 10 quantitative metrics to evaluate thcompleteness of the written fi-
nal reports (I did not consider the oral presentations in this analysis). These metrics are 
based on the number of occurrences of the following analysis elements: 
1. expressed threats; 
2. usage scenarios; 
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3. comparisons with existing, similar applications; 
4. identified stakeholders; 
5. stated requirements; 
6. stated design choices; 
7. open design issues (that is, design points that were raised by the partici-
pants but no conclusion was reached, pending more information or the 
verification of some other hypothesis); 
8. architectural components of the design; 
9. specific items of legislation referenced; and 
10. indications of the need for extended evaluations (e.g., further surveys, 
interviews, etc.). 
The first four metrics were selected to measure the thoroughness of the analysis 
performed by the participants. The next four metrics measure the complexity of the re-
sulting design. Finally, the last two metrics indicate references to external resources that 
had become necessary during the design process (i. ., expressing the need to ask stake-
holders for their opinion, reference legislation, etc.).  
I counted the occurrence of each type of metric by classifying each statement or 
paragraph in the written reports. Guidance provided to the participants suggested a spe-
cific organization of their reports. However, only groups 2 and 3 loosely followed these 
suggestions. For this reason, the identification of countable occurrences of the analysis 
elements is not as rigorous as would be desirable. In many cases, elements were not ex-
plicit and had to be interpreted (see Table 5.1). In all three groups’ reports, the report size 
(in number of paragraphs) is roughly proportional to the sum of all analysis elements. 
The numbers in the table should be taken at face value and not compared across 
columns because they are the result of different analysis processes without any control on 
the amount of time used in the analysis. Also, these bare numbers do not indicate whether 
the identified analysis elements were pertinent and correct in the context of the specific 
analysis. To control this variable, I further examined each design choice made by the 
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three groups to assess whether it had a strong impact on stakeholder privacy or security. 
The Reference columns provide numbers about the analysis performed by me. 
5.1.4 Discussion 
5.1.4.1 Usability 
All three groups provided strong evidence of having understood the method’s 
core concepts well enough to use the method or to make a justified decision not to use it. 
Group 1 did not use the design method, claiming that t e existence of very similar com-
mercial applications voided the need for applying a detailed design method. Both group 
members had a technical background and started the analysis from a feasibility assess-
ment. They based their analysis on the comparison with t o other similar applications. 
The comparison process, in their words, “jumpstarted” he design process and “gave a 
feel for what’s possible.”  
Group 2 did use the design method but skipped the first phase (which requires 
balancing application usefulness with stakeholder privacy concerns), because these “re-
quirements were already given” and they “did not feel necessary to justify that the appli-
cation was useful.” The existence of similar services on the market might have influenced 
this assessment. 
Group 3 stated that they applied an iterative design process to discover design is-
sues and decide upon them, as suggested by the proportionality method. The other two 








Table 5.1: Deliverables Coverage At a Glance. 
 Group 1 Group 2 Reference Group 3 Reference 




Used Method No Yes Yes Yes No 
Analysis Elements      
Threats 0 3 3 13 5 
Scenarios 0 3 0 0 0 
Comparisons with 
Similar Apps 
2 0 2 2 7 
Stakeholders (1)40 2 3 7 5 
Requirements 12 5 5 9 12 
Design Choices 8 11 11 15 13 
Design Choices rele-
vant to privacy / 
security  
6 6 11 13 13 
Open Design Issues 4 6 2 7 2 
Architectural Com-
ponents 
4 4 1 5 NA41 
Legislation 2 4 2 2 3 
Extended Evalua-
tion 
0 0 3 3 0 
TOTAL 33 38 31 63 47 
Report Size42 98 102 106 197 145 
                                                
 
 
40 The number of stakeholders was not indicated explicitly. 
41 The reference design of the video recording application did not include an architectural 
description of the application. 




The groups using the design method provided evidence of engaging in more 
elaborate—and more time-consuming—evaluation of alternative design options which 
did not rely much on the critique of existing applicat ons (see Table 5.1). Group 1 con-
centrated their analysis on the user interface of the application, specifying its design 
(hence the high value of the Requirements variable). The same group did not identify as 
many threats to stakeholders’ privacy.  
All participants who used the design method agreed that the application of the 
method had not increased the design time by itself, but they also indicated that they were 
encouraged to explore more design alternatives, and with greater depth, which required 
increased effort and time. Group participants that used the method commented in the in-
terviews that their designs were more thorough because of method use than they other-
wise would have been. This claim was reflected in the completeness of the deliverables 
written by the three groups. The group that did not use the method explored only one 
technological solution, primarily basing their design on a comparison with, and en-
hancement of, similar existing services, whereas the groups that used the design method 
generated comparably more detailed designs. The groups that used the design method 
identified a higher number of design issues (summing open design issues and design 
choices) than the group that did not. 
One member who used the design method stated that “the hard part was playing 
both roles [involved in the balancing of stakeholder n eds].” The balancing of cost-
effectiveness, usefulness and privacy was also cited by another participant as a challeng-
ing, but useful exercise. In particular, the participant indicated that this process helped 
him in reaching decisions among alternative design options with privacy implications. 
Finally, one group indicated that initially the application of the method had 
seemed “silly and redundant” but that eventually, the output of the analysis process, es-
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pecially the documented evaluation of several alternative technical solutions, had been 
very useful as a communication tool. This group had talked about their design with poten-
tial stakeholders and had found that the design output had been useful to justify and de-
scribe a particular solution in that context. Participants in one group commented that the 
design method would be most appropriate for exploratory applications, and less so for 
established technologies.  
5.1.4.3 Inter-Designer Stability 
I did not observe sufficient evidence to support the t esis regarding the similarity 
of the participants’ analyses to the reference analyses (see Table 5.2). Two groups, in-
cluding the group that did not use the method, produce  results that were quite different 
from the reference analysis (i.e., there was little overlap between the design choices made 
by the participants vs. those made by the experts), whereas the third group produced a 
design similar to the reference design (there was higher degree of overlap). This might 
also be a function of the available literature, of the type of application at hand and of its 
description. Given these results, I skipped this analysis in the follow-up study. 
 
                                                
 
 
43 Calculated as:  OC / TC where OC = number of choices on overlapping issues; TC = 
total number of unique choices (group + expert). 
Table 5.2: Overlap of Participants’ Design With Experts’ Design. 
 Group 1 Group 2 Expert Group 3 Expert 
Design Choices relevant 
to privacy / security  
6 8 11 13 13 




Although it is not possible to infer strong quantitative conclusions from just three 
sources of qualitative design process data, this study encouragingly suggests that the pro-
portionality method is usable for its intended purpose. Based on participants’ comments 
and evaluation of the deliverables, I can make the following tentative observations: 
– the method may be particularly fit for exploratory or novel applications 
that lack prior deployment history; 
– the method may be most useful in cases of multiple stakeholders with di-
verging interests; 
– the method may encourage designers in evaluating a larger number of de-
sign alternatives; 
– the method added little overhead to the design process; and 
– the end product of applying the method was useful to convince others 
about the validity of the design choices made (it contained a stronger ra-
tionale). 
I did not gather sufficient evidence to support my second thesis, that the design 
process can produce repeatable outcomes across expert and non-expert designers.  
5.2 The Design Method Evaluation Study 
The pilot study provided some initial hints regarding the usefulness and usability 
of the proportionality method, but not enough quantit tive evidence demonstrating its 
performance vis-à-vis other design methods or current best practice. Furthermore, the 
study suffered from an insufficient control of important independent variables, such as 
prior experience. For this reason, I conducted a follow-up design method evaluation study 
involving 48 participants. 
This second study benefited from the experience gained from the pilot study. Spe-
cifically, the pilot study allowed me to test a design method evaluation process; the quan-
titative metrics developed for the analysis of the design products were employed with 
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some modifications in this study; and experience from the interviews in the pilot study 
helped define the question set for the semi-structued interviews in this study. 
5.2.1 Overview and Hypothesis 
The purpose of the design method evaluation study was to measure the effective-
ness of three methods for analyzing and solving privacy and security issues in ubiquitous 
computing applications. The students from two sections of the Introduction to HCI class 
at the College of Computing of Georgia Institute of Technology were asked to design a 
ubiquitous computing application with known privacy and security issues. The students 
were assigned to one of three conditions (one for each of design methods) and one con-
trol condition in a between-subjects experimental design. The four conditions were:  
– Bellotti and Sellen’s feedback and control privacy framework [31] 
(henceforth called “Feedback / Control”); 
– Hong et al.’s risk analysis for ubicomp privacy [92] (“Risk Analysis”);  
– the proportionality method (“Proportionality”); and  
– the control group used Design Rationale (“Design Ration le”) [124].  
Bellotti and Sellen’s framework was chosen for comparison because it is, to my 
knowledge, the first design method proposed in the ubicomp community specifically for 
addressing privacy issues. It is a refinement of QOC (Questions, Options, Criteria), that 
suggests predefined questions and criteria (outlined  Table 3.1). Bellotti and Sellen’s 
framework was also used as a reference in other similar studies (e.g., by Jensen [108], 
who compared it with a goal-driven analysis technique). Hong et al. proposed applying 
risk analysis and risk management to the design of ubicomp applications with privacy 
concerns. Their technique was selected for comparison because risk analysis is one of the 
prime analytic tools in IT security, but its effectiveness has not yet been evaluated in the 
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specific context of ubiquitous computing.44 The third group employed the proportionality 
method described in Chapter 4. The control group did not use any privacy- or security-
specific method, and was instead instructed to use Design Rationale by MacLean et al. 
[124], a QOC requirements analysis and documentatio technique well-known in the RE 
and HCI fields. Like Bellotti and Sellen’s framework, Design Rationale proposes a QOC 
analysis, but unlike that framework, it does not suggest any specific question or criteria 
for privacy or the ubicomp domain. 
The participants were asked to design an application s milar to Microsoft’s Sen-
seCam [75],45 using one of the four techniques. The design task was given as a week-long 
homework assignment. The performance of the design methods was assessed both using 
quantitative metrics (e.g., number of privacy/security issues discovered and number of 
design choices made by each participant, time requid to perform analysis) and qualita-
tive analysis (e.g., judgment on the quality of designs by independent r viewers, type of 
issues addressed).  
The setup of this study is intended to shed light on the following questions: 1) 
whether any one design method is more effective than e others according to some per-
formance metric; and 2) what are the qualitative differences across methods. Regarding 
the first question, my null hypothesis was that all four conditions are equivalent, in terms 
                                                
 
 
44 One problem of applying risk analysis in the ubicomp domain is that risk analysis (es-
pecially quantitative risk analysis) assumes that te analyst has a great deal of knowledge 
about security risks and their impact on stakeholders. Such knowledge is by definition 
difficult to acquire in the ubicomp domain. 
45 SenseCam is a pack-of-cards sized wearable camera that utomatically captures images 
and stores them in its memory. It can be worn as a pendant hanging on the chest of the 
user. Events, such as time, movement, light level and temperature may trigger the capture 
of new information. For example, when the user walks into a room, a light change transi-
tion can be detected and an image is captured with a wide-angle lens. Accelerometer data 
is used to reduce blurred images caused by camera motion, which is an essential feature 
of any truly wearable camera. 
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of qualitative and quantitative metrics. I hypothesiz d that at least one of the three meth-
ods will provide better performance, in terms of design issues identified and a quality as-
sessment by expert reviewers, than the control conditi . Regarding the second question, 
the null hypothesis was that there would be no qualitative difference between the output 
designs in the four conditions in terms of the type of privacy and security issues identi-
fied. The hypothesis was that the type of questions probed by each method would qualita-
tively influence the type of designs issues addressed. 
5.2.2 Experimental Procedure 
The homework was part of the class syllabus, and every student had to perform it 
for class credit. Participation in this study was however voluntary, and 51 students volun-
teered to participate (out of approximately 65 enrolled students). Three participants later 
exited the study, because they were unable to complete the assignment and for other rea-
sons, resulting in N = 48. The number of participants was deemed sufficient, during 
planning, to produce statistically significant quantitative results. However, the unexpect-
edly high variance of the results prevented obtaining statistically significant results in 
many cases. 
Students who chose to participate agreed to be assigned to one of the four condi-
tions and gave us permission to review their designs, their quiz grades and their course 
grades. Students choosing not to participate were given the option to attend any one of 
the four lectures and perform the homework according to that lecture. 
The proportionality design method targets HCI designers without a specific train-
ing in security or privacy issues. The participants of this study (graduate students in a de-
sign course) were selected to represent a population of designers with low to moderate 
professional experience (see Figure 5.4). The demographics of the participants match the 
goals of the study because the design methods aim at aiding designers who operate in a 
field (ubiquitous computing) that does not have an established base of design knowledge. 
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The students from both sections in the study were randomly assigned to one of 
four groups, with the following condition. The Introduction to HCI class at this Institute 
requires students to work in groups of four on a semester-long project. Students within 
these groups have extensive contact with each other. Recognizing that students within the 
same semester project group would have more opportunities to communicate about the 
homework, I assigned them to different experimental conditions in the effort to discour-
age them from influencing each other. This task wasfacilitated due to the fact that pro-
jects groups are usually composed of 4 students, as many as the conditions in this study. 
5.2.2.1 Enrollment 
At the beginning of the semester, students were givn a information notice about 
the study, per Institutional Review Board (IRB) requirements. Students enrolled in the 
study two weeks prior to the design method lecture in class. To increase the likelihood of 
participation, I highlighted the educational aspects of the study. Contact information and 
consent forms were collected from all participants during enrollment. At this point, stu-
dents also completed a demographic survey, including esign and domain experience (to 
control for prior experience), degree program, year in program, and Harris-Westin pri-
vacy preferences [149]. 
5.2.2.2 Lectures 
Each condition received a distinct lecture on the assigned design method. The lec-
tures were all similar except for the design method presented. They all introduced the is-
sues of privacy and security in ubicomp, and the spcific design method. The lectures 
also included a sample application of the design method to the Personal Audio Loop, and 
a short description of the homework task. The same instructor gave all four lectures.  
Students were given paper copies of the respective design method reference pa-
per, and the lecture’s slides. A digital link to the SenseCam CARPE ’04 paper [75] was 
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also given to participants, along with other relevant bibliographic references, listed in the 
design brief in Appendix B. This “facilitation material” was necessary because students 
did not have enough time to perform bibliographic research on the design and I wanted to 
provide a consistent amount of basic knowledge about the application domain. Students 
were asked to cite any other sources they used. 
5.2.2.3 Exercise  
At the end of the lecture, students were given an application brief that asked them 
to design an application, based on the SenseCam, tht would support non-verbal children 
and their parents to communicate about the child’s daily activities at school. The Sense-
Cam technology and this application represent a particularly good case study because 
there are still few publications about the technology and this scenario presents multiple, 
diverging, stakeholders. On the other hand, the application and technology are conceptu-
ally small enough that design was manageable within the given time constraints. Partici-
pants were instructed to focus on the privacy and security aspects of the design, and given 
freedom to alter the operating parameters of the SenseCam as deemed necessary. An ex-
cerpt of the design brief follows: 
Non-verbal children (such as some children with disorders in the Autism 
spectrum) may be unable to recount daily activities at chool to their par-
ents when they get home. This reduces parents’ knowledge of the chil-
dren’s activity when out of the home, and of their mood or feelings. If the 
children carried a SenseCam, their parents may be al to better recon-
struct the child’s activity independently from the reporting of the teachers 
or caregivers in school. This improved knowledge, in the form of an auto-
matically-authored daily journal, may improve the parent’s understanding 
of the child’s feelings and thus his or her response to their needs or con-
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tingent behavior. […] You are asked to design a system that would sup-
port the application described above, especially focusing on privacy and 
security concerns. You are free to define the parameters and the design of 
the SenseCam device and of the other components of the system in any 
way you deem fit for achieving the goals of the application, including the 
fact that it is wearable, how pictures are taken, or additional sensing such 
as audio, video or other. 
The complete text of the design brief and a list of references provided to partici-
pants are reported in Appendix B. The choice of the design assignment is crucial in this 
kind of study and deserves an explanation. This brief strikes a middle ground between 
two options represented by the use of the design methods for summative critique as op-
posed to formative design (see the discussion in Chapter 3). The former would suggest to 
evaluate the design methods by providing students with a certain number of designs and 
have them critique these designs using one of the four design methods. According to the 
latter alternative, students would have developed dsigns from nothing, employing the 
design methods as formative tools for making reasoned design decisions. I decided to set-
tle on a mixed evaluation / design exercise because: 1) the proponents of the design 
methods do not specify whether they are intended for summative or formative use; 2) the 
timeframe given to students would not have allowed a eep enough analysis had they 
started from nothing; and 3) I wanted to constrain the design space somewhat to achieve 
a certain uniformity and comparability between design outputs. As a result, I asked the 
participants to evaluate a high-level design, given by us, by identifying risks or privacy 
issues, and design eventual changes and the detaile design features of the application 
based on the conclusions of their analyses.  
I asked for a final deliverable of 1600–2400 words (4–6 pages), suggesting that it 
would take 6–8 hours of time to perform the assignme t over one week. The reward 
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structure was based on the comprehensiveness of thedesign document and students were 
informed of this in class. I chose not to evaluate time performance (e.g., counting the 
number of issues found in a fixed period of time) bcause I was interested in students re-
flecting on the designs, coming up with solutions over a reasonable amount of time—
striving to mimic how actual design tasks are accomplished—rather than engaging them 
in a design speed contest. 
Participants were asked to follow closely the design method they had been as-
signed to and to explain any deviations from the assigned method (e.g., if they felt that 
there were important issues that would not arise from the application of the method). Par-
ticipants were asked to keep track of how much timehey spent doing the assignment us-
ing a simple form, similar to those used in techniques like the Personal Software Process 
[94]. They were asked to track time spent on researching and gathering information sepa-
rately from the time spent on designing and writing up the assignment. It was stressed 
that participants would not be evaluated on this information. Time-tracking allowed me 
to control for performance/cost variables across conditions. Students received two re-
minder emails prompting them to keep track of the time spent on the assignment, and to 
remind them to bring the sheet to class with the assignment. 
When submitting the assignment, students were asked to complete a post-study 
questionnaire with questions about the use of bibliographic and other sources (individuals 
with whom they spoke about the assignment, referenc material, etc.), Likert questions 
about the experience of using the design method (effort to understand, effort to apply, 
etc.), and some other procedural information (e.g., willingness to participate in an inter-
view). At this point, students also completed an anonymous “satisfaction” survey that 
gave them the opportunity to express their opinions  the design method and on the 
study. Assignments were graded by the two Teaching Assistants (TA) in the class (each 
TA graded half of the assignments, distributed pseudo-randomly across conditions). Ad-
ditionally, each TA evaluated all assignments on novelty, comprehensiveness and cl rity. 
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Both TAs were PhD students with experience in HCI at our institution (verified using an 
experience questionnaire similar to that used for participants). To get a sense of the reli-
ability of these evaluations, I measured inter-rater consistency.  
An adherence score was also computed for each homewrk. The adherence score 
is a value between 0 and 1 that indicates how closely th  participant applied the given 
design method. It is computed as the proportion of design steps that the participant fol-
lowed in the assignment, relative to the design steps described in the reference paper (see 
Appendix B for a formal definition of the design steps). 
5.2.2.4 Quiz 
After submitting the assignment, students completed in-class quizzes to verify 
their understanding of the design method. This test was necessary to control for potential 
unequal understanding of the design method. Individual zed quizzes for students in the 
four groups were provided. The quiz also provided class credit. Summary analysis of the 
quiz grades indicates that the majority of participants demonstrated having well under-
stood the design method. Graded quizzes were returned to the students. A sample quiz is 
found in Appendix B. 
5.2.2.5 Interviews 
Interviews were held before the end of the semester, 2–3 weeks after the assign-
ments were turned in. Interview participants received token retribution of USD10 to mo-
tivate them to participate, given their busy end-of-semester schedules. A selection of par-
ticipants was invited via email to take part in a short semi-structured interview (lasting 
15–20 minutes). I attempted to select, from each experimental condition, one participant 
who achieved a high evaluation score by the TAs in the design and one or two who 
achieved a low score. In total, this would have provided 8–12 interview participants. 
Seven participants were actually interviewed, due to the impossibility to schedule all 
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planned interviews. In the interview, participants were asked subjective questions about 
the application of the design method, including their assessment of the quality of the re-
sulting designs, the effort required, and the effects of using the design methods.  
5.2.2.6 Collected Metrics 
Several metrics were collected about each participant and his or her design (see 
Table 5.3). In the table, each metric is named and explained. The source of the metric is 
also indicated in the second column. The source indicates who has quantified the value of 
the metric. Finally, each metric is given a variable name if it was used in the quantitative 
analysis. It should be noted that the choice of metrics is necessarily based on considera-
tions that are arbitrary to a certain degree. The first seven metrics refer to a coding of the 
design deliverables. Each deliverable was analyzed and significant assertions, falling into 
one of the seven categories were flagged as such. Metrics T and C are particularly impor-
tant. T indicates the number of security / privacy issues (or “threats”) identified in the 
deliverable (e.g., “the user may lose the SenseCam device”). C indicates the design 
choices or requirements (e.g., “Access to the pictures taken by SenseCam should be 
password-protected”). The idea of using the number of identified security / privacy issues 
derives in part from work on Heuristic Evaluation, i  which “usability issues” are 
identified, prioritized and counted to show the effectiveness of discount usability 
techniques [135]. Furthermore, the identification of security / privacy issues is common 
in risk analysis and management in the security community. Finally, the identification of 
security issues is also common in security requirements engineering models such as the 
Common Criteria [105]. In the Common Criteria, security threats (i.e., issues) must be 
addressed by security objectives, reflecting security RE practice. Security objectives re-
late to the design choices measured in this study (variable C). Anecdotal evid nce from 
the deliverables indicates that, in many cases, design choices are made to address security 




Table 5.3: Metric Collected for each Participant. 
Metric Source Explanation Variable 
Number of privacy/ se-
curity issues 
Researcher Number of Identified privacy/security issues or 
threats (e.g., “the user may loose the SenseCam de-
vice”). These issues have been cataloged and 
grouped in Table 5.10. 
T 
Number of usage scenar-
ios 
Researcher Number of usage scenarios. This metric was counted 
because scenario-based requirements analysis has 
been proposed as a requirements elicitation method. 
I counted scenarios that were presented as a short 
narrative, and not threat scenarios. 
N 
Number of comparisons 
with existing, similar 
applications 
Researcher Comparison with existing applications; for example, 
comparisons with a digital camera, or surveillance i  
schools. This metric is included because designing a 
novel application is often done by analogy, looking 
at other, similar existing applications for referenc . 
X 
Number of identified 
stakeholders 
Researcher The number of identified stakeholders (e.g., the par-
ents, the child, etc.). Note that none of the four 
methods provides specific help in identifying stake-
holders. Stakeholder analysis is however a funda-
mental component of multilateral security and was 
requested as part of the assignment. 
S 
Number of stated design 
choices 
Researcher Number of stated design decisions or requirements 
(e.g., “Access to the pictures taken by SenseCam 
should be password-protected”). This metric is a 
proxy of the design complexity or depth. Not all 
design choices are at the same level of complexity. 
Also, participants did not really have the chance of 
solving design issues with specific design choices 
because they lacked the ability to evaluate their 








Table 5.3: Metric Collected for each Participant. (Continued.)  
Metric Source Explanation Variable 
Number of open ques-
tions 
Researcher Questions that were raised by the partici nts but no 
conclusion was reached, pending more information 
or the verification of some other hypothesis (e.g., 
specific items of legislation referenced, further su -
veys, interviews, etc.). 
O 
Number of value propo-
sitions 
Researcher Value propositions for the application, i.e., state-
ments about the usefulness of the application . This
metric is important because value propositions are 
used in some of the methods to justify privacy-
invasive choices (e.g., in the Proportionality method 
and in Risk Analysis). 
V 
Deliverable Size Researcher Computed as T + N + X + S + C + O + V 
46 Z 
Adherence score Researcher Estimate of how accurately the participants followed 
the design method process. The formal definition is 





Evaluators Design quality of each report as evaluated by inde-
pendent reviewers. 
The Quality metric Q is the average of the 3 scores 
given by each evaluator. 
All these scores are based on the scale  
(0: not novel/comprehensive/clear –  






Homework grade  Evaluators Assigned by the TA to the design deliverable.  G 
Quiz grades Researcher Assigned by researcher.  QU 
 
                                                
 
 
46 The pilot study suggests that this value is well correlated with the size of the design 
deliverable. 




Table 5.3: Metric Collected for each Participant. (Continued.)  
Metric Source Explanation Variable 
Demographic informa-
tion 
Participant Degree program, year in program, etc.  
Design experience met-
ric 
Participant IT development experience, RE experience, Ubi-
comp experience, experience with surveillance and 
C&A systems.  
EX  = Σ (years of commercial or research experience 





Easy to apply 
Would use again in the 
future 
Impact on time 
Impact on quality 
Participant Subjective scores of the usefulness and usability of 
the design method (scale 0: strongly disagree…6: 
strongly agree). 
 
GRE Participant General GRE score. GRE 
Privacy attitude before 
study 
Privacy attitude after 
study 
Participant We administered the Harris-Westin privacy segmen-
tation questionnaire both before and after the study. 
This metric was developed in the context of data 
protection concerns towards commercial organiza-
tions and classifies individuals in one of three cate-
gories: privacy pragmatist, fundamentalist and un-
concerned. 
 
Time spent researching 
Time spent designing 
and writing assignment 
Participant The time employed for the design exercis  by the 
participants. TR indicates the time spent researching 
and reading. TD is the time spent designing and 
writing up the assignment. TT is the total time. 












Table 5.4: Controlled Variables. 
Variable Control(s) 
Different presentations of the as-
signment or design method in the 
four groups. 
Control over presentation: same presenter for all four conditions; 
prepared, uniform slides across conditions. 
Presenter might have vested interest 
in one method. 
Have presentations made by an “independent” presentr.48  
Influence of external people.  Ask at the end of the study if there were exchanges with other indi-
viduals. 
Individual students collaborating, 
especially within project groups. 
Ask students not to collaborate, verify for similar designs (typical 
homework practice). 
Assign students in same project groups to different co ditions. 
Participants’ prior knowledge. Control with demographic survey. 
Availability of reference literature. Provide basic literature to everybody. Ask to explicitly reference 
other sources. 
Different student proficiency in two 
sections.  





                                                
 
 
48 The lectures were given by Gregory Abowd, who is co-author of the Proportionality 
paper and may thus be biased in the delivery of the lectures. He is also a very experienced 
HCI researcher and was available to teaching the lectur s in the tight schedule. In my 
opinion, he delivered unbiased lectures—differences across conditions, if any, were 




The other variables are useful to quantify secondary trends worthy of note and to 
provide a complete synthetic picture of the design deliverables. In fact, coding each para-
graph of the design deliverables as one of T, C, N, X, O, S, V, leaves very few para-
graphs not coded. 
As a final note, the process of classifying elements of a written deliverable into 
these 7 categories is necessarily imprecise, and the resulting numbers should be taken 
with caution. Having multiple raters perform this task would have provided a higher de-
gree of reliability, but the cost associated with this analysis was incompatible with the 
timeline and budget of this project. The same observation holds for the categorization of 
the type of security / privacy issues identified by the participants and listed in Table 5.10.  
5.2.2.7 Controlled Variables 
Several important variables were intentionally contr lled in the design of this 
study (see Table 5.4). As mentioned above, design i a complex activity and good designs 
may originate because of many different reasons. Controlling as many external influences 
as possible is mandatory for obtaining relevant data. 
5.2.3 Demographics 
The study involved students from both sections of the CS/PSYC 6750 Introduc-
tion to HCI class at this institution, N = 48. Table 5.5 lists participant subdivision across 
the four conditions, and the reference paper given to each participant describing the re-
spective design method. It was not possible to divide participants equally across condi-
tions because of scheduling constraints (to accommodate study requirements some par-







Table 5.5: Four Conditions of Participants in Study. 
Condition Paper provided to participants  
(in parentheses the case study discussed in paper) 
Participants 
Feedback / Control  Bellotti and Sellen’s 1993 ECSCW paper [31] (video 
awareness system as case study) 
N1 = 11 
Risk Analysis  Hong et al.’s 2004 DIS paper [92] (person finder case 
study) 
N2 = 12 
Proportionality  Iachello and Abowd’s 2004 CHI paper [97] (PAL 
case study) 
N3 = 13 
Design Rationale (Control 
group) 
MacLean et al.’s 1989 CHI paper [124] and HCI 
textbook [56] (examples from WIMP UI) 






































































































































Figure 5.2: Distribution of Participants’ Year in Program.  
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Figure 5.4: Participants’ Experience Distribution. 
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5.2.3.1 Degree Program and Education of Participants 
Basic demographic information about the participants’ degree program, year in 
program and completed education was collected (see Figure 5.1 – Figure 5.3). The major-
ity of participants were master students, in the Computer Science, HCI and IDT degree 
tracks, which is consistent with their level of completed education (predominantly under-
graduate degrees) and their program year (predominantly, 1st and 2nd year). 
5.2.3.2 Experience of Participants 
The distribution of the participants’ experience metric EX  (defined in Table 5.3) 
shows two groups: namely experienced (EX > 8) and inexperienced (EX < 8) participants 
with overall mean = 5.1, σ = 4.8 (see Figure 5.4). Table 5.6 shows the same variable 
numerically and divided by condition. The overall variance of this variable is very high 
(comparable to the absolute value) in all four conditions, indicating that the recruitment 
process yielded a mix of students without significant professional experience and of par-
ticipants returning to get an advanced degree afterworking in commercial organizations. 
An ANOVA test showed that there are no significant differences of experience across 
conditions, ensuring that the performance differences across conditions coming up later 
in the analysis do not stem from experience differences of the participants in those condi-
tions. 
Very few participants had good knowledge of requirements engineering frame-
works and laws prior to the study (see Table 5.7, which shows the number of participants 
who claimed to have worked with some Requirements Egineering frameworks of inter-
est or with specific items of privacy-related legislation). The only exceptions are Design 
Rationale, which was explained in a previous lecture in the same course, and HIPAA. 
However, knowledge of HIPAA did not correlate significantly with differences in the 






Table 5.6: Experience of Participants. 
Condition Mean N σ 
Feedback / Control  4.1 11 3.0 
Risk Analysis 5.4 12 4.2 
Proportionality 5.6 13 5.4 
Design Rationale 5.3 12 6.4 




Table 5.7: Participants’ Experience with RE Frameworks and Legislation. 
“Please list all requirements engineering frameworks and methodolo-
gies (or legislation) you had experience with (i.e., worked with or re-
searched on).” [Questions 7 and 10 form DS-Q1] 
Number of Participants 
who answered yes (N=48) 
Design Rationale 17 
Win-Win requirements analysis 1 
Risk Analysis frameworks  5 
Other  1 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)  1 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)  10 
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)   3 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA)  0 
Privacy Act of 1974   2 





5.2.3.3 Privacy Preferences 
The participants represent a typical population in relation to their general attitudes 
towards privacy, as measured by the Harris-Westin privacy segmentation (Figure 5.5).49 I 
measured this classification because it is a widely employed privacy classification, and I 
desired to verify that the participants belonged to a ‘normal’ sample with regards to data 
protection issues. However, I do not relate privacy classification with the design output of 
the participant, because this classification, targeted at consumers, is in my opinion inap-
propriate for describing designers and their activity. 
5.2.4 Quantitative Analysis 
In this section, I present a subset of all the quantitative analyses that were per-
formed on the data, limited to those that are useful for stating some claim in the discus-
sion below. Each analysis is presented within a different sub-section. 
                                                
 
 
49 Based on recent surveys, roughly 60% of individuals f l in the pragmatist category, 
roughly 30% are fundamentalists and the rest privacy unconcerned [179]. 
 
Figure 5.5: Privacy Classification of Participants (Harris-Westin Survey). 









5.2.4.1 Time to Complete Assignment 
Most participants took more time to complete the assignment than the 6–8 hours 
we had expected. Participants in the four conditions did not show significant differences 
in the amount of time necessary to complete the assignment (Table 5.8). Moreover, par-
ticipants’ comments on the post-questionnaire and in the anonymous feedback forms in-
dicated that they felt that the assignment would have required more time to perform ex-
haustively. Table 5.8 provides statistics for TT. Time was allocated approx. ⅓ research-
ing (TR) and ⅔ designing (TD) and writing up the report. Differenc s across conditions 
were not significant according to an ANOVA analysis. 
5.2.4.2 Inter-rater Consistency 
Recall that I used two independent evaluators to assess the designs’ comprehen-
siveness (EC), clarity (EL) and novelty (EN) for each homework. There is good inter-
                                                
 
 
50 I removed two outliers. Two additional participants did not return the timesheet. 
Table 5.8: Time To Complete Assignment. 
Time Employed to Perform 










N (participants) 11 10 11 12 4450 
TT Mean (hours) 9.89 10.37 9.08 10.34 9.92 
σ (hours) 3.16 2.85 3.46 2.90 3.04 
Minimum (hours) 4.00 5.50 3.83 6.50 3.83 
Maximum (hours) 16.50 15.00 14.50 15.92 16.50 
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rater consistency on all three metrics. This suggests that the quality metrics assessed by 
the evaluators are in fact reliable and interpreted in the same manner. 
r(EN1, EN2) = 0.49,  p = 0.001.
 51 
r(EC1, EC2) = 0.41,  p = 0.004. 
r(EL1, EL2) = 0.65,  p < 0.001. 
The design quality variable was defined as the average of all the evaluations given 
by the two evaluators:  
Q = (EN1 + EN2 + EC1 + EC2 + EL1 + EL2) / 6.  
The quality metric correlates to the grade assigned to the homeworks: 
r(Q, G) = 0.59, p < 0.001. 
This correlation suggests that comprehensiveness, clarity and novelty were reflec-
tive of an overall quality judgment expressed by the grade of the homework. Moreover, 
grades, although assessed by two separate evaluators, can be compared (each TA graded 
only half of the assignments to reduce their work, but evaluated all assignments on EC, 
EL and EN). 
5.2.4.3 Comprehensiveness vs. Number of Issues Identified and Number of Design 
Choices 
Comprehensiveness EC correlates weakly with deliverabl  size Z: 
                                                
 
 
51 r(A,B) indicates correlation between the variables A and B, over the whole sample set 
(N = 48) unless otherwise noted. Some samples are missing from some calculations be-




r(Z, (EC1 + EC2) / 2) = 0.329, p = 0.012. 
This level of correlation suggests that longer assignments were not just ‘longer’, 
but were also judged to be more comprehensive by the evaluators. 
The number of privacy / security issues T correlates significantly with compre-
hensiveness EC for evaluator 1 but not for evaluator 2. Moreover, average comprehen-
siveness is not significantly correlated with the number of identified privacy / security 
issues. 
r(T, EC1) = 0.29, p = 0.044. 
r(T, EC2) = -0.021, p = 0.889. 
r(T, (EC1 + EC2)/2 ) = 0.071, p = 0.320, N = 46. 
The number of design choices does not correlate to he comprehensiveness score 
given by single evaluators. However, the number of design choices C correlates weakly 
to the average comprehensiveness metric (EC1 + EC2) /2 provided by the evaluators: 
r(C, EC1) = 0.14, p = 0.325. 
r(C, EC2) = 0.275, p = 0.062. 
r(C, (EC1 + EC2) / 2 ) = 0.261, p = 0.038, N = 47. 
This level of correlation suggests that evaluator 1 was influenced more by analytic 
detail (T) in judging the design comprehensiveness, while the evaluator 2 was influenced 
more by design complexity (C). Overall, average comprehensiveness across evaluators is 
better correlated with design complexity than analytic detail. 
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5.2.4.4 Correlation of Grade and Quality with Number of Security / Privacy Issues Iden-
tified and Design Choices 
There is weak significant correlation between the number of security and privacy 
issues identified by the participants and overall grade. Similarly, there is a weak signifi-
cant correlation between the number of design choices and grade. 
r(G, T) = 0.337,  p = 0.010, N = 48. 
r(G, C) = 0.307, p = 0.018, N = 47. 
There is no correlation, however, between these two metrics and quality: 
r(Q, T) = 0.070, p = 0.318, N = 48. 
r(Q, C) = 0.118, p = 0.211, N = 48. 
This absence of correlation, and the numbers reportd above, suggest that the 
thoroughness, measured in terms of T and C, of the analysis and design may have influ-
enced the overall sense of comprehensiveness, resulting in a marginally higher grade, but 
do not necessarily affect a “quality judgment.” 
5.2.4.5 Correlation of Security / Privacy Issues Identified with Design Choices 
The number of security / privacy issues correlates w akly with design choices: 
r(T, C) = 0.258, p = 0.038, N = 48.  
In many assignments, some of the design choices were stated in the beginning 
when providing general details about the application, and some were listed after the 
analysis of the security issues. Some of the latter design choices were taken to directly 
counter potential threats to security and privacy. This partial correlation may be a symp-
tom of the latter type of design choices. 
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5.2.4.6 Correlation of Time Required to Complete Assignment with Number of Security 
/ Privacy Issues Identified and Design Choices 
Eliminating 4 participants,52 there is significant correlation between the time 
needed to complete the assignment and the number of s curity / privacy issues identified. 
TT = TR + TD 
r(TT, T) = 0.334, p = 0.027, N = 44. 
However, there is no correlation between this time and the complexity of the de-
sign (number of design choices). Even when eliminating 7 outliers, correlation is low and 
not significant:  
r(TT, C) = 0.077, p = 0.632, N = 41. 
These correlations suggest that identifying issues increased significantly the time 
spent on the assignment, while coming up with a more detailed and complex design did 
not. In general, one may doubt whether the design choices were made to respond to the 
identified issues, or participants were following their own design ideas, independently of 
the identified issues. 
5.2.4.7 Correlation of Experience with Number of Identified Issues and Design Choices 
Recall the experience metric defined above: 
EX = Σ number of years of professional experience in relevant IT fields +  
1/3 Σ number of courses in relevant IT fields 
                                                
 
 
52 These excluded data points include one outlier that was more than 3 standard devia-
tions from the mean and three not-reported values. 
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“Relevant IT fields” are: general IT development exp rience, RE experience, 
Ubicomp experience. The number of identified issues correlates weakly to the experience 
metric: 
r(EX, T)  = 0.270, p = 0.033, N = 47 (excludes the highest T value). 
This observation is confirmed by interviews, and suggests that prior experience 
has an impact on the thoroughness of the analyses. Th re was no significant correlation 
between experience and number of design choices: 
r(EX, C)  = 0.150, p = 0.154, N = 48. 
These results suggest that prior experience may have elped participants in identi-
fying security and privacy issues (the analytic phase of the assignment), but not necessar-
ily in specifying detailed designs. 
5.2.4.8 Correlation of GRE Score with Number of Identified Issues and Design Choices 
There is no significant correlation between GRE scores of participants and the 
number of identified issues or design choices. I did not collect GRE scores from all par-
ticipants (either because participants had not taken th  GRE exam, did not recall the score 
or did not want to disclose it), but this suggests that student proficiency, as measured by 
the GRE score, did not affect the deliverables. It hould be noted that the admission proc-
ess to the Institute produced a set of participants with very similar GRE scores. I did not 
use GPA scores for measuring proficiency, recognizing that most participants would be 
in their first year at Georgia Tech and would be coming from different undergraduate in-
stitutions, and would thus have incommensurable GPAs. 
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5.2.4.9 Descriptive Statistics of Relevant Metrics 
Table 5.9 reports the descriptive statistics of some of the following metrics used 
in this quantitative analysis: T, C, N, X, S, O, V, Z, G, Q, A. These statistics are divided 
by condition, and report the mean and standard deviation of the variable (fuller statistics 
are reported in Appendix C). Numbers of particular interest are contained in shaded cells. 
Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7 show the means of these variables in graphical form. These de-
scriptive statistics are used in the analyses report d below. Some numbers in Table 5.9 
are noteworthy, and are highlighted in a shaded cell. The mean adherence score in the 
Risk Analysis condition is lower than the others because few participants completed the 
risk management part of the process, in part due to time limitations and in part possibly 
due to the difficulty and low perceived utility of performing the semi-quantitative risk 
comparison. Similarly, many participants in the Proportionality condition did not com-
plete the Adequacy phase. In contrast, participants using the two QOC methods managed 
to cover most of the process steps. 
In general, participants included in the deliverables few scenarios, open-ended 
questions and comparisons with other applications. Only the Proportionality method ex-
plicitly suggests employing the latter design element. The number of value propositions 
(V) is particularly low in the Design Rationale condition. This difference may be due to 
the fact that in the other three conditions, the method process reminded participants to 
state at least one value proposition (Proportionality frames it in terms of ‘usefulness,’ the 
Feedback / Control framework talks about ‘purpose’ and Risk Analysis explicitly re-
quires designers to state the ‘value proposition’ of the application). 
5.2.4.10 Difference in Means: Security / Privacy Issues, Design Choices, Grade, Quality 
As a Function of Condition 
In this section, I compare the difference in means of the variables reported in 
Table 5.9. It should be noted that at this point, the comparison is not intended to support a 
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claim that any method is ‘better’ than the others for specific design performance goals. 
The statistics are provided and commented with reference to the individual design 
method, with the intent of discovering the effects of the structure of different methods on 
the final deliverable. 
An ANOVA test was used to analyze the differences in the means of the variables 
of interest summarized above (identified issues T, design choices C, grade G and quality 
metric Q). Although the graphs reported below (Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7) suggest that 
these variables present different means across conditions, in general, these differences are 
not significant (the full data of this analysis is provided in Appendix C), due to the high 
variances of the results (see Table 5.9). 
Only the following differences are statistically sign ficant (p < 0.05) and can be 
explained post-hoc by considering the structure of the four design methods. 
Identified privacy/security issues (T), between conditions Feedback / Control 
and Risk Analysis (mean difference = 3.43, p = 0.01). Risk Analysis offers a large 
number of questions that the designers must answer, which are designed to identify risks 
(which translate to security and privacy issues), whereas in the Feedback / Control 
framework, the issues are, so to speak, inherent to the method and relate to those issues 
typically found in awareness and multimedia conferencing systems that led Bellotti and 
Sellen to write their paper. Perhaps Feedback / Control does not help to think ‘out of the 









Table 5.9: Descriptive Statistics of Relevant Metrics. 









Mean 5.18** 7.83** 6.85 6.25 6.56 T  Number of Identi-
fied Security/Privacy 
Issues 
Std. Dev. 3.31 3.24 2.34 1.66 2.78 
Mean 10.64 9.33 10.08 8.42 9.60 C  Number of Design 
Choices Std. Dev. 3.88 2.67 3.99 5.26 4.01 
Mean 0.18 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.06 N  Number of Sce-
narios Std. Dev. 0.40 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.24 
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.62 0.33 0.25 X  Number of Com-
parisons to Similar 
Apps 
Std. Dev. 0.00 0.00 0.77 0.89 0.64 
Mean 6.82 4.75 5.23 6.42 5.77 S  Number of Stake-
holders Std. Dev. 3.09 1.60 1.17 2.84 2.36 
Mean 0.36** 0.25** 1.69** 0.83 0.81 O   Number of Open-
ended Issues Std. Dev. 0.50 0.62 1.25 1.59 1.21 
Mean 1.36 2.00** 1.92 0.75** 1.52 V   Number of Value 
Propositions Std. Dev. 0.81 1.28 1.55 0.62 1.22 
Mean 24.55 24.17 26.46 23.00 24.58 Z   Size of the Deliv-
erable Std. Dev. 7.19 4.86 7.13 7.07 6.55 
Mean 8.77 8.21 8.65 8.46 8.52 G  Grade (1–10) 
Std. Dev. 1.54 1.03 0.69 0.72 1.02 
Mean 4.24** 3.21** 3.96 3.83 3.81 Q   Quality (0–6) 
Std. Dev. 0.99 0.79 0.95 0.93 0.96 
Mean 0.80 0.66 0.71 0.93 0.78 A   Adherence (0.0–
1.0) Std. Dev. 0.37 0.30 0.21 0.13 0.28 
 






































































































































































































































































Figure 5.6: Graphs of Means of Variables T, C, N, X, S, O across conditions. 
Diamonds indicate mean; vertical bars indicate ± 1 standard deviation.  
Significant differences: Identified privacy/security issues (T), between conditions Feed-
back / Control and Risk Analysis;  
Number of open-ended design issues (O), between conditions Proportionality and Feed-

























































































































































































































Figure 5.7: Graphs of Means of V, Z, G, Q, A. 
Diamonds indicate mean; vertical bars indicate ± 1 standard deviation. 
Significant differences: Number of value propositions (V), between conditions Risk 
Analysis and Design Rationale;  




Number of open-ended design issues (O), between conditions Proportionality 
and Risk Analysis (mean difference 1.44 (p = 0.011) and between conditions Propor-
tionality and  Feedback / Control (mean difference 1.33 (p = 0.025). The Proportional-
ity method yielded a higher number of open-ended design issues than the other methods, 
that is, points in which the designer stated the ned to gain further information through 
user studies, reference to legislation, or where he or she stated other uncertainties in the 
design. This observation is confirmed by the interviews of the pilot study, when partici-
pants claimed that the proportionality process led them to a point in the design process 
where they needed further, external validation (in the form of interviews with stake-
holders and user studies) for making final design decisions. Insofar adoption of UCD is 
needed in the design for privacy and security in ubicomp, this can be seen as a positive 
quality of the proportionality design method.  
Number of value propositions (V), between conditions Risk Analysis and De-
sign Rationale (mean difference = 1.25, p = 0.05). The higher number of value proposi-
tions (V) stated by participants in the Risk Analysis condition is due to a structural effect 
of one explicit question regarding value proposition n that process. The proportionality 
method also asks for a value proposition to counterbalance the impact on privacy of the 
stakeholders, and although the mean of V in the Proportionality condition is similar to 
that in the Risk Analysis condition, it fails to reach statistical significance at the p < 0.05 
level. 
Quality metric (Q) between conditions Feedback / Control and Risk Analysis 
(mean difference = 1.03, p < 0.05). An interesting observation relates to the Quality (Q)
and Grade (G) mean scores of the Risk Analysis conditi . The mean scores in this con-
dition are quite lower than those in other conditions, and, in fact, the Q mean difference 
between the Feedback / Control and Risk Analysis conditi ns is even statistically signifi-
cant. This result is even more striking considering that participants in the Risk Analysis 
condition identified more security and privacy issue  than those in the other conditions. 
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One possible explanation for this discrepancy is that Risk Analysis was the only method 
that provided a detailed checklist of items to consider during the analysis phase. While 
guaranteeing that relevant questions are not ignored, this check-list approach may have 
resulted in dry ‘laundry-lists’ and may have not provided enough space for developing 
creative designs. Furthermore, few participants in th s condition went through the risk 
management phase due to time constraints, which may have limited their abilities to draft 
interesting designs. The lack of developed designs may have negatively affected the 
evaluated quality of the deliverables. 
Concluding, the quantitative analysis does not provide strong evidence of differ-
ences between the analytic power of the various design methods. In particular, I had hy-
pothesized that at least one of the specialized design methods would have produced a 
more thorough analysis in terms of number of identified privacy and security issues than 
the control condition. Although Design Rationale reported lower C and T values, the dif-
ferences are not statistically significant. On the other hand, my second goal was not of 
demonstrating the predominance of one method over the others in quantitative terms, but 
just understanding the effects of the structure of each design method on the resulting 
analyses. Quantitative analysis provides some insight into these effects. The time spent 
on the assignment and the prior experience of the participant correlates better with the 
number of identified issues than the design method used. 
The design complexity, C, does not correlate significantly with experience, time 
nor the design method. This lack of correlation may be in part explained with the volatil-
ity of this metric: both complex design requirements and simple requirements (such as 
password protection) counted as a design choice. However, the correlation of C with the 
grade indicates that independent evaluators saw differences between designs with low 
and high C values, suggesting that there is a ‘significa t component’ to C apart from 
analysis noise. My interpretation is that the limited scope, complexity and time allocated 
to this exercise did not allow participants to complete the designs to a point at which the 
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time they put into the assignment, their experience and the analytic tools at their disposal 
might have made a difference. While the variable C did not exhaust the expressive poten-
tial of the four design methods, variable T did so, if nly in part.  
5.2.5 Qualitative Analysis 
The objective of the qualitative analysis is to identify differences in the type of 
security / privacy issues brought up by the participants in their designs, as a function of 
the design method employed. This analysis has been conducted by me, by reading all as-
signments and coding the privacy and security issues I found according to a classification 
method described below. The issues were then grouped and further categorized for com-
piling summary analyses. 
5.2.5.1 Identified Issues 
I started by reading an assignment, and tagging assertions that could be inter-
preted clearly as the expression of a privacy or security issue. Then, each issue was com-
pared to a list of issues found in the previous assignments (the list was initially empty). If 
the issue in question was similar enough to one of those already identified, it was labeled 
as such. Otherwise, the issue was inserted in the list as a novel entry, rephrasing it in gen-
eral terms. In cases in which the issue was similar to  previously found issue but did not 
match exactly, the listed issue’s definition was expanded to include both the previously 
found issue and the one at hand. This process resulted in a list of 61 issues, reported in 
Table 5.10. Note that these issues were produced by the participants with specific refer-
ence to the SenseCam technology and application describ d above. Each issue was num-
bered and defined as indicated in the first two columns of the table. The third column in-
dicates the type of issue, as defined below in Section 5.2.5.4. Thereader will notice that 
these ‘issues’ include both potential security and privacy threats in the traditional sense, 
as well as risks to the well-being and physical security of the people affected by the tech-
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nology. Moreover, some issues are broad, whereas others are very specialized. Both these 
effects are caused by the structure of the analysis process. 
Two classic problems with this kind of analysis relat  to matching and coverage. 
First, the judgment of whether an issue corresponds to one previously identified is neces-
sarily arbitrary because I did not use formal models for the privacy and security issues. 
Using such models would have provided more precise re ults in some cases, but at an ex-
ceedingly high cost to the analyst and without the guarantee of being able to model such a 
wide variety of possible issues, threats and risks. Second, a posteriori, some issues may 
overlap. Controlling this overlap requires the evaluator to define accurately every issue 
and to proceed with careful classification. An analysis by external, independent reviewers 
would help increase the reliability of this classification but was not performed at this 
point due to resource constraints. Notwithstanding these two limitations, the classification 
reported above allowed me to make interesting observations, including counting the 
number of unique issues, the most frequent issues, and the type of issues identified in 














Table 5.10: Identified Issues. 
Issue Issue Description Type 
0 Specific to Design – Miscellaneous  Security 
1 Wearer does not understand device Notification 
2 Wearer does not understand rights Notification 
3 Impossibility to turn off/control device Control 
4 User is not aware of device operation Notification 
5 Wearer does not understand risks / when to deactivate device Notification 
6 Pictures taken in inappropriate environment Privacy 
7 FERPA-covered data may be collected Privacy 
8 Owner may circumvent notification mechanisms Notification 
9 Capturing same data multiple times Data 
10 Data tamper/destruction by observer Security 
11 Data management burden excessive Management 
12 Others avoid wearer/stigma Social 
13 Capturing irrelevant data Data 
14 Capturing excess data / excessive storage requirements Data 
15 Camera obscured  Control 
16 Capturing too little data Data  
17 Wearer does not want to capture / loss of privacy of wearer Privacy 
18 Change of behavior in front of camera Social 
19 Recording of others’ health-related information Privacy 
20 Bystander is not aware of presence of camera Notification 
21 Bystander does not understand how camera operates Notification 
22 Recording of pictures of written text Security 
23 Use of photos out of context Social 
24 Maintaining photos permanently Security 
25 Expose data in case of theft/loss / Theft - loss Security 




Table 5.10: Identified Issues. (Continued.) 
Issue Issue Description Type 
27 Intentional surveillance of schools or other peopl  / Misuse of captured info Privacy 
28 Misuse for kidnapping/mugging/harm Physical 
29 Use of data for marketing purposes Privacy 
30 Bribing children to use device Social 
31 Bystander does not understand purpose of use / Lack of trust Notification 
32 Bystander does not know who has access to collected data Notification 
33 Others do not have control on use Control 
34 Curtails plausible deniability Social 
35 Data mining Privacy 
36 Lack of value proposition Social 
37 Removal of device by wearer or others / Assault Physical 
38 Device is distracting to user Social 
39 Data capture about people who do not want it  Privacy 
40 Bystanders feel uncomfortable Social 
41 Legal risks Social 
42 Enable mass surveillance Privacy 
43 Hacking / tampering with device or system Security 
44 Replication of personal data Privacy 
45 Increase disputes between parents and school Social 
46 Unauthorized access after capture Security 
47 Unauthorized tampering with information Security 
48 Others forcing user to take pictures / Others taking pictures with the camera Social 
49 Infrared sensor may reveal hidden details Privacy 
50 Risk of physical damage to child (e.g. choking) Physical 
51 Repurposing of device Social 
52 Record interaction that does not affect wearer Data 




Table 5.10: Identified Issues. (Continued.) 
Issue Issue Description Type 
54 Lack of maintenance / supervision / administration  Management 
55 Others may become verbally abusive with child about camera Physical 
56 Location tracking of wearer and third parties Privacy 
57 Parents exploiting other children’s developmental problems  Social 
58 Unintentional disclosure of collected data Privacy 
59 Child unable to request consent Control 
60 Child does not heed to no-capture desires of others Control 
 
5.2.5.2 Identified Issues by Condition 
A first question is whether the issues identified by participants varied based on the 
condition. Figure 5.8 lists all issues on the vertical axis and shows, on the histogram on 
the left, the numbers of participants in the respectiv  condition who identified that issue. 
Different colors relate to the four different conditions.  
Participants in some conditions were able to identify a higher number of unique 
issues than participants in other conditions (see Figure 5.8). The number of unique issues 
identified by a group of analysts is interesting because it relates to analytic coverage. 
Clearly, higher coverage is better, but it is difficult to understand how to achieve such 
coverage. Section 5.2.5.3 reports on this analysis. 
The figure also suggests that participants in some condition were more likely to 
identify certain issues than participants in other conditions. The question ensues whether 
a certain method leads to identifying certain kinds of issues instead of others. Instead of 
performing such analysis on the raw data, I performed a summary analysis, by grouping 









































































































































0 Specific to Design – Miscellaneous 
1 Wearer does not understand device
2 Wearer does not understand rights
3 Impossibility to turn off/control device
4 User is not aware of device operation
5 Wearer does not understand+B56 risks / when to deactivate device
6 Pictures taken in inappropriate environment
7 FERPA-covered data may be collected
8 Owner may circumvent notification mechanisms
9 Capturing same data multiple times
10 Data tamper/destruction by observer
11 Data management burden excessive
12 Others avoid wearer/stigma
13 Capturing irrelevant data
14 Capturing excess data / excessive storage requirements
15 Camera obscured 
16 Capturing too little data
17 Wearer does not want to capture / loss of privacy of wearer
18 Change of behavior in front of camera
19 Recording of others’ health-related information
20 Bystander is not aware of presence of camera
21 Bystander does not understand how camera operates
22 Recording of pictures of written text
23 Use of photos out of context
24 Maintaining photos permanently
25 Expose data in case of theft/loss / Theft - loss
26 Bystander's information accessed / Take pictures without permission
27 Intentional surveillance of schools or others / Misuse of captured info
28 Misuse for kidnapping/mugging/harm
29 Use of data for marketing purposes
30 Bribing children to use device
31 Bystander does not understand purpose of use / Lack of trust
32 Bystander does not know who has access to collected data
33 Others do not have control on use
34 Curtails plausible deniability
35 Data mining
36 Lack of value proposition
37 Removal of device by wearer or others / Assault
38 Device is distracting to user
39 Data capture about people who do not want it 
40 Bystanders feel uncomfortable
41 Legal risks
42 Enable mass surveillance
43 Hacking / tampering with device, system
44 Replication of personal data
45 Increase disputes between parents and school
46 Unauthorized access after capture
47 Unauthorized tampering with information
48 Others forcing user to take pictures / Others taking pictures with the camera
49 Infrared sensor may reveal hidden details
50 Risk of physical damage to child (e.g. choking)
51 Repurposing of device
52 Record interaction that does not affect wearer
53 Damage to device
54 Lack of maintenance / supervis ion / administration 
55 Others may become verbally abusive with child about camera
56 Location tracking of wearer and third parties
57 Parents exploiting other children's developmental problems 
58 Unintentional disclosure of collected data
59 Child unable to request consent
60 Child does not heed to no-capture desires of others
Number of participants in condition who identified issue
Feedback and Control Risk Analysis Proportionality Design Rationale
 
Figure 5.8: Identified Issues and Frequency. 
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The most often cited issues (e.g., 20, 46, 25, 6) are particularly interesting because 
they help to understand whether the various design methods reliably help identifying at 
least this subset of most popular issues. Furthermore, the question arises whether experts 
would agree that these issues are the most relevant in the context of the SenseCam appli-
cation. This analysis is presented in Section 5.2.5.5. 
Finally, some issues were identified by many participants (in some cases up to 
roughly half of the participants in each condition), but the majority of issues were found 
by only one or two participants. Different methods may lead to different analytic spread, 
i.e., situations in which independent analysts identify heterogeneous subsets of issues or 
where, instead, analysts consistently focus on few,r levant issues. The question of spread 
is examined in Section 5.2.5.6. 
5.2.5.3 Unique Issues  
As mentioned in the previous section, the number of unique issues identified by 
participants in one condition is an interesting metric because it can be used to demon-
strate the analytic coverage of heuristic methods (to which all three privacy methods con-
sidered here belong), in the spirit of Nielsen’s analysis of heuristic evaluation [135]. 
Table 5.11 shows the number of unique issues identified by participants in each condi-
tion. These values are not normalized on the number of participants. A lightweight sig-
nificance test indicates that the Risk Analysis andProportionality conditions are signifi-
Table 5.11: Unique Issues. 
Condition Cumulative  
Unique Issues 
N 
Feedback / Control  29 11 
Risk Analysis 41 12 
Proportionality 37 13 
Design Rationale 24 12 
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cantly different from the Feedback / Control and Design Rationale conditions.53 The 
numbers suggest that the Risk Analysis and Proportionality conditions produced higher 
numbers of unique issues, corroborating the comments in Section 5.2.4.10 above.  
In the case of Risk Analysis the process suggested by Hong et al. provides a long 
list of questions that may have invited participants to come up with a higher number of 
issues. The effect is less clear in the Proportionality condition, which leaves the task of 
identifying issues more open-ended. Feedback / Control only concentrates on a subset of 
privacy issues related to multimedia awareness systems, which may account for the lower 
number of unique issues identified by participants. Finally, Design Rationale does not 
suggest particular privacy and security risks for which the analyst should search and this 
fact can explain the lower number of unique issues id ntified. 
These observations hint at a problem of analysis completeness, a problem com-
mon to many domains. Nielsen argued that multiple analysts performing discount usabil-
                                                
 
 
53 This significance test was done by taking, in each condition, the unique issues identi-
fied by 10 most prolific analysts, those identified by the 10 least prolific analysts, and the 
average number of unique issues identified by all subsets of 10 designers in each condi-



































Figure 5.9: Sample Efficiency Rating Curve. 
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ity procedures can uncover a large percentage of usability issues [135]. This practice is 
not unique to the usability community: multiple, independent experts are also used in SE 
techniques such as Delphi and in IT security engineer g. Nielsen used efficiency rating 
curves to support this claim. These curves assume an independent probability p of identi-
fying a certain usability issue by each expert, and plot the aggregate probability (1-(1-p)n) 
of identifying a given issue as a function of the number of experts n (Figure 5.9 shows a 
sample curve for p = 10%.) These curves suggest that, with enough experts, any issue can 
be identified with high probability and that the marginal benefit of adding experts to the 
task decreases with the number of experts. Jensen has used a similar argument in his 
analysis of the STRAP method vis-à-vis Bellotti and Sellen’s method [107]. 
In this case, however, such reasoning cannot be applied in a straightforward man-
ner, because the statistical data obtained in this study suggests that each design method 
helps the analyst identify only a subset of all the possible issues. For example, the mar-
ginal gains obtained by adding participants to the task of identifying privacy and security 
issues (assuming that the participants who identifid the most issues are counted first) 
decrease to 0 at around 5–7 participants in all four c nditions, although at different num-
bers of unique issues. Note, however, that none of the curves reaches 70% of the total 
number of all identified issues (see Figure 5.10). 
If the inverse graphing strategy is used, i.e., counting first those participants who 
identified fewest issues, a more linear trend appears (Figure 5.11). Finally, I graphed the 
average number of identified issues, computed on all subsets of 1, 2, 3…13 participants 
in each of the four conditions (for example, the values for Participants = 3 represent the 
average of identified issues by all subsets of 3 participants in the respective condition) 
(Figure 5.12).  This graph is similar to the Most-First curves and shows that three out of 
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Figure 5.11: Unique Issues Identified by Participants – Least-First Curve. 
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Unique Issues Identified by Participants in Each 

































Figure 5.12: Unique Issues Identified by Participants – Average Curve. 
 
One interpretation is that although some methods may help identify a higher 
number of unique issues, there is no guarantee that a single method can achieve full cov-
erage of the issue space the way Nielsen’s efficiency curves suggest, nor that any method 
is squarely ‘better’ than the others. This result is due, in my analysis, to a combination of 
analytic ‘noise’ (single participants coming up with ssues that nobody else sees, e.g., is-
sue 49), and the effect of the four design methods encouraging designers only to look into 
a subset of potential issues. The analysis of issue typ  in the next Section suggests that 
the latter effect may in fact be the case. 
5.2.5.4 Types of Issues Identified 
The discussion above leaves open the question of what are the different types of 
issues that each design method helps to identify. Instead of analyzing each issue as a 
separate entity, I grouped them in eight categories: 
– Privacy (general privacy concerns / issues). 
– Security (issues pertaining to traditional security: data and service avail-
ability, confidentiality and integrity). 
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– Social (potential social problems caused by the device). 
– Notification (issues pertaining to notification of collection of data). 
– Physical (risks to the physical integrity of the user or the device). 
– Control (issues pertaining to control on the collection and use of data). 
– Data (data-based issues, .g., collecting too much data). 
– Management (security management issues). 
These categories were derived from the source data but their comprehensiveness 
is confirmed by the fact that they partially overlap with classifications adopted by IT se-
curity best practices (e.g., security management standards like IS17799 [104]). The third 
column in Table 5.10 indicates the classification of each issue. Table 5.12 shows the 
number of issues of each type identified by the participants in each condition, and overall. 
Shaded cells indicate numbers of interest that are discussed below. Note that the numbers 
cannot be compared directly across conditions because of the different numbers of par-
ticipants in the four conditions.  
The most commonly cited issues were those relating to security, privacy, social 
impact and notification problems. In general, security management issues were not fre-











Data Mgmt Total 
Feedback / 
Control 
11 11 9 16 4 2 2 2 57 
Risk 
Analysis 
25 25 11 8 10 6 5 0 90 
Proportio-
nality 
26 19 17 9 9 3 5 0 88 
Design  
Rationale 
25 18 14 11 3 2 1 1 75 




quent in the participants’ analysis. This reflects the general difficulty of forecasting man-
agement problems during application design. The typof issues identified relate loosely 
to the type of questions or heuristics that each design method proposes.54 The Feedback / 
Control condition led participants to cite many more notification issues, probably in re-
sponse to the explicit focus on feedback (notification) mechanisms (this is supported by 
direct inspection of the design deliverables: most of these issues were listed as response 
to the questions by Bellotti and Sellen). On the other hand, the participants in the Feed-
back / Control condition identified a low number of general privacy issues (which include 
consent, data misuse, tc.) and security issues. This may reflect the type of questions ad-
dressed by the QOC framework of that method. SenseCam’s lack of a user interface may 
explain the low number of Control issues found by participants in this condition.  
Similarly, the Proportionality method suggested to analyze the broader social im-
plications of the technology, especially in the desirability and appropriateness phases, and 
this may explain the higher number of identified social issues in this condition. In the 
case of Risk Analysis, many of the issues categorized as “security issues,” are directly 
related to the set of risk analysis and management questions proposed by that method. 
The Proportionality and Risk Analysis conditions produced a higher number of 
physical security issues than the other conditions, probably due to the suggestion in the 
methods to consider the broader effects and potential side-effects of the technology. 
An interesting observation relates to issues of data quality (type “Data”), i.e., col-
lecting irrelevant data, excess data, unusable data or oo little data. Participants in the 
Risk Analysis and Proportionality conditions mentioed more data quality issues than 
participants in the other two conditions. Data quality is an interesting category because it 
                                                
 
 
54 Chapter 3 lists the questions and criteria suggested by the Feedback / Control and Risk 
Analysis methods. Chapter 4 lists the questions of the proportionality method. 
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is part of the FIPS and affects the usefulness judgment of the technology, but is otherwise 
rarely seen as a security issue in the traditional sense. The focus on “value proposition” 
and “balancing” in Risk Analysis and Proportionality may have prompted participants to 
consider this issue (Risk Analysis even asks: “How much information is shared?”). 
5.2.5.5 Most Frequently Identified Issues 
The most frequently identified issues are worthy of their own analysis because 
they introduce the issue of analytic consistency of the design methods. Looking at the 
issues that were identified by the greatest number of participants in each condition may 
help develop claims regarding the kind of analysis that each method consistently favors. 
Focusing on the most frequent issues eliminates thoe “stray” issues that were identified 
by one or two participants, and which might have ben identified due to analysis noise or 
other factors such as personal experience. Table 5.13 lists all privacy and security issues 
identified by at least ⅓ of the participants in one or more conditions (this proportion was 
selected to provide a reasonable number of “most frequent issues”). The percentages in 
the cells indicate the portion of participants in each condition who identified the respec-
tive issue. Cells with percentage 33% or higher are shaded.  
It is worthwhile to note that only one issue has been identified by at least one third 
of all participants in all conditions—“Unauthorized access after capture.” Considering the 
scope and type of issue, it appears to be a reasonable c ndidate as the most prominent 
issue. Three further issues, 6 “Pictures Taken in Inappropriate Environment,” 20 “By-
stander Not Aware of Camera” and 25 “Expose Data in Case of Theft/Loss” were identi-
fied by ⅓ of participants in three of the four conditions. 
A first observation relates to the relevance and type of the most frequently identi-
fied issues. The Risk Analysis, Proportionality and Design Rationale conditions present a 
higher degree of coverage of the most prominent issues. It is interesting to note that in 
this respect, the Feedback / Control condition produce  lower coverage of prominent is-
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sues. This is in part attributable to the analytic framework proposed by that method—
issues such as Theft (25), Disagreement (39), Third Parties (26), etc. are not explicitly 
contemplated by that framework. In this respect, it appears that Bellotti and Sellen’s 
Feedback / Control framework, borne from a specific type of ubicomp application, may 
not perform as well as more general approaches in ide tifying relevant privacy / security 
issues in a different type of application (one obvius difference between the RAVE sys-
tem and SenseCam is the mobility of the latter). 
Design Rationale left participants unaided in discovering issues and this may have 
helped them identifying consistently the more popular issues overall because they were 
free to think about the application without having to respond to specific design questions. 
However, some issues identified often by participants i  that condition are arguably of 
secondary importance in this application context (.g., “Record pictures of written text”). 
Another way of looking at this data is that of cataloging the intentionality of the 
threat associated with a specific issue. Issues marked with an asterisk (*) in Table 5.13 
indicate that the issue requires an intentional action by a threat agent to become a real 
threat. Risk Analysis is correlated with the consistent identification of more issues of this 
kind than Proportionality and Design Rationale. Again, this may be explained by the spe-
cific questions asked in the Risk Analysis analytic framework. 
An interesting consideration relates to the issues that are not in Table 5.13: were 
important issues consistently overlooked by these participants? I did not perform an ex-
pert analysis of this application to compile a set of important privacy and security issues 
usable as benchmark. However, as a first approximation, I employed the list of all identi-
fied issues (Table 5.10) as benchmark. A summary examination of that list suggests that 
few relevant issues in the context of this application were left out by more than ⅔ of the 
participants in all conditions. This suggests that t e issues in Table 5.13 are not only the 
most popular, but also include many of the most relevant. An independent evaluation by 
experts would improve the trustworthiness of this conclusion.  
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Table 5.13: Issues Identified by 33% or More Participants in at Least One Condition. 








46 Unauthorized Access 
After Capture * 
Security 
(45%) (42%) (46%) (50%) 
6 Pictures Taken In Inap-
propriate Environment 
Privacy 
(18%) (33%) (54%) (50%) 
20 Bystander Not Aware Of 
Camera 
Notification 
(45%) (25%) (38%) (58%) 
25 Expose Data In Case Of 
Theft/Loss 
Security 
(27%) (92%) (69%) (58%) 
26 Access To Bystander/ 
Third Party Data 
Privacy 
(18%) (50%) (38%) (17%) 
39 Capture Of Data Of Peo-
ple Who Do Not Agree 
Privacy 
(9%) (25%) (38%) (58%) 
41 Legal Risks Social (18%) (0%) (38%) (67%) 
21 Bystander Doesn’t Un-
derstand Device Operation  
Notification 
(18%) (0%) (15%) (33%) 
22 Record Pictures Of Writ-
ten Text 
Security 
(0%) (25%) (8%) (33%) 
27 Intentionally Monitoring 
School * 
Privacy 
(18%) (42%) (15%) (25%) 
28 Misuse For Kidnapping / 
Mugging * 
Physical 
(18%) (42%) (15%) (25%) 
31 Bystander Doesn’t Un-
derstand Purpose Of Use 
Notification 
(36%) (8%) (0%) (0%) 
32 Bystander Doesn’t Know 
Who Has Access To Data 
Notification 
(36%) (0%) (0%) (0%) 
33 Third Parties Do Not 
Have Control On Use 
Control 
(18%) (33%) (0%) (17%) 
37 Removal Of Device By 
Others / Assault * 
Physical 
(0%) (17%) (38%) (0%) 
** Cells with 33% or higher are shaded. 
 
 169 
5.2.5.6 Issue Spread 
The distinction between prominent issues from those identified occasionally leads 
to the question of how focused each design method is. Table 5.14 reports “analytic 
spread,” i.e., the ratio between unique (Table 5.11) and the total number of issues identi-
fied by participants (last column of Table 5.12) in each condition. This value indicates 
how focused the analysis performed by participants was on a subset of issues (lower val-
ues indicate higher focus). Higher spread indicates  higher variance of issues raised be-
tween participants in a given condition. In general, these values are in accord with the 
data in Table 5.13: participants in the Feedback / Control condition identified less promi-
nent issues, with higher spread and participants in the Design Rationale condition pre-
sented lower spread and more focus on few prominent issues. (Note that the “Total Cu-
mulative Issues” and “Spread” numbers in Table 5.14 have not been tested for statistical 
significance).  
Participants in the Feedback / Control condition identified less unique issues than 
participants in other conditions. Participants using Design Rationale identified roughly as 
many total issues as participants in the Risk Analysis and Proportionality conditions but 
focused on a smaller number of unique issues; this is interesting because it suggests that 
without specific guidance, participants identified almost the same amount of issues as 
Table 5.14: Issue Spread. 





(unique issues /  
total cumulative 
issues) 
Feedback / Control 29 57 0.51 
Risk Analysis 41 90 0.46 
Proportionality 37 88 0.42 
Design Rationale 24 75 0.32 
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other groups but were less “creative” in doing so. Participants in the Proportionality and 
Risk Analysis conditions identified similar numbers of total issues, with the Proportional-
ity conditions showing a slightly higher spread.  
A high spread can be viewed both positively and negatively. High spread may in-
dicate that the design method prompts designers to explore more diversified issues, in-
creasing “analytic reach.” Since these participants did not have enough time to exhaust 
the analysis of the application, they might not have reached a level where they started 
identifying the same issues. Given more time, methods with high spread may result in the 
identification of more issues. A high spread is however a risk to consistency, because it 
weakens the claim to predictability of the outputs of the analysis activity. 
Conversely, low spread may be positive for consistency: every designer using the 
same method tends to find the same issues. However, low spread also suggests that even 
by adding more experts to the task of identifying issues and giving them more time, they 
may still not find all possible issues. 
5.2.6 Subjective Metrics 
In this section, I present summary results on the participants’ subjective assess-
ment of the perceived usefulness and usability of the four methods to complete the 
homework assignment, on the time it took them to complete it and on the stability of their 
opinions and preferences about privacy. 
5.2.6.1 Perceived Usefulness and Usability of the Four Methods 
Table 5.15 shows the self-reported statistics on the perceived usefulness and us-
ability of the design methods as probed in the post-questionnaire. Although none of the 
differences in the averages is significant according to an ANOVA test, due to the high 
variance, it is interesting to observe that Design Rationale scored lowest on the usefulness 







Table 5.15: Perceived Usefulness and Usability of Design Methods. 









The design method was useful 
to me in this assignment. (0: 
strongly disagree, 6: strongly 
agree) 
mean = 4.3 
σ = 1.5 
mean = 4.5 
σ = 1.6 
mean = 4.4 
σ = 1.3 
mean = 3.9 
σ = 2.2 
mean = 4.3 
σ = 1.7 
The design method was easy to 
apply. (0: strongly disagree, 6: 
strongly agree) 
mean = 2.9 
σ = 2.0 
mean = 4.0 
σ = 1.8 
mean = 3.6 
σ = 1.6 
mean = 4.2 
σ = 1.8 
mean = 3.7 
σ = 1.7 
I would use the design method 
again in the future for similar 
design tasks. (0: strongly dis-
agree, 6: strongly agree) 
mean = 3.5 
σ = 1.4 
mean = 4.3 
σ = 1.4 
mean = 4.4 
σ = 1.8 
mean = 4.2 
σ = 1.9 
mean = 4.1 
σ = 1.6 
How did the design method 
affect the quality of your as-
signment? (0: greatly increased, 
6: greatly decreased) 
mean = 2.6 
σ = 1.7 
mean = 3.5 
σ = 1.2 
mean = 3.3 
σ = 1.9 
mean = 1.8 
σ = 1.6 
mean = 2.8 
σ = 1.7 
How did the design method 
affect the time it took to per-
form the homework? (0: greatly 
increased, 6: greatly decreased) 
mean = 1.8 
σ = 1.9 
mean = 1.6 
σ = 1.5 
mean = 2.7 
σ = 1.7 
mean = 2.6 
σ = 1.3 
mean = 2.2 




Risk Analysis and Proportionality scored lowest on the perceived improvement of 
the quality of the assignment (note that the scale is inverted for consistency reasons with 
other questions on the survey). In any case, they scored barely worse than the mid point 
(which was labeled “did not increase nor decrease”). It is interesting to note that the self-
assessed measure of quality across conditions is somewhat parallel to the evaluators’ 
quality metric Q in Table 5.9 (in fact, there is a weak, non-significant correlation).  
Participants in all four conditions indicated that using the respective design 
method increased the time needed for the assignment (especially in the Feedback / Con-
trol and Risk Analysis conditions). This is interesting because it contrasts with interview 
responses and written comments on the questionnaires, where participants noted that hav-
ing a standard procedure to follow relieved them from having to plan the steps needed for 
performing the homework. On the other hand, many participants complained that the 
homework was too complex and lengthy for the available time. Recalling the comments 
made in the pilot study interviews, the correct interpretation of this contradiction may be 
that, while having a standard procedure reduced planning time, satisfying all the steps 
required by such procedure took more time than what they would have otherwise spent 
on the assignment. 
Note that the self-assessed data on time reflects in part the homework execution 
time TT in Table 5.8 (again, there is a weak, non-sig ificant correlation). For example, 
the perception of the increase in time required to complete the assignment by participants 
in the Proportionality condition was the lowest. These participants took the least time in 
completing the assignment. 
5.2.6.2 Participants’ Change of Privacy Preferences 
On average, participants stated that their opinions on privacy and security had not 
changed because of participating in this study (“Working on this assignment changed my 
opinion about technology and its social implications.” 0: strongly disagree, 6: strongly 
 
 173 
agree; mean 3.0, σ = 1.7, no significant difference across conditions). This is part sup-
ported by the stability of the Harris-Westin survey taken before and after the assignment 
was made. Only 13 participants changed their Westin classification, and in all cases these 
were borderline switches.  
It should be noted, however, that the Harris-Westin classification scheme may not 
be particularly suited to characterize the privacy opinions of participants with reference to 
this study, because it relates to individuals vs. organizations as opposed to personal appli-
cations such as the target of the homework in this study. Moreover, the Harris-Westin is 
intended for probing the opinions of consumers and not designers. 
5.3 Discussion 
What conclusions can be drawn from the results this evaluation, specifically in 
reference to the thesis outlined in Chapter 1? Although many of the results presented 
above are not statistically significant, it is still possible to infer a number of interesting 
conclusions. 
Participants in all four conditions took approximately the same amount of time to 
complete the assignments and many indicated that the assignment scope was broader than 
what they could accomplish in the allotted timeframe. This, and the high spread measures 
reported in Table 5.14 above suggest that the participants did not individually exhaust the 
“analytic potential” of any of the four design methods (i.e., they did not reach the point 
where no further security and privacy issues could have been identified, and design 
choices made). They also did not exhaust the design space, (i.e., the number of aspects of 
the design and application that were available for consideration) as indicated by the low 
ratio between identified issues by any participant and total identified issues.  
Thus, the results are bound by the available time. One may question whether it is 
fair to evaluate design methods, that by definition are meant to be used over long periods, 
in a time-limited experiment. One approach would have been to allow designers more 
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time—a month or two (as was done in the pilot study). At the other extreme, are time-
constrained evaluations of performance. For example, Chung et al.’s evaluation of pat-
terns was limited to 80 minutes, both for expert and novice designers; in Jensen’s evalua-
tion of STRAP, participants took 80–100 minutes to complete the analysis. It is true that 
design tasks in the real world enjoy limited budgeting and staffing and that IT developers 
commonly lament lack of both. However, design and aalysis, even of very simple appli-
cations such as SenseCam, are complex activities that require time to perform accurately. 
Limiting evaluation to one or two hours may not result in an accurate picture of how de-
signers work in practice. In this respect, I believe that the setup of this study strikes a 
middle ground between a drastically time-limited “race to find the issue” and an un-
bounded analysis.  
Time spent on the assignment, as well as the experience of the participants, ap-
pear to be important determinants in the comprehensiv ess of the analysis. There is sig-
nificant correlation between the time needed to complete the assignment and the number 
of security and privacy issues identified. The experience metric is also correlated with the 
number of identified issues. This suggests that participants with extensive prior experi-
ence were somewhat facilitated in the analysis. On average, these two factors appear to 
be more influential than the specific design method employed, suggesting, again, that the 
limits of the design methods were not reached. 
However, the number of identified privacy and security issues cannot be taken as 
the best or only way of evaluating the design products, as suggested by the lack of corre-
lation between the evaluators’ quality judgment with the number of identified issues. The 
relevance of issues as well as more general concerns r garding issue coverage and heuris-
tics’ efficiency are as important in evaluating a design method. 
In this respect, the qualitative analysis provides even more compelling insight 
than the quantitative assessment: the issues that were identified by the participants were 
related to the analysis questions proposed by the three privacy-specific design methods. 
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Lacking this support, participants in the control cndition identified less unique privacy 
and security issues. Analytic coverage (the percentage of identified issues by all partici-
pants in one condition relative to all issues) of each method appears to be limited, and it 
is not clear whether any one method would help ident fyi g all the issues that were men-
tioned by the participants—ideally, two or more design methods covering different as-
pects of the design space should be used together, by multiple analysts, to obtain high 
coverage and a high probability of identifying relevant issues.  
Such a compound design method could combine general questions, such as those 
proposed by the proportionality method, with a risk analysis approach and domain-
specific questions such as those proposed by Bellotti and Sellen. 
The lack of concern for security management in the participants’ designs—both 
of experienced and inexperienced participants—thoug expected, is worrying. Security 
management is today considered one of the most challenging aspects of information sys-
tems’ security, and ubicomp technology will bring a whole new scale to the problem. The 
worry is not that the participants did not raise management issues—after all, a majority of 
study participants were students with scarce professional experience, and security man-
agement is (unfortunately) not taught in class. What is worrisome is that none of these 
“design methods” managed to push the problem of management to the forefront of the 
designers’ attention. In truth, the proportionality method suggests to consider manage-
ment issues during design, but that observation is buried in the method’s description and 
may not be prominent enough. One conclusion is that management should be promoted to 
a major item of concern in future design methods in this domain. 
5.4 Thesis Coverage 
Let’s return now to the proportionality method and reconsider the thesis statement 
of Chapter 1. My personal experience with the case studies of Chapter 4 and the two 
studies documented in this Chapter provide some matrial for arguing the various claims. 
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Thesis Claim 1, that the proportionality method canbe employed in the design of 
ubiquitous computing applications, is in my judgment supported not only by own experi-
ence in the case studies, but also by the results of both the pilot and the evaluation stud-
ies. The proportionality method was usable by participants of the pilot study. The propor-
tionality method was used by participants in the second study along with other similar 
design methods, with good results in terms of quality, comprehensiveness, issue cover-
age.  
Thesis Claim 2, that it “supports requirements analysis by indicating pertinent re-
search questions targeted at improving the understanding of applications and their usage 
context” is supported, again, by my own experience documented in the two case studies 
and by study participants. Participants in the pilot study spontaneously commented that it 
helped them frame research questions and communicate in a way that is convincing to 
external people. Though encompassing less steps than Risk Analysis, the proportionality 
method fared comparably in the number of identified privacy and security issues (which I 
use as a proxy for “requirements analysis” in the tsis claim), and brought many more 
participants to state the need for external reference than the other methods. 
Thesis Claim 3, that it helps “select the most appro riate alternative among design 
options” was not demonstrated. Informal evidence gained in the analysis of the design 
products in the two studies suggests that it helped decide among design options, but not 
that the choices made by designers are the most appropriate. At this point, there is not 
sufficient evidence to support this claim, also because confirming it would require further 
evaluation of the design decisions taken by participants. 
Thesis Claim 4 (generality across individuals) is in part confirmed by the informal 
analysis of the design deliverables, where participants followed the steps suggested by 
the method’s description. However, the average Adherence score of the Proportionality 
condition is relatively low at 0.71, due to many participants skipping the adequacy phase 
probably due to lack of time. Issue spread, which I used to indicate the level of consis-
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tency across designers, is the second lowest among the four conditions, at 0.42. Overall, 
there is not sufficient evidence for confirming or disproving this thesis. 
Thesis Claim 5 (acceptable cost) is supported by the data collected in the second 
study. Participants using the proportionality method employed approximately the same 
time as participants in other methods, with similar if not better performance in terms of 
identified issues, grade and quality. 
Thesis Claim 6 (better performance) could not be demonstrated conclusively. 
Data shows that the performance of the proportionalty method with relation to variable T 
is very close to that of Hong et al.’s risk analysis, and better than Design Rationale and
Bellotti and Sellen’s framework. The difference in means is not statistically significant. 
However, proportionality also scores high both in the cumulative total number of identi-
fied issues (see Table 5.10), and in the coverage of the top 15 issues (see Table 5.13). 
Concluding, while it seems that the proportionality method may have not fared 
significantly better than the other methods in quantit tive terms, this evaluation suggests 
a path for further research, which combines one or m re methods to achieve superior re-
sults—specifically, a general design method such as the proportionality method com-
bined with a heuristic method such as the Bellotti’s framework. This argument is further 


















TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES 
 
In the introduction, I argued that a tighter integration of UCD principles in the 
domain of ubicomp privacy and security is necessary for bridging the acceptance gap fac-
ing the development of these technologies.  
In Chapter 4, I compared the proportionality method to a scaffolding structure that 
invites the designer to ask questions about the stakeholders, the application and its de-
sign, but does not indicate a response to those questions. The evaluation in Chapter 5 
provided hints that this scaffolding structure indee  accomplishes its purpose of motivat-
ing a user-centered approach to security and privacy analysis. In particular, the partici-
pants using the proportionality method in the second evaluation study referenced the need 
for external inputs and validation (which includes probing users’ opinions, evaluating the 
technology in deployments, analysis of legislation, etc.) statistically more often than par-
ticipants in other conditions. This suggests that te proportionality method encourages 
designers to adopt an inquisitive approach to design in this domain, potentially furthering 
UCD. 
Therefore, the question becomes how to integrate, in practice, user inquiry and a 
broader consideration of requirements into privacy nd security-enhancing design. Us-
ability and security are a tough mix, and often compete for what remains of a product de-
velopment budget once as many features as possible have been designed and performance 
maximized. In Seeing What’s Next, Christensen et al. argue that non-functional aspects of 
design (such as usability or privacy) are relevant, from a business standpoint, only for a 
short window in most products’ lifecycle, after the product has matured but before com-
petition shifts to price [44].  
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This Chapter attempts to address these questions: hw do we identify the most 
relevant questions affecting adoption, security andprivacy in a timely manner? How do 
we demonstrate their relevance and how do we go about answering them? And, finally, 
how do we integrate the acquired knowledge back into application design? Below, I pre-
sent some techniques that I have used in the past few years in connection with the case 
studies described in Chapter 4. Instead of discussing how the proportionality method was 
applied in the two studies, as done above, I discuss here more general issues, including 
the advantages and disadvantages of the techniques I us d. There is no silver bullet, and I 
do not claim that my experience generalizes to all ubicomp applications—the intent in 
this Chapter is to start reflecting on the application of user-centered design in the domain 
of privacy and security in ubicomp, with the hope that these observations may be useful 
for solving similar problems in the future. 
6.1 Using Surveys Probing Privacy and Security Questions 
In Chapter 4, I noted that in order to make strong claims within the proportional-
ity method, reference to the user and the application’s purpose is necessary in addition to 
considering technical and legal issues. Surveys are a popular way of probing the opinion 
of people about a technology and are widely used in the HCI community. Surveys repre-
sent a low-cost method for gathering statistically significant information about users’ 
preferences and opinions. However, privacy and security are elusive topics to survey, be-
cause often the behavior of people differs from what t ey say when asked about them.  
In Chapter 3, I claimed that many people assume a dontological stance towards 
privacy for many reasons, including insufficient informational awareness, overriding 
primary goals or carelessness. On the other hand, people have a very refined sense of pri-
vacy in interpersonal relations, as described by Altman [20], and may choose certain 
paths of behavior to avoid conflict or in response to overriding social goals. In some 
cases, however, they may be unable or unwilling to explain their behavior, due to many 
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reasons. Behavior in specific circumstances may be difficult to generalize; second, it may 
be difficult to express openly (e.g., the need for plausible deniability in social relations is 
well known [54], but people may not want to admit it); and thirdly, we may be unaware 
of certain dynamics because they are so engrained in our daily behavior. 
Security is often perceived as an impediment to effectiveness and many organiza-
tions handle data differently from how a straightforward security system assumes. Povey 
argues that any security system should provide escap  mechanisms that allow users to 
complete transactions, in exceptional circumstances, that would be otherwise forbidden 
[147]. Povey claims that by employing audit and redress, social forces can prevent mis-
use even without strict technical control, while still allowing for exceptions. He calls this 
policy “Optimistic Security.” I would argue further that in many instances there is a mis-
match between day-to-day behavior and idealized (and often overly strict) security 
frameworks, and that this is one of the reasons why many security systems fail—a similar 
rift exists between written policies and actual practice in some ISO9001-certified organi-
zations. Asking people in a survey how their “security system” works (be it in an organi-
zation or in private life) may likely result in them describing the way it should work, and 
not how it really works. These observations suggest that surveys must attempt to investi-
gate the “action behind the opinion.”  
In Chapter 2, I distinguished the “personal privacy” approach to privacy issues 
from the “data protection” approach. These distinctions are relevant also when using sur-
veys to probe privacy attitudes. Personal privacy focuses on interpersonal relations, that 
most individuals manage continuously as a natural matter of life, influenced by the social 
context, the quality of the interpersonal relationship and the purposes of the activities be-
ing achieved. As mentioned above, many details of the social relationships involved in 
personal privacy may go unexpressed in the standardized questions of a survey. To probe 
these details, researchers should attempt to capture the actual manifestation of privacy 
preferences and attitudes and focus on specific instances of interpersonal interchanges 
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(for example, in the Personal Audio Loop Diary study interviews, we tried to survey 
opinions always in relation to a specific incident of use of the application). In fact, tools 
such as ethnographic inquiry, experience sampling procedures, or evidence-based focus 
groups may represent more informative investigative tools, as discussed further below. 
On the contrary, data protection rests on the accurte definition of data manage-
ment processes and on the specification of privacy preferences and procedures. Given 
that data protection issues arise in conjunction to large numbers of individuals, surveys 
appear as an appropriate tool for probing a social group’s preferences (e.g., the GVU 
WWW User Survey [83], the PB&A Survey [149]). Here, one fundamental evaluation 
challenge rests in the ability to convey, to non-expert users, sufficient information to ex-
press reasonable and informed preferences and attitudes (as attempted by Günther and 
Spiekermann in their recent survey on RFID privacy preferences [82]). As Adams and 
Blandford point out [17, p. 180],  risk management is hard for individuals who do not 
have sufficient information to evaluate the graveness and likelihood of a certain threat—
e.g., how does the retention time of financial information by credit rating organizations 
affect identity theft? Even experts may be unable to state informed and realistic policies 
in such settings. The way these threats are presented to the surveyed participant may 
strongly influence the outcome of surveys and is a serious roadblock to gathering reliable 
data for design. Furthermore, surveys can fail to consider scale: asking whether an indi-
vidual desires tight control on certain information disclosures may not be representative 
of the individual’s day-to-day handling of hundreds of information disclosures. In this 
context, it is interesting to note that one of the main weaknesses of data protection legis-
lation is in long-term control and scalability. Not nly are individuals unaware of their 
rights, as noted in a 2003 EU Commission report [49], but they also tend to forget of all 
the parties to which they consented disclosing data. 
Summarizing, surveys may be a cost-effective way of gathering information about 
user preferences and opinions, but the researcher should beware that results may differ 
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significantly from how people may act when faced with the same situation in the real 
world, both when considering personal privacy and iformation transactions with data 
protection concerns. 
6.2 Beyond Surveys: Using Experience Sampling to Probe Privacy and Security 
In light of the problems detailed above, I have come to question the descriptive 
power of abstract surveys on privacy and security, even accounting for their cost advan-
tages. Studies that probe users more closely, such as ethnographic observation, can pro-
duce more accurate results. In addition to providing grounding for determining legiti-
macy, appropriateness or adequacy of an application, such studies help to understand how 
users might adopt the application, and its social effects. 
Even adopting these inquiry tools, the problem remains that people may be unable 
to grasp immediately the security effects of new technologies on their existing socio-
technical practices: ubicomp technologies are often difficult to imagine in operation, and 
in addition, security or privacy-enhancing functions may not be employed immediately. 
However, observing use in a long-term deployment may be a costly endeavor. We thus 
have a chicken-and-egg problem in that “authentic” observation of people’s behavior and 
opinions probed in realistic conditions is necessary fo  informing design, but a certain 
level of technology is necessary for allowing peopl to understand what is being asked. 
 In part as a response to this problem, Experience Sampling Method (ESM) stud-
ies are becoming increasingly popular in HCI practice, often in association with diary 
studies, to probe privacy questions. Experience sampling is a self-reported inquiry tech-
nique that has long been used within behaviorism, medicine, and industrial psychology. 
Larson and Csikszentmihalyi were among the first to pr pose experience sampling as a 
quantitative self-reported inquiry technique [117] for social and psychological research. 
Wheeler and Rois described the use of experience sampling techniques in many domains, 
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and categorized them in: interval-, signal- and event-contingent, depending on what initi-
ates the self-report procedure [181].  
Prior to the Reno deployment, Consolvo et al. conducted a signal-contingent ex-
perience sampling to study the privacy issues involved in disclosing one’s location on 
mobile terminals [51]. In their study, participants carried a Palm device that simulated, at 
random times, location requests from friends, family and colleagues. Consolvo et al. 
point out that these random simulated requests were in various occasions implausible 
from a social standpoint. Nevertheless, they were abl to obtain interesting data on their 
participants’ privacy preferences that would have be n difficult to obtain using a normal 
paper survey. 
The PAL Diary and Proxy studies described in Chapter 4 both employ event-
contingent experience sampling procedures. In the Diary study, the event prompting the 
survey was the hypothesized instance of use of the application (i.e., when the user desired 
to re-listen to audio he or she heard in the near past). Figure 6.1 shows a sample diary en-
try compiled for each event by the diary study participants, including salient questions 
about the application usefulness and potential privacy implications (“were other people 
    
Figure 6.1: The PAL diary. 
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present at the recording?,” “how long ago did the ev nt happen”). The diary was purpose-
fully made to mimic the form factor of the phone on which we had developed the PAL 
application (picture on the right). Each diary contai ed several event pages and was re-
placed every week during the study. The diary entris were utilized in weekly interviews 
to provide factual foundation to questions about the hypothesized use of the application. 
Appendix B contains the interview templates we used in the weekly interviews, where we 
probed both a selection of specific events and general opinions. 
In both this study and the Proxy study, we were abl to gain credible insight into 
the privacy preferences of the participants in socially plausible situations. Using event-
contingent instead of signal-contingent procedures allowed us to increase the plausibility 
and realism of the probed situation. 
6.2.1 “Paratypes:” Combining Experience Sampling with Experience Prototyping 
In the PAL Proxy study, the survey was also prompted by an “event”—the con-
versation occurring between a hypothetical user of PAL and another person. However, 
the Proxy study went further than merely sampling participants’ experience. When the 
investigator (the proxy) handed out the survey, he or she asked the participant to imagine 
that he or she had been using PAL. This allowed us to prototype an experience,55 with a 
concrete reference to an instance of real life, and to sample the participant’s opinion on 
that instance. I called this procedure a paratype: a simulation, or model, of interaction (“-
type”) with a technology which is evaluated alongside (“para-”) real-world experience. 
                                                
 
 
55 Buchenau and Suri published an article on Experience Prototyping [41], where they 
claim that role playing can be useful for understanding the social context in which a per-
son will use a technology. Their approach creates artificial experiences (e.g., by building 
a reproduction of a plane interior, or by role playing during a train journey). In the PAL 
Proxy study, we attempted to use the actual experience of the participant, as it would 
have happened without the study.  
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This procedure allowed us to situate participant response in the experience the person just 
had, with a specific partner, conversation topic and location, supposedly reducing recall 
errors and hypothetical answers. That the survey was administered by human proxies is 
not part of my definition of paratype. The term paratype only refers to introducing simu-
lated interaction with a certain technological artif ct within a specific setting of real so-
cial action, and documenting the effects of this combination. The proxy’s role was only 
incidentally that of administering the survey—the main function of the proxy was that of 
acting as “PAL’s user” and as interaction counterpart of the participant. In this sense, the 
proxy’s role was to create the instance of technological interaction on which we wanted 
feedback, with the help of the description of the application and, upon request, a demon-
stration of the working device. Event-contingent exp rience sampling was deemed a par-
ticularly suitable way of documenting participant feedback in this case. 
Figure 6.2 shows the PAL proxy survey. The survey form is divided in three 
parts, here shown after being reassembled. The right s de was given to the participant af-
ter the conversation with the proxy had occurred. It contains a description of the applica-
tion and the survey (the descriptive text is reported in Appendix B for enhanced readabil-
ity). The survey was designed to be self-explanatory, and contained a description of PAL 
and a short questionnaire. The description had beenvalidated prior to the study to ensure 
that it would be pertinent and sufficient. When possible, the investigator explained PAL 
verbally, and optionally showed the working application, if requested by the participant. 
We chose not to operate PAL during the study on ethical grounds and to avoid conten-
tious situations. The left side was filled out by the researcher while the participant was 





Figure 6.2: Proxy Study Survey. 
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The participant was asked to fill out the survey immediately if possible, to in-
crease recall accuracy. Otherwise, the survey portion of the card (lower right in Figure 2) 
was return-addressed on the backside and could be mail d back at the participant’s con-
venience (we affixed a postage stamp for this purpose). The questionnaire included six 
questions on a 5-point scale, one multiple-choice qu stion and, on the backside, a blank 
space for optional comments in addition to our lab’s address and space for postage. The 
questions included the following: 
– the importance of being informed about the application; 
– the importance of asking permission before using the application; 
– the time span for which the subject would allow the us r to store the con-
versation; 
– the likelihood that the subject would ask the user to erase the recording;  
– the importance of asking for permission to copy andreplay the conversa-
tion to others; and 
– an indication of the subjective “confidentiality” of the conversation.  
The survey also included three anonymous demographic questions: age range (in 
decade), gender and occupation. This structure minimized completion time and, in fact, 
most participants were able to complete the survey immediately. 
I believe that this setup allowed us to gather observations that would have been 
difficult to obtain with a typical survey or in a lboratory setup. For example, I could 
have used scenarios to evaluate PAL, asking people t  r ad a short story of one instance 
of use of PAL and then answer to a survey. However, such a setup would have three 
drawbacks: 1) it would require participants to reflect on a situation that may not be part of 
their way of behaving; 2) the selection of the situation and the way the scenario is pre-
sented may affect the results; and 3) it would be difficult to create a set of scenarios rep-
resentative of all possible conversational situations.  
Because the paratype combines event-contingent experi nc  sampling with ex-
perience prototyping, it is especially useful for evaluating high-level or implicit interac-
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tion where reference to concrete instances of life is needed. This is particularly important 
when we do not know how often these instances arise, or how to describe them (e.g., how 
often are people in a “confidential” conversation?) and when later recollection of these 
instances may be inaccurate. The latter may occur when reference is sought to privacy, 
or, more generally, to social relations, personal preferences, or when considering situated 
action [161].  
In fact, paratypes, and more generally experience sampling, may be useful for 
gathering early feedback on mobile and ubiquitous technologies, such as applications that 
collect information at unexpected times (e.g., Microsoft’s SenseCam [75]), or provide 
information when needed (e.g., portable guides), or where interaction is embedded in un-
planned social practice or everyday routine, such as ome communication systems [133]. 
These applications may have high prototyping costs; probing salient aspects of the ex-
perience without the need for working artifacts may represent an efficient way of obtain-
ing relevant information needed for design.  
6.2.2 Caveats 
When using paratypes (and generally mixed experience prototyping and sampling 
techniques), several issues must be considered, includ g potential sources of bias related 
to the people who are used in the sampling and the typ  of experiences manufactured. 
Moreover, study implementation cost may be higher tan normal surveys.  
The demographics of the proxies are likely to influence the demographics of the 
respondents, in terms of age, socio-economic class, education, etc. In the PAL Proxy 
study, the proxies’ age, profession and social class are reflected in the respondents’. Also, 
relative differences in age, gender and socio-economic class between proxy and respon-
dent could influence the results. To control these variables, it is advisable to recruit a di-
verse group of proxies as possible, and to verify that heir social interaction patterns actu-
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ally reach the target demographic by using exercises specifically developed for this pur-
pose [129].  
Selection bias on the probed situations may also repres nt a potential issue with 
paratypes and experience sampling. Research ethics and ocial appropriateness may sug-
gest avoiding intrusive studies in sensitive situatons (e.g., at a funeral) and to resort to 
more hypothetical means for probing behavior. Certain countermeasures may decrease or 
control situation selection bias. First, the researche  administering the survey could com-
plete only his side of the data, without handing out the survey to the participant. This 
would provide a statistic on the number of situations that were not probed, and the reason 
why this did not happen, thus allowing researchers to plan supplemental inquiry. Second, 
administration of the experience sampling survey could be deferred to a more appropriate 
moment. Researcher’s notes could be used to help th articipant recollect the situation, 
although there is a risk of introducing even more bias. 
While conducting an experience sampling study is decidedly less expensive than a 
deployment with a working prototype, which typically has high development, recruit-
ment, and operational costs, it is not, by any means,  ‘discount usability’ technique 
[135]. It still requires careful planning and its execution is more complex than a mass sur-
vey administered via email or by stopping people in a shopping mall. Cost is related to 
sample size. The number of participants of ESM studies (and of our PAL Proxy study) is 
generally low compared to other privacy surveys such as the GVU WWW User Surveys 
[83] and Ackerman et al.’s e-commerce surveys mentioned above [15]. In effect, experi-
ence sampling trades quantity for increased authenticity and situatedness. Given the 
lower number of participants it is especially important to verify demographic coverage 
when using these techniques. 
Disruption is an important consideration as well. Because immediate feedback is 
sought, the survey must fit within the timeframe of the interaction that it is probing. The 
PAL Proxy study succeeded in this, although at the cost of having to sensibly cut down 
 
 191 
the number of questions asked. One practical problem w  incurred in this respect was re-
lated to consent requirements set by our IRB (Institutional Review Board). Although we 
did not have to document participants’ consent (i.e., have them sign a consent form), we 
still had to provide them with an information notice. Reading the one-and-a-half page no-
tice disrupted the experience even further than the disruption caused by filling out the 
survey. More concise consent notices would be helpful, though changing standard word-
ing requires extensive collaboration with IRB officials. 
6.3 Using Prototypes in Deployments with Users 
While Experience Sampling can be used to gain early feedback on ubicomp tech-
nologies with reduced cost, developing prototypes and deploying them with test users can 
prove to be a much more costly endeavor. The advantage, however, is increased realism, 
leading to supposedly more reliable data, and the ability to identify emergent issues.  
The deployment of the Reno application that I conducted with Intel Research, 
mentioned in Chapter 4, is an example of such a study done to answer specific privacy 
questions. Colleagues at Intel had previously focused on the privacy implications of dis-
closing the user’s location (Consolvo et al.’s ESM study) and at understanding usage 
(Smith et al.’s pilot deployment). The deployment I carried out wi h two families with 
teenage children investigated the issues of plausible deniability and the need for auto-
matic functions within the application [99, 100]. In this study we used a number of in-
struments to gather data: usage was logged on the phone and reported back to the re-
searchers once a day using SMS and emails. We interviewed the participants twice, after 
sending them email questionnaires every other day. And we collected demographic and 
preference data using questionnaires. 
The results of the interviews were interesting because they showed that privacy 
was subsumed in a broader system of concerns and requirements. For example, Reno 
could be configured to reply automatically to location requests (the Instant Reply func-
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tion described in Section 4.3.2.1), but participants did not use this automatic feature. We 
expected privacy to be the primary reason. Instead, interview records show that the pri-
mary reasons were a lack of need, the desire to avoid misleading their conversation part-
ners with potentially wrong disclosures and to maintain expressive control on the com-
munication; achieving privacy protection and maintaining the freedom to exercise plausi-
ble deniability was mentioned only occasionally by participants [99].  
In that study, one-to-one interviews proved to be good investigative tools for un-
derstanding the intent of individuals’ actions with relation to privacy. Even then, it is im-
portant to separate causes and effects carefully. The Reno study was focused on privacy, 
but we were careful not to address the issue of privacy upfront in the interviews, in order 
to avoid biasing participants. We addressed the issue of privacy explicitly only at the end 
of the last interview, if the participant had not brought it up autonomously. Had we 
sought explicit feedback on privacy upfront, we may h ve obtained skewed observations, 
in terms of an excessive focus on privacy. Focusing o  utility and day-to-day manage-
ment instead, allowed us to frame privacy questions n broader terms that I believe are 
more representative of potential use.  
In contrast, log data on the use of the application proved difficult to interpret in 
isolation, and we did not succeed in gathering statistic data on the reasons for using the 
application, notwithstanding the email questionnaires sent every other day to sample use 
contained questions about use purpose. One of the reasons for this was that the deploy-
ment was too short and usage did not settle. This invalidated claims that our observations 
would be representative of actual long-term use. Furthermore, we did not collect descrip-
tive information about enough instances of use from the users in the interviews (e.g., ex-
planations why they sent a particular message). For these reasons we chose not to use the 
traffic logs to derive conclusions on privacy and security, and resorted mostly on qualita-
tive data from interviews instead. 
 
 193 
The Reno study highlighted some potential issues that must be considered when 
performing this type of deployment to probe privacy and security, including the charac-
terization of users, learning curves and deployment circumstances. These issues are dis-
cussed in further detail below. 
6.3.1 User Characterization  
One issue is how to characterize users and their ned for security and privacy fea-
tures. Attributing needs for specific security features to certain user groups based on 
common sense can be very misleading. In the Reno depl yment, with the support of so-
cial psychology literature and common sense, we assumed that deceptive practices among 
teens and parents would be quite prominent. When we failed to observe the amount of 
deception we had hypothesized, we were forced to look back and reconsider our assump-
tions. First, we observed large variability among teens in their use of the technology. 
Each user appropriated the system in different ways, nd each teenager had different pri-
vacy needs which required different security strategies. For example, one participant 
formed a very clear mental model of the application and demonstrated the ability to ac-
tively deceive his parents about his location in order to achieve personal privacy with re-
gard to the places he desired to go. This participant admitted that he would have never 
voluntarily used the Instant Reply feature, because he worried that his parents would have 
used it as a surveillance tool to prevent him visiting certain friends. If forced, he also 
claimed that he would label places in a way that would not cause repercussions with his 
parents. 
Some participants relied on their parents providing transportation to achieve their 
own social goals and thus were quite insensitive to privacy concerns. Other teenagers 
thought that socially induced self-restraint would have prevented abuse of the automatic 
reply function (e.g., stalking), because the requesting party’s identity would have be visi-
ble in their Reno inbox.  
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Thus, characterizing use of privacy and security features based on broad social 
groups like ‘parents’ and ‘teens’ was demonstrated to be exceedingly blunt. Characteriza-
tion must be more fine-grained to provide high quality results, especially in studies with 
small participant pools. 
6.3.2 Long Learning Curves 
User studies that target the security and privacy-related features of applications 
are hampered by the fact that these features, deriving from non-functional requirements, 
tend to remain invisible until users really need them or some incident occurs. This mun-
dane observation has the consequence that it is diff cult to define the length of a user 
study that reliably produces observations on the use of such features.  
We found that the Reno application was not fully appro riated even after 14 days 
of deployment. (The application was running, in theav rage across participants, 48% of 
the total study time, thus for the majority of the wake hours). Reno was arguably a simple 
application composed of 40–50 interaction steps (screens) accessible to the user (approx. 
15,600 lines of Java code). Considerable effort went into fine-tuning the interface, which 
had been reviewed after the pilot study, and subjected to a cognitive walkthrough by two 
experienced HCI professionals. Notwithstanding training and access to detailed docu-
mentation, most participants took one full week to become acquainted with the applica-
tion’s basic functionality, and a majority of participants never used advanced features 
with security implications such as the automatic features and the auditing functions. 
Longer studies may allow researchers to observe the usage of these technologies, 
but cost concerns may limit the duration of deployment studies. However, in the Reno 
study, most of the cost was incurred during the planning and development phases, and not 
during the actual deployment. On the other hand, long deployments may be problematic 
for recruitment, requiring higher compensations andincurring higher recruitment costs. 
Long deployments also require guarantees against usability issues or malfunctions in the 
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software, or contingency plans in the event issues should arise. Segmented deployments 
may provide the best results. In these deployments, participants use the application for a 
certain amount of time. The application is then fine-tuned, and showstopper bugs are 
fixed. The same set of participants then use the application again for the remainder of the 
study, which reduces deployment costs related to learning. 
6.3.3 The Impact of Deployment Circumstances  
As people’s social activity and practices vary not only over the course of a life-
span but in yearly, weekly and shorter cycles, the results of user studies can be strongly 
influenced by the specific circumstances of a deployment. This demands careful selection 
of appropriate times of year for performing specific studies. In the Reno deployment 
study, for example, it was observed that the tight sc edules of most teens, and the time of 
year, during school, just before major holidays, reduced their independent mobility. I be-
lieve this impacted our observation of deceptive practices both between peers, and with 
their parents. 
Some participants went as far as spontaneously noting that repeating the study 
during the summer vacation could have produced verydifferent usage patterns. During 
that time, teen participants would have been much more mobile and independent than 
during the period of our deployment, and potential deceptive practices related to their 
specific activities outside of the home may have ben very different. Again, this issue 
emphasizes the latent character of security and privacy requirements. 
6.4 Looking at Both Sides of the Issue 
The proportionality method suggests that designers should examine both the bene-
fits that an application provides to the user and the security and privacy constraints of all 
affected parties. For example, in the PAL application, we considered both the primary 
user’s needs and his or her conversation partners’ concerns, as well as the concerns of 
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other third parties. In some cases, a trade-off among design choices can be reached. One 
fundamental parameter of the application is the retention time of the buffer—
proportionality suggested a balance between a useful enough application and a minimal 
invasion of privacy.  
Application usefulness was probed using a diary study. In that study, participants 
were asked to complete a very short survey about when t ey would like to use PAL to 
recall previously recorded audio. These surveys were collected in a diary that participants 
carried with them (Figure 6.1). One of the questions asked how long ago the experience 
of interest occurred. With this question, we wanted to understand how long the buffer 
would have to be in order for the application to be us ful. Study results suggested to fix 
this time between 15 and 60 minutes, because partici nts estimated that a majority of 
events had occurred less than 60 minutes prior to the moment when the user wanted to 
recall them. This seemed to us a very reasonable retention time in order to minimize risk. 
We then probed in the Proxy study the symmetric opini n, i.e., the conversation partner’s 
take on how long they would allow the user to retain he conversation. We were surprised 
when they indicated much longer retention times than we had initially hypothesized.  
In Chapter 4, I pointed out that the ‘balancing’ between stakeholders’ needs in 
terms of privacy vs. usefulness rarely translates into a simple quantitative assessment. An 
excellent example is provided by the retention time discussion above: at the end of the 
Proxy study, we concluded that conversation partners were much more concerned about 
potential misuse of the recording than about retention time—shifting our initial design 
question away from a quantitative assessment of retention time and towards preventing  
misuse. Summarizing, the purpose of the proportionality method is not that of necessarily 
reaching quantitative balances, but rather that of situating the engineering of privacy and 




One interesting question when evaluating both sides of a privacy problem relates 
to the structure of participants’ involvement. One way to structure a study is to ask ques-
tions about usefulness and privacy concerns to different participants. A second approach 
would be that of asking both questions to the same participant. For example, Consolvo et 
al. attempted to probe both sides of a location disclosure in the ESM study of Reno [51]. 
The participants were asked to indicate their availbil ty to disclosing their location at 
fictitious requests generated randomly by a handheld d vice they carried with them. Oc-
casionally, a final question on the survey also asked them to indicate whether they would 
have wanted to know the requesting party’s location as well. Considering the need to ref-
erence instances of real life, discussed in Section 6.2, this final question, which relates to 
the usefulness of the person finder, appears even more detached from everyday needs 
than the random location request. Not surprisingly, the authors de-emphasized the results 
of that part of the survey, concentrating on privacy instead.  
However, probing both sides of the disclosure with the same participant may af-
fect his or her responses. In particular, participants may be led to understanding the utility 
of the application and perhaps the potential for misuse, which might provide an advan-
tage in evaluating the risks related to the privacy issues. Similarly, in the Reno deploy-
ment study, participants used the application both f r requesting and disclosing their lo-
cation, because the application was symmetric. In the PAL case, instead, two separate 
studies were performed to understand the two sides of the issue. One concern with this 
setup is that the participants of the Proxy study would have been overly exposed to the 
negative impact of the application. For this reason, in the PAL description in the Proxy 
study (reported in Appendix B), we attempted to provide a neutral description of the ap-
plication, mentioning both the usefulness of the application and the potential risks. 
Clearly, this is a tricky manipulation, due to the risk of biasing the results. I attempted to 




6.5 Design Guidelines, Design Methods and Analytic Tools 
Throughout this thesis, I argued that uncharted fields such as ubicomp privacy 
and security may be best tackled using generative frameworks rather than prescriptive 
techniques such as privacy guidelines. By generative, I mean frameworks that help iden-
tify (generate) design questions as opposed to prescribing solutions. The proportionality 
method and the advocacy of employing UCD techniques embody this conviction. I 
claimed that privacy guidelines, such as those proposed by Langheinrich [116] represent 
a useful starting point but may be too vague to provide detailed guidance for many appli-
cations whose purpose, utility and impact on the security and privacy of stakeholders are 
unclear.  
While in general I stand by this viewpoint, prescriptive guidelines still have a role 
in ubicomp design. Following the Reno deployment, I wrote, with the other researchers 
involved in that project, a summary article of the entire application evaluation and design 
cycle (the ESM study, the pilot and the deployment). I  that paper, entitled Developing 
Privacy Guidelines for Social Location Disclosure Applications and Services, I proposed 
a set of eight guidelines for the development of social location disclosure applications 
[100], shown in Figure 6.3. These guidelines specifically highlight privacy concerns in 
social location disclosure applications and in the paper it was argued that they were nec-
essary but not sufficient for achieving a successful design.  
Applying design guidelines has been traditionally problematic in the mobile and 
ubiquitous computing field, which suffers from the lack of an established design practice. 
In the paper mentioned above, I applied these guidelines to an evolution of Reno, to 
demonstrate how they can inform the development of a new applications. I indicated 
where the guidelines came into play in the new design, both as justifications for design 
choices, or as warnings that design choices made for satisfying other needs (such as sup-
porting group communication) might cause acceptance problems.  
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Guidelines focused on one type of application may be easier to apply reliably, be-
cause similar design problems may have similar solutions. In the case of Reno and its 
evolution the difference was relatively minor. By contrast, in Chung et al.’s evaluation of 
design patterns, the difference between the application that was being designed and the 
examples encoded by the design patterns was significa t and this may have been one of 
the reasons for the failure of that experiment. Their patterns were also expressed at a very 
high level, perhaps too high to be used effectively (see Table 3.2). In Chapter 5, I make a 
similar observation, claiming that Bellotti and Sellen’s Feedback / Control framework 
may not provide guidance for applications that are different from video media spaces 
(e.g., mobile applications). 
The discussion above suggests that there is no straightforward answer to what de-
sign techniques or methods are most effective in this domain. The lack of success of pre-
scriptive guidelines may be due to their misapplication more than to their lack of value. 
The various techniques and methods presented in this thesis may provide an advantage to 
designers in specific situations. An interesting question then is at what point, in the de-
sign cycle of ubiquitous computing applications, are the various design techniques dis-
cussed here best employed? The answer to this question a sumes, perhaps a bit improp-
erly, that it is possible to generalize the findings of this thesis, but I believe it is a worthy 
Flexible Replies. 
Support Denial. 
Support Simple Evasion (e.g., “I’m busy”). 
Don’t Start With Automation. 
Support Deception. 
Start with Person to Person Communication. 
Provide Status / Away Messages. 
Operators Should Avoid Handling User Data. 
Figure 6.3: Privacy Guidelines for Social Location Disclosure Applications and Services. 
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research question that should be asked. Rather than providing a conclusive answer to this 
question, in the following, final Chapter, I will frame the discussion as suggestions that 










TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 
 
Viewing the proportionality method as a scaffold suggests a metaphor useful for 
answering the question posed at the end of the previous chapter: What role do different 
design techniques and methods play in this problem do ain and when should we apply 
them? Generative design methods could provide the structure of the analysis tasks facing 
the designer; the voids in the structure could then b  ‘filled out’ using specific tools and 
techniques. In the Reno and PAL case studies, I used the proportionality method to frame 
the basic application questions, and to connect questions about privacy and security to the 
general requirements of the application. Various types of inquiry techniques were then 
employed to obtain answers to relevant privacy and security questions, including diary 
studies, experience sampling, deployments, legal analysis, bibliographic analysis, and the 
application of design guidelines.  
7.1 The Role of General Design Methods 
The comparison between design methods documented in Chapter 5 suggests that 
in that experiment, participants’ use of different methods did not relate to significant 
quantitative performance differences in two important metrics—identified issues and the 
complexity of the resulting design. However, the four methods made a difference in how 
participants approached the design task they were assigned. The differences are both 
formal and related to content. The formal differencs onsist in the structure of the design 
deliverables, in the type of external resources (e.g., reference literature) that participants 
used, and in the order in which design determinatios were made. Although I did not col-
lect statistical data on these effects, I believe that hey had an impact on the overall con-
clusions of a design process. The content-related differences refer to the types of ques-
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tions that were asked by the participants. As suggested by the Issue Type analysis in Sec-
tion 5.2.5.4 (page 163), each design method highlighted certain concerns, risks or issues, 
mostly as a result of the specific ‘checklists’ they propose to the designer. 
Based on these observations, one may conclude that the role of a generative de-
sign method is that of gaining broad coverage of the design space, by generating as many 
questions and issues upfront and reducing the time necessary for gaining a broad under-
standing of the design space structure. In this respect, the Risk Analysis phase of Hong et 
al.’s method and the Proportionality method appeared to fare better than the other two 
conditions in the evaluation study, because they produced a higher number of unique is-
sues and a wider spectrum of issue types. These questions can then be used to bootstrap 
further research or design decisions. This characteriza ion matches what is commonly 
associated with ‘second-generation’ design methods in the design method research com-
munity [63].  
Given that none of the methods tested in the evaluation study reached the full set 
of security and privacy issues (Figure 5.10 on page 162), it follows that there is still a re-
search opportunity in compiling more exhaustive check-lists or generative methods that 
allow designers to reach broader coverage, or at least better characterizing generative 
methods in terms of the type of applications they target. One way of proceeding, based on 
evidence in Table 5.12 would be that of combining a eneral design method (e.g., Risk 
Analysis, Proportionality) with specific guidelines covering aspects of the design space 
(e.g., Bellotti and Sellen’s Feedback / Control, my Design Guidelines for Social Location 
Disclosure Applications, and security management guidelines). 
7.2 The Role of User Studies  
Once general issues have been identified, prescriptive methods can provide local 
design guidance. As noted above, however, these guidelines should not be applied before 
understanding the broader issues involved in the application’s design. For this purpose, 
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some type of real-world evaluation of the application concept may be necessary. User 
studies may be useful in this context, but are often p rceived as overly costly, especially 
if performed uniquely for investigating non-functional aspects of design such as privacy 
and security. For this reason, reference to existing b bliography for meeting reasoned de-
sign choices may be a cheaper alternative—legislation, market research, ethnographic 
research. Piggybacking on other formative studies bing conducted for other purposes 
may be possible, too. 
User studies, especially targeted at what Wynekoop and Conger [183] call “re-
search for understanding,”56 also represent valuable generative techniques for identifying 
privacy and security issues. This is especially true for studies that reference working 
technology in realistic settings, such as deployments a d field studies (consider, for ex-
ample, the insights we gathered through the PAL Proxy and Reno deployment studies). 
Clearly, user studies are employed in HCI practice for summative purposes as well, but 
such use is less relevant to the topic of this thesis. 
A growing number of researchers targeted privacy and security in the past few 
years, and this very thesis attempts to contribute to he state of the art of the development 
of user study techniques in this domain. However, there is still much work to be done in 
this area. Interesting research questions include understanding which user study tech-
niques are most appropriate for investigating specific privacy and security questions, us-
ers and applications. Furthermore, it would be interesting to assess the optimal cost-
benefit for this kind of studies, in order to increas  their efficiency.  
                                                
 
 
56 That is, “research focusing on finding the meaning of studied phenomena through e.g. 
frameworks or theories developed from collected data.” [183] Wynekoop and Conger 
published a classification of research paper types in 1990, with reference to the Software 
Engineering community. Their model was subsequently adopted by Kjeldskov and Gra-
ham [112] who analyzed publications in the Mobile HCI community. 
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7.3 The Role of Specific Guidelines and Analytic Frameworks 
Design guidelines are prescriptive methods, i.e. methods that provide a solution 
or an indication on how to solve a specific problem. Examples of prescriptive methods in 
this domain include the design guidelines derived by Langheinrich from the FIPS [116], 
or those generated from evaluation of case studies [45, 100]. They are popular due to 
their relatively simple structure and ease-of-use. 
Analytic frameworks may be seen as an evolution of prescriptive guidelines. One 
of the most well-known analytic framework in this domain is the Approximate Informa-
tion Flows framework. AIF provides both design guidel nes (i.e., reduce information 
asymmetry) and a way to describe privacy management as a set of data exchanges and 
manipulations [110]. It further suggests constraints on these manipulations in order to 
achieve privacy goals. This thesis did not consider analytic frameworks explicitly. How-
ever, the prescriptive nature of these frameworks suggests that they should be employed 
similarly to other prescriptive guidelines, after basic knowledge about the application, the 
social context and the user purposes has been acquired. One important caveat in the use 
of prescriptive methods is the scope of applicability of these methods. Guidelines devel-
oped from experience in one application domain may be, in the best case, difficult to ap-
ply to other domains, as suggested by the relatively low number of unique design issues 
identified by participants in that condition (see Table 5.11 on page 159). In the worst 
case, they may mislead designers towards irrelevant issues and detrimental design 
choices. In particular, methods developed for addressing personal privacy should not be 
employed for solving data protection concerns, as the design solutions are in some cases 
opposite. 
One interesting research question would be to evaluate analytic frameworks and 
guidelines both in terms of their expressive potential and with relation to the design con-
clusions they lead to. This could be done by extending the analysis of Section 5.2.5.3 on 
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page 159, in the style of how Nielsen evaluated the eff ctiveness of general heuristic 
techniques, or Mankoff et al.’s evaluation of ambient displays heuristics [125]. 
7.4 Completeness and Documentation 
Completeness of the analysis of the design space is a classic problem in all ex-
ploratory design disciplines. The proportionality method is essentially a heuristic design 
method, which puts it at odds with structured SE processes targeted at achieving high as-
surance of exhausting the analysis and design space. Within the proportionality method, 
assurance may be provided, if at all, by the thoroughness of the analysis of the questions 
indicated by the design method. I do not address the issue of completeness in this thesis, 
and merely suggest standard workarounds (e.g., using multiple designers, cyclic design 
processes, etc.). It should be noted, however, that some of these workarounds assume that 
enough prior experience is available—a questionable ssumption in the undeveloped field 
of ubicomp. 
A practical concern related to completeness in SE is that of producing adequate 
process documentation.57 Not only is documentation essential for preserving memory of a 
specific application development process, but it also constitutes the main product and 
communication tool within design groups. When I initially started working on this design 
method, I did not consider the issue of documentation, because I assumed that the inter-
mediate and final products of the design method would be relatively short and self-
contained. After the experience of the first two case studies, it appears that this assump-
tion may not hold as the systems under consideration expand in complexity. While the 
PAL application described in Chapter 4 could be designed without a formal documenta-
tion process, other systems may require a more formal documentation format associated 
                                                
 
 
57 K. Rannenberg, personal correspondence. 
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with the proportionality method. In Chapter 3, two approaches to the documentation 
problem were cited: Design Rationale and formal Protection Profiles [105].  
The proponents of Design Rationale express the common opinion that managing 
complex designs requires the ability to trace design choices back to the motivating factors 
or requirements [124]. Design Rationale was used in the evaluation study as the control 
condition and I did not observe significant differenc s in the size of the design deliver-
able. Anecdotal observation suggests that participants using Design Rationale connected 
privacy and security issues more explicitly to design choices, but that the overall quality 
of the deliverable, as evaluated by the independent reviewers, was not affected by this. 
Providing a design rationale may not have been considered an advantage by the evalua-
tors in that context. In fact, the overall quality of the deliverables documentation, as ex-
pressed by the clarity score (EL) by the two evaluators was lowest in the Risk Analysis 
and Design Rationale conditions. This suggests that the documentation format suggested 
by Design Rationale may be not be sufficient to provide adequate documentation for this 
type of design problems. 
Formal documentation proposed by established SE standards such as the Common 
Criteria may provide higher assurance of requirements coverage and rationale connec-
tions, but does so at a very high cost that may be premature for many research ubicomp 
applications. What is lacking in traditional documentation formats such as Design Ra-
tionale and Common Criteria is the ability to keep track of post-deployment events. If 
learning from experience is the goal, proper documentation of such experience is neces-
sary. I believe that an interesting research question related to the domain of this thesis, 
and, generally, to ubicomp in general, is how to document valuable experience with real 
applications in a way that can inform design at later s ages. 
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7.5 Novel Technology vs. Evolution  
One important aspect of technological development that was not addressed in this 
work relates to the effectiveness of the proportionality method to handle technological 
evolution as opposed to original designs.58 Technology may evolve because users appro-
priate it in unforeseen ways, or due to gradual repurposing and further development. 
Technology appropriation by users has long been a topic of research in the IT commu-
nity, and the proportionality method suggests to investigate the issue of appropriation us-
ing adequate user study techniques, prior to, during and after development.  
However, the proportionality method is aimed at helping design, so it should be 
usable both in situations where applications are developed ex novo, and in situations 
where existing systems are expanded to support new applications that can unsettle exist-
ing privacy / security assumptions (e.g., the example in Chapter 2 of city-wide surveil-
lance systems). Clearly, using the proportionality method assumes that the desirability 
and appropriateness questions are worth asking (i.e., the outcome is not obvious and the 
designer can actually do something about it). This may or not be the case when consider-
ing evolutions of existing applications. If the designer’s analysis cannot influence devel-
opment due to constraints inherited from the existing systems, the proportionality method 
could be at least used similar to how DPAs have employed desirability and appropriate-
ness questions in analyzing existing technology—as a summative analysis tool. This hints 
at an interesting research opportunity: understanding the role of existing technology’s 
constraints on the privacy and security properties of evolutionary systems. 
                                                
 
 
58 K. Rannenberg, personal conversation. 
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7.6 The Notable Absent: Security Management 
In Chapter 2, I suggested that security management is notably absent from the re-
search in this field. Participants in the design method evaluation study also ignored man-
agement. One reason for this is that the design of post-deployment security management 
processes is usually not viewed as an integral part of product design. However, this situa-
tion is at odds with the needs of industry and users. Lately, both industry and academia 
are coming to the understanding that without careful planning for management proce-
dures, technological security measures can become at b st ineffective, and may even be 
counterproductive [148]. 
I believe that more attention to security management in ubicomp is urgent and 
throughout my doctoral work have attempted to translate this belief in action. One of the 
objectives of the proportionality method is that of producing, in addition to design guide-
lines for the product itself, also suggestions on the organizational, policy or other post-
deployment measures to address security or privacy risks that the technology cannot, by 
itself, counter. Furthermore, I have attempted to document a systematic analysis of the 
management challenges related to security in the ubicomp domain, and of their relation-
ship with design [96].  
The results of the design study suggest that all design methods, including the pro-
portionality method, failed to stimulate participants to consider management issues as 
part of the design of the application. These results may have been influenced in part by 
the limited available time and by the design brief that suggested to concentrate on the ar-
tifact. In the pilot study, where I explicitly asked participants to consider management as 
well as product design, management issues were cited by participants. However, it is 
clear that more research is necessary to understand the relationship between design, secu-




The capable designer selects the appropriate tools f r solving the problem at hand. 
The concept of proportionality can be a helpful aid in ecomposing complex security and 
privacy issues where no obvious solution is available. However, the proportionality 
method does not exclude the methods or techniques sugge ted by others to tackle the end-
user security and privacy issues in ubicomp. 
In fact, if a summary conclusion can be drawn from this work, it is that none of 
the methods proposed to date in this field can be applied unconditionally—doing so may 
be misleading or even detrimental. I have attempted to indicate to what types of problems 
certain methods and tools are best applied and the relationship of mutual support existing 
between the proportionality design method and other m thods and guidelines. In this 
process, the qualitative results of the evaluation study have proven more compelling and 
informative than the quantitative outcomes. Furthermore, this work shows how different 
types of research questions (e.g., data protection vs. personal privacy concerns, technolo-
gies at different levels of maturity) demand  different user study and analysis techniques. 
Along the way, I identified many interesting research problems, including further 
investigating the power of generative design methods, the constraints and effectiveness of 
user study techniques, and the applicability of prescriptive methods. The problem of se-
curity management in ubicomp deserves special consideration: not only is research on 
security management missing, but so are also the methodological tools to conduct such 
research. Important assumptions typically associated with security management do not 
hold when considering ubicomp applications—impacting the success metrics and solu-
tions employed in traditional IT security management.  
I hope that the reader will appreciate that this thesis shines a light in a deep cave 
of research problems. Many of these problems are tim ly, relevant and within reach, 












 UBICOMP PRIVACY AND SECURITY RESEARCH VENUES 
 
Tables A.1 and A.2 report a list of conferences andworkshops that have pub-






Table A.1: Conferences for Ubicomp Security and Privacy. 
Conference Name URL 
Ubicomp – International Conference on Ubiquitous 
Computing 
http://www.ubicomp.org 
Pervasive – International Conference on Pervasive 
Computing 
http://www.pervasive2006.org/ 
PerCom – IEEE International Conference on Perva-
sive Computing and Communications  
http://www.percom.org/ 
Mobisys – International Conference on Mobile Sys-
tems, Applications and Services 
http://www.sigmobile.org/mobisys/ 
Mobile HCI – International Conference on Human 
Computer Interaction with Mobile Devices and Ser-
vices  
http://www.mobilehci.org 











Table A.2: Past Workshops for Ubicomp Security and Privacy.  




Ubicomp 2003 Workshop Ubicomp communities: 
privacy as boundary negotiation  
http://guir.berkeley.edu/pubs/ubicomp2003/privacy
workshop/ 
Ubicomp 2003 Workshop Security in Ubiquitous 
Computing  
http://www.vs.inf.ethz.ch/events/ubicomp2003sec/ 
Ubicomp 2004 Workshop Ubicomp Privacy: Cur-
rent Status and Future Directions 
 
Ubicomp 2005 Privacy in Context Workshop  http://ww.sims.berkeley.edu/~jensg/Ubicomp2005 
Pervasive 2004 Workshop SPPC: Security and Pri-
vacy in Pervasive Computing  
http://www.vs.inf.ethz.ch/events/sppc04/ 
First IEEE International Workshop on Pervasive 
Computing and Communication Security (associ-
ated with PerCom) 
 http://www.list.gmu.edu/persec/ 
Second IEEE International Workshop on Pervasive 
Computing and Communication Security  
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/persec-2005/ 
Third IEEE International Workshop on Pervasive 
Computing and Communication Security  
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/persec-2006/ 
Mobile HCI 2004 Workshop On Location Systems 









This appendix contains reproductions of some of the study materials used in the 
various user studies conducted as part of this work. 
B.1 PAL Study 
The Personal Audio Loop underwent several user studies, including a lab test of 
the interface, a diary study, the Proxy study, a short deployment and interviews.  
B.1.1 Interview Template 
Figures B.1 and B.2 show the PAL diary interview templates. These interviews 
were conducted at the end of each week during the study. Note how questions about pri-
vacy, purposefulness and politeness are mixed in one interview. 
B.1.2 Proxy Study 
The descriptive text of the PAL Proxy study survey is reported in Figure B.3. 
(Figure 6.2 depicts the actual format of the survey). This description underwent thorough 




















Would you consider this a typical week? 
 
For the events that happened while other people weraround, would you have been concerned about 
recording and playing back their conversation(s)?   
 
Do you think it would have been uncomfortable or problematic if they knew you were using PAL? 
 
If any of your conversations involved personal/sensitive information, would you: 
 - like to have had an erase button? 
- have felt responsible for keeping the conversation secret? 
 - have felt uncomfortable if someone else had used th  system in those situations? 
 - If someone else was using it, would you ask them to erase some of it? 
 
 
Does one understand from the diary entry whether: 
1. it is a formal situation (work, asymmetry in social role)? 
2. the person is a good acquaintance / friend or a stranger?  
















PAL Weekly Interview Questions   Participant Number       Week 
 
Entry Number      
Would you have felt it 
would be impolite towards 
your conversation partner 
to recall a lost 
conversation? 
Make a note of private 
review 
     
Would you feel less so if 
you could share your 
memory aid? 
     
Would you have felt less 
so if you had informed 
your partner prior to 
beginning the 
conversation? 
     
Would you think that a 
completely invisible 
system would be 
preferable to you and your 
partner? 
     
Had they object to it, what 
would you have done? 
(e.g. turn off the device, 
explain how it works…) 
     
How likely do you think it 
is that they would have 
objected? 
     
Was your cell phone with 
you?  If so, how far? 
     
 
At what distance were other unrelated people around? (Quantify in each section) 
Entry Number      
Arm-Length      
Same Room      
Larger Area      
  









The Personal Audio Loop 
The Personal Audio Loop (PAL) continuously records sound and voices 
from the user’s environment. The device allows the user to replay, at any 
specific moment in time, any sound that was heard in the recent past, up to 
a defined maximum time span (for example, up to 1 hour in the past). 
Sound older than that is automatically erased and cannot be replayed. 
Currently, PAL is integrated in a cell phone (see figure), but the device 
only records sound from the environment, and not phone conversations. 
The user can replay the recording and rewind and fast orward through it. 
The stored audio can be heard either through the loudspeaker on the 
phone, or through the external speaker/mike.  
People who used this device, employed it as a memory aid, as a reminder 
tool, as a short-term voice notepad and to relay information from one per-
son to another. Although PAL could be useful to many people, we are also 
aware that other people might have concerns about the privacy of their 
conversations.  
Suppose that the person who gave you this survey is using PAL. We 
would like to know your opinion about PAL. Please complete the survey 
on both sides of the card, as soon as possible.  








B.2 Reno Deployment 
Figure B.4 shows two screenshots of the Reno application. Reno is modeled ac-
cording to a messaging metaphor. Incoming location requests and disclosures are dis-
played on the main screen (Figure B.4.a): the firstitem is a location disclosure; the sec-
ond item is a location request by Phoebe. When the user replies to a location request, the 
application asks to indicate a place name to disclose. Figure B.4.b. shows the selection of 
a place name. Reno lists places in the physical proximity of the user, as well as activity 
names. 
B.3 Design Method Evaluation Study 
Figure B.5 shows the assignment brief given to the Design Method Evaluation 





a.    b.  





In this project, we ask you to design (not to implement) an application that allows the recording 
of daily activities using a wearable camera, described below.  
You will turn in the assignment after one week. You should complete the assignment 
individually.  
Design Method 
We ask that you use the design method that we presented in class on Nov. 9th or 11th to perform 
your assignment. It is very important that you follow the method as closely as you can.  
Time Tracking 
If you are participating in the study, we should have given you a special form to keep track of the 
time needed to perform the assignment. It is important that you accurately track the time 
spent in the assignment. The time you report will not influence your grade on the homework. 
Please respond as accurately and honestly as you can, as time tracking is important for the 
outcome of the study. 
References 
Take advantage of all available sources for gathering supporting arguments for your choices. 
Reference all sources you use in your paper. 
Design Brief  
SenseCam is a pack-of-cards sized wearable camera that automatically captures images and stores 
them in its memory. Events, such as time, movement, light level and temperature may trigger the 
capture of new information. For example, when the user walks into a room, a light change 
transition can be detected and an image is captured with a wide-angle lens. Accelerometer data is 
used to reduce blurred images caused by camera motion, which is an essential feature of any truly 
wearable camera. 
Non-verbal children (such as some children with disorders in the Autism spectrum) may be 
unable to recount daily activities at school to their parents when they get hom . This reduces 
parents’ knowledge of the children’s activity when out of the home, and of their mood or feelings. 
If the children carried a SenseCam, their parents may be able to better reconstruct the child’s 
activity independently from the reporting of the teachers or caregivers in school. This improved 
knowledge, in the form of an automatically-authored daily journal, may improve the parent’s 
understanding of the child’s feelings and thus his or her response to their needs or contingent 
behavior.  
In the example of the Personal Audio Loop given in class, bystanders’ voices may be recorded 
accidentally without their knowledge. Similarly, the data sensed by SenseCam may raise concerns 
of social appropriateness, including privacy concerns. SenseCam may raise security concerns, 
both related to its user and to others around him or her. In the Personal Audio Loop example, the 
user may lose the device, thus exposing his or her recording to whomever picks up the device. 
You are asked to design a system that would support the application described abov , especially 
focusing on privacy and security concerns. You are free to define the parameters and the design 
of the SenseCam device and of the other components of the system in any way you deem fit for 
 
Figure B.5: Assignment for the Design Method Evaluation Study.
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achieving the goals of the application, including the fact that it is wearable, how pictures are 
taken, or additional sensing such as audio, video or other.  
However, we ask that you remain within the range of what you consider feasible with current-day 
technology. We encourage you to explain each design choice you make based on the user’s 
needs, other stakeholders’ needs, or technical reasons.  
Deliverable 
We expect you to turn in a written deliverable of 4–6 pages (1600–2400 words), that follows the 
outline presented in the design method paper and in class. The design document should be 
detailed enough that it could be given to an R&D design team for further development. The 
design document should include at least the following: 
– General System Design 
– Identification of stakeholders  
Include a list of all the people affected by the system, and a description of how these 
stakeholders relate to it.  
– Identification of relevant privacy and security issue  
Include a concise description of each design issue yo  identify and of its peculiar 
characteristics in terms of security and privacy.  
– Proposal of solutions to privacy and security issue 
Provide solutions based on your application of the design method. Explain why you 
chose particular solutions. 
We suggest you focus on specific design issues and on how to solve them. The homework will be 
graded based on the breadth and depth of the design, i.e. on the number and relevance of 
identified issues and on well you analyze them.  
 
Useful Sources 
Paper describing SenseCam: http://www.cc.gatech.edu/~giac/p48-gemmell.pdf 
Legislation (e.g. Computer Security Act of 1997, Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 
1986, available from www.law.cornell.edu, http://thomas.loc.gov, www.findlaw.com, European 
Data Protection Directive www.europa.eu.int) 
Data Protection Authorities rulings (http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/privacy/) 
Federal Trade Commission (http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/index.html) 
Department of Homeland Security Privacy Office 
Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights (www.dhhs.gov/ocr/hipaa/) 
Department of Education Family Policy Compliance Office (www.ed.gov) 
Court rulings e.g. Kyllo vs. US, Katz vs. US (available through Google) 
User/marketing studies & Industrial best practice avail ble through Lexis Nexis, access through 
GT library (-> databases -> business -> LexisNexis) 
Security Best Practices (800 series publications, available from NIST: http://csrc.nist.gov) 
 
 
Figure B.5: Assignment for the Design Method Evaluation Study. (Continued.)
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B.3.1 Adherence Criteria 
Figure B.6 shows the criteria for the evaluation of the Adherence Score A. The 
Adherence Score is the proportion of steps the participant followed out of the steps de-
scribed in the respective design method, according to the lists specified below. For exam-
ple, if a participant used the risk analysis framework and only followed steps 1–10, the 
adherence score would be 10 / 17 = 0.59. 
B.3.2 Quiz 
Figure B.7 shows one of the four quizzes that participants took after completion 
of the assignment (namely, Bellotti and Sellen’s Feedback / Control method). Each con-
dition had a custom quiz, tailored for their condition. 
B.3.3 Lecture Slides 
Figure B.8 shows one of the four lecture slide sets (namely, the set used in the 




1. Did they define design questions? E.g. when to takepictures 
2. Did they define design options around the design questions? E.g. when light 
changes, when movement is detected 
3. Did they define consistency criteria? 
4. Did they define evaluation criteria? E.g. Intrusiveness on bystanders 
 





Identify risks associated with the following questions: 
1. Who are the users? 
2. What information is shared? 
3. What is the value proposition for sharing personal i formation? 
4. Is there potential for malicious data observers? 
5. Other Stakeholders? 
6. How is information collected? 
7. How is information shared? 
8. How much information is shared? 
9. Qualities of shared information 
10.Retention time 
11.Prioritizing Risks: Identify L, D C  
C = cost of adequate privacy protection 
L = likelihood that unwanted disclosure of personal information occurs 
D = damage that will happen on such a disclosure 
If C < LD do something  
Risk management: for at least one identified Risk:  
12.How does the unwanted disclosure take place?  
13.How much choice, control, and awareness do data sharers have?  
14.What are the default settings?  
15.In what cases is it easier to prevent unwanted disclosures and abuses?  
16.Are there ways for data sharers to maintain plausible deniability? 
17.What mechanisms for recourse or recovery are the? 






1. What is the purpose of the application? 
2. What are the advantages gained? (e.g., expressed in reduction of risk, or 
economical benefit) 
3. What is the imposed burden? (e.g., in terms of changes of behavior, “chill ef-
fect,” or other social costs) 
Appropriateness  
4. Do the costs and benefits of the selected technology offset the potential inva-
sion of privacy with respect to alternative solutions? 
5. Does the technology pose the risk of being abused or employed with further 
privacy implications? 
6. Can the application goals be reached by other means (including non-technical)? 
Adequacy —Evaluation of at least one design option according to metrics: 
7. What are the characteristics of the privacy-impacting design features?  
8. How are design features described as variables?  
9. What are the values or ranges of each variable critical o the success of the 
application?  
10.What are the values or ranges of each variable which impact on the privacy of 
all stakeholders?  
11.What compromise is possible between these values or ranges? 






Did they choose the best design option using the Options/Criteria Ta-
ble?Feedback/Control 
1. Capture: how does the user know what kind of information is being collected? 
2. Construction: how does the user know what happens to the information?  
3. Accessibility: how does the user know who has access to the information? 
4. Purpose: how does the user know how is the information used? …how might it 
be used in the future? 
5. Capture: how can the user control what kind of information is being collected? 
6. Construction: how can the user control what happens to the information? Is it 
stored, processed,…? 
7. Accessibility: how can the user control who has access to the information? 
8. Purpose: how can the user control how the information is used? …how might it 
be used in the future? 
9. Did they evaluate at least one design solutions based on the following 11 
evaluation criteria? 
Trustworthiness, Appropriate Timing, Perceptibility, Unobtrusiveness, 
Minimal Intrusiveness, Fail-safety, Flexibility, Low-effort,  
5. Meaningfulness, Learnability, Low-cost. 










GT ID: _______________________________ 
 
 
E-Z Pass ® is an automatic toll payment system used on highways in New York, New 
Jersey and several other States. After subscribing to the system, customers are given a 
radio transponder to keep in their car that is activ ted whenever the car drives through a 
tollbooth, communicating the identity of the customer to the collection system. The toll 
management company then deducts toll bills automatically from the customer’s bank. 
Each month, customers receive a summary of their transactions. 
Bellotti and Sellen propose a structured analysis of ubicomp applications that helps in 
designing applications with privacy implications. They propose to analyze the 
collection and use of information in terms of feedback about and control on the 
information collected about the users.  
1. Below, write the what kind of feedback the E-Z Pass system should provide to its 
user about his or her personal information that is collected and used by the system, 
in the four phases of Capture, Construction, Accessibility and Purposes. Be sure to 
specify what information about the user you are considering; you should provide 

















2. Pick any one of the feedback mechanisms you wrote above and evaluate it based on 
at least two of the 11 evaluation criteria proposed by Bellotti and Sellen. 
 














































B.4 Pilot Study Assignment 
The text below reports one of the project descriptions used in the design method 
evaluation pilot study. 
“CS6725 Security Strategy Course 
Mobile Location-Enhanced Person Finder 
Project Description 
Location technologies are becoming increasingly comm nplace on a variety of 
platforms, including cell phones and portable computers. One class of applications sup-
ported by these technologies consists in people finder tools. Usually implemented on cell 
phones, these tools allow a user to ask for the locati n of another person and reply to such 
requests. Early user testing suggest that people may find person finders very valuable. At 
least one such application has been marketed in the Unit d States, by AT&T Wireless. 
We desire to implement a person finder application hat runs on a cell phone, 
which would allow users to ask the location and respond to location requests. These mes-
sages can then be used for a variety of reasons, includ g meeting up, either in person or 
per phone, assessing the availability of the other person, or as a status notification to co-
ordinate joint activities.  
The confidentiality of people’s location data used for call routing has been tradi-
tionally covered by specific legislation. However, the broader use of location information 
within social groups and organizations my raise concer s relating to its security, control 
and user privacy. The collected information is personally identifiable and may be used to 
track individuals, which could lead to stalking incidents, as well as commercial exploita-
tion.  
A variety of different architectures can be used for developing such applications, 
including server-based, device-based and mixed. Moreover, several alternative location 




In this project you will be asked to design (not to implement) a person finder ap-
plication, and specifically, you will be asked to define information management and/or 
organizational policies of the application and the aspects of the user interface that have 
security and privacy implications. You will be asked to justify your technical and organ-
izational design choices. You will reference federal and state regulation, industry guide-
lines and other sources.  
The resulting design should be technically and organizationally feasible, given ex-
isting available technology and considering the organizational structure of deployment. 
You will be asked to follow a general design method, provided by us, for the 
analysis of security and privacy requirements. [G. Iachello & G. Abowd: “Privacy and 
Proportionality: Adapting Legal Evaluation Techniques to Inform Design In Ubiquitous 
Computing”]  
Research Study 
You will be asked to participate in a research study with the purpose of assessing 
the effectiveness and usefulness of the above mentioned design method. Your participa-
tion in this research study is voluntary. If you don’t want to be in this study you have the 
option of choosing another project for completing your CS6725 requirements. 
Milestones and deliverables 
Mar 15 – Mid-project milestone 
On this date you will turn in a written document, encompassing the initial analysis 
of the problem, which should include at least the following items: 
– Project definition, including application goals. 
– Short exploration of 2 – 4 Alternative designs. This will allow both to ex-
plore the design space and will inform the final design you choose. It is 
important to include here a concise description of each design, what makes 
it different from the others and what its peculiar characteristics in terms of 
security and privacy are. 
– Identification of involved stakeholders and concerns. This should include 
a list of direct and indirect stakeholders in your system, and a discussion 
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of how these stakeholders relate and are affected by it. Also, you should 
include a discussion of the points of contact of your application/system 
with other organizational entities. 
– Identification of design resources. This should include an initial explora-
tion of existing sector literature, regulation, technical sources, and any 
other sources you may find useful for conducting your analysis. 
Apr 14 – Final Deliverable 
At the end of the project you will be expected to pr duce a final design document 
which should include at least the following: 
– Regulatory constraints. 
– Experience from similar applications. 
– Description of system design. 
– Discussion of the selected design for the system. Information management 
policies. Technical safeguards for securing data and people, including 
which aspects of the user interface of the system you consider relevant 
(e.g. how the system is operated, accessed, etc.) Indicate how you address 
all stakeholder concerns within your design. 
– Organizational measures to be adopted with system use. It is important 
that you justify in some way all the major or potentially divisive choices 
you make in your design. Take advantage of all avail ble sources for gath-
ering supporting arguments for your choices. 
You will be asked to present in class your project. You will be given a time slot 
still to be defined between 10 and 30 minutes, including question time. 
Your project will be graded both on the quality of y ur written submission and of 
that of your presentation. 
Initial Sources List 
The following is an initial list of sources for your project. It is not meant to be ex-
haustive! You are strongly encouraged to consult other sources as you may find appropri-
ate. 
– US Federal Communications Commission (www.fcc.gov) guidelines and 
policy. 
– Similar existing applications. (E.g. AT&T Find People Nearby) 
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– Existing US Regulation. If your design is meant to w rk in other jurisdic-
tions, include and discuss the impact of one example of regulation from 
that country(ies). 
– Journals in the telecommunication sector (e.g. Education Resource 
Information Center, PsychArticles, both are searchable on the EBSCO 
database accessible through the Georgia Tech Library)  
– News sources such as Lexis Nexis (available through the Georgia Tech 
Library) 
Further support 
If you want to ask me (Giovanni) specific questions, I will be available after class 




EVALUATION STUDY STATISTICAL DATA 
 
C.1 Means Comparison Across Conditions 
Tables C.1 and C.2 show the descriptive statistics and the mean differences sig-





















Table C.1: Descriptive Statistics of Relevant Metrics. 









N 11 12 13 12 48 
Mean 5.18** 7.83** 6.85 6.25 6.56 
Std. Dev. 3.31 3.24 2.34 1.66 2.78 
Min 2 3 3 4 2 
T  
Number of Identified 
Security/Privacy Is-
sues 
Max 13 12 11 9 13 
N 11 12 13 12 48 
Mean 10.64 9.33 10.08 8.42 9.60 
Std. Dev. 3.88 2.67 3.99 5.26 4.01 
Min 4 6 2 3 2 
C  
Number of Design 
Choices 
Max 16 14 15 22 22 
N 11 12 13 12 48 
Mean 0.18 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.06 
Std. Dev. 0.40 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.24 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 
N  
Number of Scenarios 
Max 1 0 1 0 1 
N 11 12 13 12 48 
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.62 0.33 0.25 
Std. Dev. 0.00 0.00 0.77 0.89 0.64 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 
X  
Number of Compari-
sons with Similar 
Applications 
Max 0 0 2 3 3 
N 11 12 13 12 48 
Mean 6.82 4.75 5.23 6.42 5.77 
Std. Dev. 3.09 1.60 1.17 2.84 2.36 




Max 11 9 8 13 13 
** Difference in means significant p < 0.05. 
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Table C.1: Descriptive Statistics of Relevant Metrics. (Continued.) 









N 11 12 13 12 48 
Mean 0.36** 0.25** 1.69** 0.83 0.81 
Std. Dev. 0.50 0.62 1.25 1.59 1.21 




Max 1 2 4 5 5 
N 11 12 13 12 48 
Mean 1.36 2.00** 1.92 0.75** 1.52 
Std. Dev. 0.81 1.28 1.55 0.62 1.22 
Min 0 1 0 0 0 
V  
Number of Value 
Propositions 
Max 3 5 6 2 6 
N 11 12 13 12 48 
Mean 24.55 24.17 26.46 23.00 24.58 
Std. Dev. 7.19 4.86 7.13 7.07 6.55 
Min 14 16 11 13 11 
Z  
Size of the Deliver-
able 
Max 35 33 37 36 37 
N 11 12 13 12 48 
Mean 8.77 8.21 8.65 8.46 8.52 
Std. Dev. 1.54 1.03 0.69 0.72 1.02 
Min 5 6 8 7 5 
G  
Grade (1–10) 
Max 10 10 10 10 10 
N 11 12 13 12 48 
Mean 4.24** 3.21** 3.96 3.83 3.81 
Std. Dev. 0.99 0.79 0.95 0.93 0.96 
Min 2.2 2.2 1.8 2.5 1.8 
Q  
Quality (0–6) 




Table C.1: Descriptive Statistics of Relevant Metrics. (Continued.) 









N 11 12 13 12 48 
Mean 0.80 0.66 0.71 0.93 0.78 
Std. Dev. 0.37 0.30 0.21 0.13 0.28 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.60 0.00 
A  
Adherence (0.0–1.0) 













































2 -3.43(*) 1.041 .010 -6.21 -.65 
3 -2.45 1.022 .094 -5.18 .29 
1 
  
  4 -1.85 1.041 .298 -4.63 .93 
1 3.43(*) 1.041 .010 .65 6.21 
3 .99 .973 .742 -1.61 3.59 
2 
  
  4 1.58 .992 .392 -1.07 4.24 
1 2.45 1.022 .094 -.29 5.18 
2 -.99 .973 .742 -3.59 1.61 
3 
  
  4 .60 .973 .927 -2.00 3.20 
1 1.85 1.041 .298 -.93 4.63 








  3 -.60 .973 .927 -3.20 2.00 
2 .18 .101 .284 -.09 .45 
3 .10 .099 .714 -.16 .37 
1 
  
  4 .18 .101 .284 -.09 .45 
1 -.18 .101 .284 -.45 .09 
3 -.08 .097 .856 -.33 .18 
2 
  
  4 .00 .098 1.000 -.26 .26 
1 -.10 .099 .714 -.37 .16 
2 .08 .097 .856 -.18 .33 
3 
  
  4 .08 .097 .856 -.18 .33 
1 -.18 .101 .284 -.45 .09 





  3 -.08 .097 .856 -.33 .18 
*  The mean difference is significant at the .05 leve . 
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2 .00 .250 1.000 -.67 .67 
3 -.62 .245 .072 -1.27 .04 
1 
  
  4 -.33 .250 .546 -1.00 .33 
1 .00 .250 1.000 -.67 .67 
3 -.62 .239 .063 -1.25 .02 
2 
  
  4 -.33 .244 .528 -.99 .32 
1 .62 .245 .072 -.04 1.27 
2 .62 .239 .063 -.02 1.25 
3 
  
  4 .28 .239 .644 -.36 .92 
1 .33 .250 .546 -.33 1.00 







  3 -.28 .239 .644 -.92 .36 
2 2.07 .953 .147 -.48 4.61 
3 1.59 .935 .337 -.91 4.08 
1 
  
  4 .40 .953 .975 -2.14 2.94 
1 -2.07 .953 .147 -4.61 .48 
3 -.48 .913 .952 -2.92 1.96 
2 
  
  4 -1.67 .932 .292 -4.15 .82 
1 -1.59 .935 .337 -4.08 .91 
2 .48 .913 .952 -1.96 2.92 
3 
  
  4 -1.19 .913 .569 -3.62 1.25 
1 -.40 .953 .975 -2.94 2.14 




























2 1.30 1.694 .868 -3.22 5.83 
3 .56 1.663 .987 -3.88 5.00 
1 
  
  4 2.22 1.694 .562 -2.30 6.74 
1 -1.30 1.694 .868 -5.83 3.22 
3 -.74 1.625 .968 -5.08 3.60 
2 
  
  4 .92 1.657 .945 -3.51 5.34 
1 -.56 1.663 .987 -5.00 3.88 
2 .74 1.625 .968 -3.60 5.08 
3 
  
  4 1.66 1.625 .738 -2.68 6.00 
1 -2.22 1.694 .562 -6.74 2.30 






  3 -1.66 1.625 .738 -6.00 2.68 
2 .11 .459 .995 -1.11 1.34 
3 -1.33(*) .451 .025 -2.53 -.13 
1 
  
  4 -.47 .459 .737 -1.70 .76 
1 -.11 .459 .995 -1.34 1.11 
3 -1.44(*) .440 .011 -2.62 -.27 
2 
  
  4 -.58 .449 .568 -1.78 .62 
1 1.33(*) .451 .025 .13 2.53 
2 1.44(*) .440 .011 .27 2.62 
3 
  
  4 .86 .440 .222 -.32 2.03 
1 .47 .459 .737 -.76 1.70 





























2 -.64 .478 .549 -1.91 .64 
3 -.56 .469 .635 -1.81 .69 
1 
  
  4 .61 .478 .578 -.66 1.89 
1 .64 .478 .549 -.64 1.91 
3 .08 .458 .998 -1.15 1.30 
2 
  
  4 1.25(*) .468 .050 .00 2.50 
1 .56 .469 .635 -.69 1.81 
2 -.08 .458 .998 -1.30 1.15 
3 
  
  4 1.17 .458 .065 -.05 2.40 
1 -.61 .478 .578 -1.89 .66 






  3 -1.17 .458 .065 -2.40 .05 
2 .38 2.769 .999 -7.01 7.77 
3 -1.92 2.717 .895 -9.17 5.34 
1 
  
  4 1.55 2.769 .944 -5.85 8.94 
1 -.38 2.769 .999 -7.77 7.01 
3 -2.29 2.655 .823 -9.38 4.79 
2 
  
  4 1.17 2.708 .973 -6.06 8.40 
1 1.92 2.717 .895 -5.34 9.17 
2 2.29 2.655 .823 -4.79 9.38 
3 
  
  4 3.46 2.655 .566 -3.63 10.55 
1 -1.55 2.769 .944 -8.94 5.85 
2 -1.17 2.708 .973 -8.40 6.06 



























2 .56 .431 .561 -.59 1.71 
3 .12 .423 .992 -1.01 1.25 
1 
  
  4 .31 .431 .885 -.84 1.46 
1 -.56 .431 .561 -1.71 .59 
3 -.45 .413 .704 -1.55 .66 
2 
  
  4 -.25 .421 .933 -1.37 .87 
1 -.12 .423 .992 -1.25 1.01 
2 .45 .413 .704 -.66 1.55 
3 
  
  4 .20 .413 .965 -.91 1.30 
1 -.31 .431 .885 -1.46 .84 




  3 -.20 .413 .965 -1.30 .91 
2 1.034(*) .3812 .045 .016 2.052 
3 .281 .3742 .876 -.718 1.280 
1 
  
  4 .409 .3812 .708 -.609 1.427 
1 -1.034(*) .3812 .045 -2.052 -.016 
3 -.753 .3656 .182 -1.729 .223 
2 
  
  4 -.625 .3729 .348 -1.621 .371 
1 -.281 .3742 .876 -1.280 .718 
2 .753 .3656 .182 -.223 1.729 
3 
  
  4 .128 .3656 .985 -.848 1.104 
1 -.409 .3812 .708 -1.427 .609 













[1] Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament ad of the Council of 24 October 
1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal 
data and on the free movement of such data Official Journal of the European 
Communities, L281 (1995) 31–50. 
 
 
[2] Directive 1999/93/EC Of The European Parliament A d Of The Council of 13 
December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures Official 
Journal of the European Communities, L13 (1999) 12–20. 
 
 
[3] Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament a d of the Council of 12 July 
2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in 
the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic com-
munications) Official Journal of the European Communities, L201 (2002) 37-47. 
 
 
[4] Dodgeball web site.  (2004). Available from: http://www.dodgeball.com/ 
 
 
[5] Katz v. United States, S.Ct.; 389 U.S. 347; 88 S.Ct. 507 (1967). 
 
 
[6] Kyllo v. United States, S.Ct.; 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 
 
[7] United Kingdom Data Protection Act (1998). 
 
 














[11] United States Sarbanes-Oxley Act, P.L. 107-204 (2002). 
 
 
[12] United States Video Voyeurism Prevention Act, 18 USC 1801 et seq. (2004). 
 
 
[13] Volkszählungsurteil vom 15. Dezember 1983, BVerfGE 65,1, German Constitu-
tional Court (Bundesverfassungsgerichts) (1983). 
 
 
[14] Abowd, G.D. and Mynatt, E.D. Charting past, present, and future research in 
ubiquitous computing. ACM Transactions on Computer-Human Interaction (TO-
CHI), 7, 1 (2000) 29–58. 
 
 
[15] Ackerman, M.S., Cranor, L. and Reagle, J. Privacy in e-commerce: examining 
user scenarios and privacy preferences. Proc. ACM conference on electronic 
commerce (EC’99). Denver, Colorado (1999) 1–8. 
 
 
[16] Acquisti, A. and Grossklags, J. Privacy and Rationality in Individual Decision 
Making. IEEE Security and Privacy, 3, 1 (2005) 26–33. 
 
 
[17] Adams, A. and Blandford, A. Bridging the gap between organizational and user 
perspectives of security in the clinical domain. Int. J. Human-Computer Studies, 
63 (2005) 175–202. 
 
 
[18] Adams, A. and Sasse, M.A. Privacy in Multimedia Communications: Protecting 
Users, Not Just Data. Proc. Human-Computer Interaction/Interaction d'Homme-
Machine (IMH-HCI 01). Lille, France: Springer Verlag (2001) 49–64. 
 
 
[19] Alexander, C. The Timeless Way Of Building, Oxford University Press: New 
York, NY, USA (1979) ISBN: 0-19-502402-8. 
 
 
[20] Altman, I. The Environment and Social Behavior—Privacy, Personal Space, Ter-




[21] Altman, I. Privacy Regulation: Culturally Universal or Culturally Specific? Jour-





[22] Arnold, M. On the phenomenology of technology: the "Janus-faces" of mobile 
phones. Information and Organization, 13 (2003) 231–256. 
 
 
[23] Association for Computing Machinery. ACM Code of Ethics. Available from: 
http://www.acm.org/serving/ethics.html. Last accessed: 3/21/2006. 
 
 
[24] AT&T Wireless. Find People Nearby. Available from: 




[25] Barkhuus, L. and Dey, A. Location-Based Services for Mobile Telephony: a 
Study of Users’ Privacy Concerns. Proc. Interact 2003. Zurich, Switzerland: 
ACM Press (2003) 709–712. 
 
 
[26] Barofsky, A. The European Commisssion's Directve On Electronic Signatures: 
Technological "Favoritism" Towards Digital Signatures. Boston College Interna-
tional & Comparative Law Review, 24, 1 (2000) 145–160. 
 
 
[27] Barrett, R., Kandogan, E., Maglio, P.P., Haber, E.M., Takayama, L.A. and Pra-
baker, M. Field Studies of Computer System Administrators: Analysis of System 
Management Tools and Practices. Proc. CSCW '04, 6(3). Chicago, IL, USA: 
ACM Press (2004) 388–395. 
 
 
[28] Bäumler, H., Federrath, H. and Golembiewski, C., Report on the Criminal Justice 
Process against "AN.ON - Anonymity.Online", TU-Dresden, Germany (2003). 




[29] Beckwith, R. and Lederer, S. Designing One's Dotage: Ubicomp in Residential 
Care Facilities. Proc. Home-Oriented Informatics and Telematics HOIT 03: Cen-
ter for Research on Information Technology and Organizations (2003). 
 
 
[30] Belair, R. and Bock, C., Police Use of Remote Camera Systems for Surveillance 
of Public Streets, in Surveillance, Dataveillance and Personal Freedoms: Use and 





[31] Bellotti, V. and Sellen, A. Design for Privacy in Ubiquitous Computing Environ-




[32] Bennet, C. and Grant, R., Editors, Visions of Privacy: Policy Choices for the Digi-
tal Age, University of Toronto: Toronto, Canada (1999) ISBN: 0-8020-8050-2. 
 
 
[33] Berendt, B., Günther, O. and Spiekermann, S. Privacy in e-commerce: stated 




[34] Beresford, A.R. and Stajano, F. Location Privacy in Pervasive Computing. IEEE 
Pervasive Computing, 2, 1 (2003) 46–55. 
 
 
[35] Berleur, J. and Brunnstein, K., Editors, Ethics of Computing: Codes, spaces for 




[36] Boehm, B.W., Bose, P., Horowitz, E. and Lee, M.J. Software Requirements As 
Negotiated Win Conditions. Proc. First International Conference on Require-
ments Engineering: IEEE Press (1994) 74–83. 
 
 
[37] Böhm, A., Leiber, T. and Reufenheuser, B. Trust and Transparency in Location-
Based Services: Making Users lose their Fear of Big Brother. Proc. Mobile HCI 
2004 Workshop On Location Systems Privacy and Control. Glasgow, UK (2004). 
 
 
[38] Boyle, M., Edwards, C. and Greenberg, S. The eff cts of filtered video on aware-
ness and privacy. Proc. ACM CSCW 2000: ACM Press (2000) 1–10. 
 
 
[39] Boyle, M. and Greenberg, S. The language of privacy: Learning from video media 
space analysis and design ACM Transactions on Computer-Human Interaction 
(TOCHI), 12, 2 (2005). 
 
 
[40] British Institute of International and Comparative Law, The implementation of 










[42] Chalmers, M. A Historical View of Context. Computer Supported Cooperative 
Work, 13, 3–4 (2004) 223–247. 
 
 
[43] Chaum, D. Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses, and Digital Pseudo-
nyms. Communications of the ACM, 24, 2 (1981) 84–88. 
 
 
[44] Christensen, C.M., Anthony, S.D. and Roth, E.A. Seeing What's Next: Using 
Theories of Innovation to Predict Industry Change, Harvard Business School 
Press: Boston, MA, USA (2004) ISBN: 1591391857. 
 
 
[45] Chung, E., Jason, H., Lin, J., Prabaker, M., Landay, J. and Liu, A. Development 
and Evaluation of Emerging Design Patterns for Ubiquitous Computing. Proc. 
DIS 2004: ACM Press (2004) 233–242. 
 
 
[46] Chung, E., Jason, H., Lin, J., Prabaker, M., Landay, J. and Liu, A. Ubicomp De-
sign Patterns.  (2004). Available from: http://guir.berkeley.edu/projects/patterns/. 
Last accessed: 3/22/2006. 
 
 
[47] Clarke, R. Person-Location and Person-Tracking: Technologies, Risks and Policy 
Implications. Information Technology & People, 14, 2 (2001) 206–231. 
 
 
[48] Columbia Human Rights Law Review, Editor Surveillance, Dataveillance and 
Personal Freedoms: Use and Abuse of Information Technology, Burdick: Fair 
Lawn, NJ, USA (1973) ISBN: 0-913638-03-X. 
 
 
[49] Commission of the European Communities, First report on the implementation of 
the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC), COM(2003) 265 final, Commission of 
the European Communities, Brussels, Belgium (2003).  
 
 
[50] Commission of the European Communities, Information Technology Security 
Evaluation Criteria, Version 1.2, Technical Report, Commission of the European 





[51] Consolvo, S., Smith, I., Matthews, T., LaMarca, A., Tabert, J. and Powledge, P. 
Location Disclosure to Social Relations: Why, When, & What People Want to 
Share. Proc. CHI 2005: ACM Press (2005) 82–90. 
 
 
[52] Covington, M.J. A Context-Aware Security Architecture for Emerging Applica-
tions. Proc. ACSAC ‘02: IEEE Press (2002) 249–258. 
 
 
[53] Department of Defense, Department of Defense Trusted Computer System 
Evaluation Criteria, Standard DoD 5200.28-STD, Department of Defense (1985).  
 
 
[54] DePaulo, B.M. and Kashy, D.A. Everyday Lies in Close and Casual Relation-
ships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 1 (1998) 63–79. 
 
 
[55] Dey, A.K., Salber, D. and Abowd, G.D. A Conceptual Framework and a Toolkit 
for Supporting the Rapid Prototyping of Context-Aware Applications. Human-
Computer Interaction (HCI) Journal, 16, 2–4 (2001) 97–166. 
 
 
[56] Dix, A., Finlay, J., Abowd, G. and Beale, R. Human Computer Interaction (2nd 
ed.), Prentice Hall Europe: London (1998). 
 
 
[57] Dourish, P. What We Talk About When We Talk About Context. Personal and 
Ubiquitous Computing, 8, 1 (2004) 19–30. 
 
 
[58] Dow, S., Lee, J., Oezbek, C., MacIntyre, B., Bolter, J.D. and Gandy, M. Explor-
ing Spatial Narratives and Mixed Reality Experiences in Oakland Cemetery. 
Proc. Advances in Computer Entertainment ACE’05: ACM Press (2005). 
 
 
[59] Duckham, M. and Kulik, L. A Formal Model of Obfuscation and Negotiation for 
Location Privacy. Proc. Pervasive 2005, LNCS 3468. Munich, Germany: 
Springer Verlag (2005) 152–170. 
 
 






[61] European Commission Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 4/2004 on the Process-
ing of Personal Data by means of Video Surveillance, 11750/02/EN WP 89 
(2004). Available from: http://www.europa.eu.int 
 
 
[62] European Commission Article 29 Working Party, Working Document on Biomet-
rics, 12168/02/EN WP80 (2004). Available from: http://europa.eu.int 
 
 
[63] Fallman, D. Design-oriented Human-Computer Interaction. Proc. CHI 2003. Ft. 
Lauderdale, Florida, USA: ACM Press (2003) 225–232. 
 
 
[64] Federal Communications Commission, Third Report And Order And Third Fur-




[65] Federal Trade Commission, National and State Trends in Fraud & Identity Theft 
January - December 2004, Federal Trade Commission (2005). Available from: 




[66] Federal Trade Commission, Standards for Safegurding Customer Information; 
Final Rule, 16 CFR Part 314. 
 
 
[67] Fogg, B.J., Soohoo, C., Danielson, D.R., Marable, L., Stanford, J. and Tauber, 
E.R. How do users evaluate the credibility of Web sites?: a study with over 2,500 
participants. Proc. Designing for User Experiences: ACM Press (2003) 1–15  
 
 
[68] Friedman, B. Value-Sensitive Design. Interactions: New Visions of Human-
Computer Interaction, 3, 6 (1996) 17–23. 
 
 
[69] Garfinkel, S. Adopting Fair Information Practices to Low Cost RFID Systems. 
Proc. Ubiquitous Computing 2002 Privacy Workshop (2002). 
 
 
[70] Garfinkel, S. and Rosenberg, B., Editors, RFID : Applications, Security, and Pri-





[71] Gates, W. Trustworthy Computing.  (2002). Available from: 




[72] Gaver, W., Moran, T., MacLean, A., Lovstrand, L. Dourish, P., Carter, K. and 
Buxton, W. Realizing a Video Environment: EuroPARC's RAVE System. Proc. 
CHI'92. Monterey, CA, USA: ACM Press (1992) 27–35. 
 
 
[73] Geason, S. and Wilson, P. reventing graffiti and vandalism, Australian Institute 
of Criminology: Canberra, Australia (1990) ISBN: 0-642-14936-4. 
 
 
[74] Gedik, B. and Liu, L., A Customizable k-Anonymity Model for Protecting Loca-
tion Privacy, GIT-CERCS-04-15, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, 
USA (2004). Available from: http://www.cercs.gatech.edu/tech-
reports/tr2004/git-cercs-04-15.pdf. Last accessed: 3/21/2006. 
 
 
[75] Gemmell, J., Williams, L., Wood, K., Lueder, R. and Bell, G. Passive Capture and 




[76] Giddens, A. Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern 
Age, Stanford University Press: Stanford, CA, USA (199). 
 
 
[77] Goffman, E. Behavior In Public Places, Free Press (1966) ISBN: 0029119405. 
 
 




[79] Goldschlag, D.M., Reed, M.G. and Syverson, P.F. Hiding Routing Information. 
Proc. Information Hiding, LNCS 1174: Springer-Verlag (1996) 137–150. 
 
 
[80] Grinter, R., Dourish, P., Delgado de la Flor, J. and Joseph, M. Security in the 
wild: user strategies for managing security as an everyday, practical problem. 





[81] Gruteser, M. and Grunwald, D. Enhancing Location Privacy in Wireless LAN 
through Disposable Interface Identifiers: A Quantitative Analysis. Proc. ACM In-
ternational Workshop on Wireless Mobile Applications and Services on WLAN: 
ACM Press (2003) 46–55. 
 
 
[82] Günther, O. and Spiekermann, S. RFID And The Perception Of Control: The 
Consumer's View. Communications of the ACM, 48, 9 (2005) 73–76. 
 
 
[83] GVU Center, 10th WWW User Survey – Online Privacy and Security, GVU Cen-
ter, Georgia Insitute of Technology (1999). Available from: 
http://www.gvu.gatech.edu/user_surveys/survey-1998-
10/graphs/graphs.html#privacy. Last accessed: 3/21/2006. 
 
 
[84] Hall, E. The Hidden Dimension: Man’s use of Space in Public and Private, Dou-
bleday: New York, NY, USA (1966). 
 
 
[85] Hancock, J.T., Thom-Santelli, J. and Ritchie, T. Deception and Design: The Im-
pact of Communication Technology on Lying Behavior. Proc. CHI 2004. Vienna, 
Austria: ACM Press (2004) 129–134. 
 
 
[86] Hayes, G.R., Kientz, J., Truong, K.N., White, D., Abowd, G.D. and Pering, T. 
Designing Capture Applications to Support the Education of Children with Au-
tism. Proc. Ubicomp 2004, LNCS 3205: Springer Verlag (2004) 161–178. 
 
 
[87] Hayes, G.R., Patel, S.N., Truong, K.N., Iachello, G., Kientz, J.A., Farmer, R. and 
Abowd, G.D. The Personal Audio Loop: Designing a Ubiquitous Audio-Based 
Memory Aid. Proc. Mobile HCI 2004, LNCS 3160. Glasgow, Scotland: Springer 
Verlag (2004) 168–179. 
 
 
[88] Hayes, G.R., Truong, K.N., Abowd, G.D. and Pering, T. Experience buffers: a 
socially appropriate, selective archiving tool for evidence-based care. Proc. CHI 
2005. Portland, OR, USA: ACM Press (2005) 1435–1438. 
 
 
[89] Helmers, S. A Brief History of anon.penet.fi — The Legendary Anonymous Re-
mailer Computer-Mediated Communication Magazine (1997). Available from: 






[90] Hilty, L.M., Som, C. and Köhler, A. Assessing the Human, Social and Environ-
mental Risks of Pervasive Computing. Human and Ecological Risk Assessment, 
10 (2004) 853–874. 
 
 
[91] Hong, J. and Landay, J. An Architecture for Privacy-Sensitive Ubiquitous Com-
puting. Proc. MobiSys '04. Boston, MA, USA: ACM Press (2004) 177–189. 
 
 
[92] Hong, J., Ng, J.D., Lederer, S. and Landay, J.A. Privacy Risk Models for Design-
ing Privacy-Sensitive Ubiquitous Computing Systems. Proc. DIS 2004: ACM 
Press (2004) 91–100. 
 
 
[93] Hudson, S. and Smith, I. Techniques for Addressing Fundamental Privacy and 
Disruption Tradeoffs in Awareness Support Systems. Proc. CSCW ’96: ACM 
Press (1996) 248–257. 
 
 
[94] Humphrey, W.S. PSP: A Self-Improvement Process for Engineers, Addison-
Wesley (2005) ISBN: 03213054931. 
 
 
[95] Iachello, G., Reno: from ‘privacy test bed’ to ‘communication tool’, Version 0.5, 
Unpublished document, Intel Research Seattle (2005).  
 
 
[96] Iachello, G. and Abowd, G.D., Emerging Ubiquitous Computing Technologies 
and Security Management, in Information Security Policies and Practices, Bask-
erville, R., Goodman, S. and Straub, D., Editors (in preparation). 
 
 
[97] Iachello, G. and Abowd, G.D. Privacy and Proportionality: Adapting Legal 
Evaluation Techniques to Inform Design In Ubiquitous Computing. Proc. Con-




[98] Iachello, G. and Abowd, G.D., A Token-based Access Control Mechanism for 
Automated Capture and Access Systems in Ubiquitous C mputing, GIT Technical 
Report GIT-GVU-05-06, Georgia Institute of Technology, GVU Center (2005). 





[99] Iachello, G., Smith, I., Consolvo, S., Abowd, G.D., Hughes, J., Howard, J., Potter, 
F., Scott, J., Sohn, T., Hightower, J. and LaMarca, A. Control, Deception, and 
Communication: Evaluating the Deployment of a Location-Enhanced Messaging 




[100] Iachello, G., Smith, I., Consolvo, S., Chen, M. and Abowd, G.D. Developing Pri-
vacy Guidelines for Social Location Disclosure Applications and Services. Proc. 
Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS). ittsburgh, PA, USA: 
ACM Press (2005) 65–76. 
 
 
[101] Iachello, G., Truong, K.N., Abowd, G.D., Hayes, G.R. and Stevens, M. Event-
Contingent Experience Sampling to Evaluate Ubicomp Privacy in the Real World. 
Proc. Accepted to CHI 2006 (2006). 
 
 
[102] Information Systems Security Association, Generally Accepted Information Secu-




[103] International Labor Organization Part II: Monitoring and Surveillance in the 
Workplace Conditions of Work,  ISBN: ISBN 92-2-108740-9. 
 
 
[104] International Organization for Standardization / International Electrotechnical 
Commission, ISO/IEC 17799:2000 Information technology — Code of practice 
for information security management (2000).  
 
 
[105] ISO/IEC, IS15408: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security 
Evaluation (2000).  
 
 
[106] Jehl, D., Domestic Surveillance: Congressional Leaders; Among Those Told of 
Program, Few Objected New York Times, December 23, 2005. 
 
 
[107] Jensen, C., Designing For Privacy in Interactive Systems, Doctoral Dissertation, 
Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, USA (2005).  
 
 
[108] Jensen, C., Tullio, J., Potts, C. and Mynatt, E.D., STRAP: A Structured Analysis 
Framework for Privacy, GVU Technical Report 05-02, GVU Center, Georgia In-
 
 253 
stitute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, USA (2005). Available from: 
http://www.cc.gatech.edu/gvu/research/tr05_02.html. Last accessed: 2/10/2006. 
 
 
[109] Jensen, L., Jensen, J., Feldman, S. and Cauffm n, E. The Right to Do Wrong: Ly-
ing to Parents Among Adolescents and Emerging Adults. Journal of Youth and 
Adolescence, 33, 2 (2004) 101–112. 
 
 
[110] Jiang, X., Hong, J.I. and Landay, J.A. Approximate Information Flows: Socially-
Based Modeling of Privacy in Ubiquitous Computing. Proc. Ubicomp 2002, 
LNCS 2498: Springer Verlag (2002) 176–193. 
 
 
[111] Kindberg, T., Sellen, A. and Geelhoed, E. Security and Trust in Mobile Interac-
tions: a Study of Users' Perceptions and Reasoning. Proc. Ubicomp 2004, LNCS 
3205. Nottingham, UK: Springer Verlag (2004) 196–213. 
 
 
[112] Kjeldskov, J. and Graham, C. A Review of Mobile HCI Research Methods. Proc. 
Mobile HCI, LNCS 2975: Springer Verlag (2003) 317–335. 
 
 
[113] Knox, D., Zusman, M.E., McGinty, K. and Gescheidler, J. Deception of Parents 
During Adolescence. Adolescence, 36, 143 (2001). 
 
 
[114] Konrad, R., Calls for federal regulation grow as data retailer scandal widens, 
The Associated Press State & Local Wire, 2/18/2005. 
 
 
[115] Laasonen, K., Raento, M. and Toivonen, H. Adaptive On-Device Location Rec-




[116] Langheinrich, M. Privacy by Design — Principles of Privacy-Aware Ubiquitous 
Systems. Proc. Ubicomp 2001, LNCS 2201: Springer Verlag (2001) 273–291. 
 
 
[117] Larson, R. and Csikszentmihalyi, M. The experience sampling method. New Di-
rections for Methodology of Social and Behavioral Science, 15 (1983) 41–56. 
 
 
[118] Latour, B. We’ve never been modern, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, 





[119] Lederer, S., Designing Disclosure: Interactive Personal Privacy at the Dawn of 
Ubiquitous Computing, UC Berkeley Computer Science Division (2003).  
 
 
[120] Lederer, S., Hong, J., Dey, A. and Landay, J., Personal Privacy through Under-
standing and Action: Five Pitfalls for Designers, IRB-TR-03-035, Intel (2003).  
 
 
[121] Lessig, L. The Architecture of Privacy. Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment Law 
& Practice, 1 (1999) 56. 
 
 
[122] Li, Y., Hong, J. and Landay, J. Topiary: A Tool for Prototyping Location-
Enhanced Applications. Proc. UIST 2004: ACM Press (2004) 217–226. 
 
 
[123] MacLean, A., Young, R.M., Bellotti, V. and Moran, T.P. Questions, Options, and 
Criteria: Elements of Design Space Analysis. Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) 
Journal, 6, 3&4 (1991) 201–250. 
 
 
[124] MacLean, A., Young, R.M. and Moran, T.P. Design Rationale: The Argument 
Behind The Artifact. Proc. CHI 1989: ACM Press (1989) 247–252. 
 
 
[125] Mankoff, J., Dey, A.K., Hsieh, G., Kientz, J.Lederer, S. and Ames, M. Heuristic 
Evaluation of Ambient Displays. Proc. CHI 2003. Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, USA: 
ACM Press (2003) 169–176. 
 
 
[126] Markus, M.L. and Keil, M. If We Build It, They Will Come: Designing Informa-




[127] Mayer-Schönberger, V., Generational Development of Data Protection in 
Europe, in Technology and Privacy: The New Landscape, Agre, P.E. and Roten-
berg, M., Editors. The MIT Press (1998) 219–241. 
 
 
[128] Melenhorst, A.S., Fisk, A.D., Mynatt, E.D. and Rogers, W.A. Potential intrusive-
ness of aware home technology: Perceptions of older a ults. Proc. Human Fac-





[129] Milardo, R.M. Comparative methods for delineating social networks. Journal of 
Social and Personal Relationships, 9 (1992) 447–461. 
 
 
[130] Moran, T.P., Chiu, P., Harrison, S., Kurtenbach, G., Minneman, S. and Melle, 
W.v. Evolutionary Engagement in an Ongoing Collabortive Work Process: A 
Case Study. Proc. CSCW 96. Boston, MA, USA: ACM Press (1996) 150–159. 
 
 
[131] Müller, G., Presentation at "Privacy In Context" workshop at the Ubicomp 2005 
conference.: Tokyo, Japan (2005). 
 
 
[132] Müller, G. and Rannenberg, K., Editors, Multilateral Security in Communications, 
Volume 3: Technology, Infrastructure, Economy, Addison Wesley: München 
(1999) ISBN: 3-8273-1426-7. 
 
 
[133] Nagel, K., Hudson, J. and Abowd, G.D. Predictors of availability in home life 
context-mediated communication. Proc. CSCW’04: ACM Press (2004) 497–506. 
 
 
[134] National Institute of Standards and Technology, An Introduction to Computer Se-
curity: The NIST Handbook, Special Publication 800-12 (1996). Available from: 








[136] Nielsen, J. and Mack, R.L., Editors, Usability Inspection Methods, John Wiley & 
Sons: New York, NY, USA (1994) ISBN: 0-471-01877-5. 
 
 









[139] Norman, D.A. and Draper, S.W., Editors, User Centered System Design: New 
Perspectives on Human-Computer Interaction, L. Erlbaum Associates: Hillsdale, 
NJ, USA (1986). 
 
 
[140] Norris, C. and Armstrong, G. The maximum surveillance society: The rise of 
CCTV, Berg: Oxford, England (1999) ISBN: 1-85973-226-7. 
 
 
[141] Northrop Grumman Corp. TRIMARC - Automatic Incident Recording System.  
(2002). Available from: http://www.trimarc.org/perl/about_trimarc.pl and 
http://www.nascio.org/scoring/files/2002Kentucky7.doc Last accessed: 4/2/2004. 
 
 
[142] Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Guidelines on the 




[143] Palen, L. and Dourish, P. Unpacking “Privacy” for a Networked World. Proc. 
CHI 2003: ACM Press (2003) 129–136. 
 
 
[144] Patrick, A.S. and Kenny, S. From Privacy Legislation to Interface Design: Im-
plementing Information Privacy in Human-Computer Interactions. Proc. PET 
2003, LNCS 2760: Springer Verlag (2003) 107–124. 
 
 
[145] Patton, J.W. Protecting privacy in public? Surveillance technologies and the value 
of public places. Ethics and Information Technology, 2 (2000) 181–187. 
 
 
[146] Pilu, M., Image capture method, device and system. Hewlett-Packard Develop-
ment Company, L.P. United States Patent No. 20040202382 (2004). 
 
 
[147] Povey, D. Optimistic Security: A New Access Control Paradigm. Proc. New Se-
curity Paradigms Workshop. Ontario, Canada: ACM Press (1999) 40–45. 
 
 
[148] President’s Information Technology Advisory Committee, Cyber Security: A Cri-
sis of Prioritization, Report to the President (2005). Available from: 





[149] Privacy & American Business Consumer Privacy Attitudes: A Major Shift Since 
2000 and Why. Privacy & American Business Newsletter, 10, 6 (2003). 
 
 
[150] Radio-Television News Directors Association, Hidden Cameras, Hidden Micro-




[151] Rannenberg, K. Identity Management in mobile cellular networks and related ap-
plications. Information Security Technical Report, 9, 1 (2004) 77–85. 
 
 
[152] Rannenberg, K. Multilateral Security: A Concept and Examples for Balanced Se-
curity. Proc. New Security Paradigms Workshop: ACM Press (2000) 151–162. 
 
 
[153] Rannenberg, K. Recent Development in Information Technology Security Evalua-
tion – The Need for Evaluation Criteria for Multilaeral Security. Proc. Security 
and Control of Information Technology in Society – Proceedings of the IFIP 
TC9/WG 9.6 Working Conference. Onboard M/S Ilich and ashore at St. Peters-
burg, Russia: North-Holland, Amsterdam (1993) 113–128. 
 
 
[154] Robinson, P. and Beigl, M. Trust Context Spaces: An Infrastructure for Pervasive 
Security in Context-Aware Environments. Proc. Security in Pervasive Computing 
2003, LNCS 2802: Springer Verlag (2004) 157–172. 
 
 




[156] Sasse, A. Computer Security: Anatomy of a Usability Disaster, and a Plan for Re-
covery. Proc. 2003 Workshop on Human-Computer Interaction and Security Sys-
tems at CHI 2003 (2003). 
 
 
[157] Schneier, B. Secrets and Lies: Digital Security in a Networked World, Wiley 
Computer Publishing: New York, NY, USA (2000) ISBN: 0-471-25311-1. 
 
 
[158] Smith, I.E., Consolvo, S., Hightower, J., Hughes, J.I., Iachello and LaMarca, A. 
Social Disclosure Of Place: From Location Technology to Communication Prac-
tice. Proc. 3rd International Conference on Pervasive Computing, LNCS 3468. 





[159] Som, C., Hilty, L.M. and Ruddy, T.F. The Precautionary Principle in the Informa-
tion Society. Human and Ecological Risk Assessment, 10 (2004) 787–799. 
 
 




[161] Suchman, L.A. Plans and Situated Actions - The problem of human mchine in-
teraction, Cambridge University Press (1987). 
 
 
[162] Sweeney, L. k-anonymity: A Model For Protecting Privacy. International Journal 
on Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-based Systems, 10, 5 (2002) 557–570. 
 
 
[163] Swiss Federal Data Protection Commissioner, 7. Tätigkeitsbericht 1999 / 2000 
(7th Annual Report 1999/2000) (2000). Available from: http://www.edsb.ch/ 
 
 
[164] Terrell, T. and Jacobs, A. Privacy, technology, and terrorism: Bartnicki, Kyllo, 
and the normative struggle behind competing claims to solitude and security. 
Emory Law Journal, 51, 4 (2002) 1469–1511. 
 
 




[166] Townsend, M. and Harris, P., Security role for traffic cameras: London’s new 
charging zone helps to form ‘ring of steel’ guarding capital against al-Qaeda 
bombers, The Observer, 2/9/2003. 
 
 
[167] Tran, Q.T., Calcaterra, G. and Mynatt, E. Cook's Collage: Deja Vu Display for a 




[168] Truong, K.N. and Abowd, G.D. INCA: A Software Infrastructure to Facilitate the 
Construction and Evolution of Ubiquitous Capture & Access Applications. Proc. 






[169] Truong, K.N., Abowd, G.D. and Brotherton, J.A. Who, What, When, Where, 
How: Design Issues of Capture & Access Applications. Proc. Ubicomp 2001, 
LNCS 2201. Atlanta, GA, USA: Springer Verlag (2001) 209–224. 
 
 
[170] Truong, K.N., Patel, S.N., Summet, J. and Abowd, G.D. Preventing Camera Re-
cording by Designing a Capture-Resistant Environment. Proc. Ubicomp 2005, 
LNCS 3660. Tokyo, Japan: Springer Verlag (2005) 73–86. 
 
 




[172] United States Department of Health Education and Welfare, Records, Computers 
and the Rights of Citizens, Report of the Secretary's Advisory Committee on 
Automated Personal Data Systems (1973).  
 
 
[173] United States General Accounting Office, Video Surveillance: Information on 
Law Enforcement's Use of Closed-Circuit Television to Monitor Selected Federal 
Property in Washington, D.C., GAO-03-748, General Accounting Office (2003). 




[174] US Department of Health and Human Services, Health Insurance Reform: Secu-
rity Standards; Final Rule, 45 CFR Parts 160, 162, and 164. 
 
 
[175] Venkatesh, V., Morris, M.G., Davis, G.B. and Davis, F.D. User Acceptance of 




[176] Want, R., Hopper, A., Falcão, V. and Gibbons, J. The Active Badge Location 
System. ACM Transactions on Information Systems, 10, 1 (1992) 91–102. 
 
 




[178] Weiser, M. Some Computer Science Problems in Ubiquitous Computing. Com-





[179] Westin, A.F., Harris-Equifax consumer privacy survey 1991, Equifax Inc., At-
lanta, Georgia (1991).  
 
 
[180] Westin, A.F., Editor Information Technology in a Democracy, Harvard University 
Press: Cambridge, MA, USA (1971). 
 
 
[181] Wheeler, L. and Rois, H.T. Self-Recording of Everyday Life Events: Origins, 
Types, and Uses. Journal of Personality, 59, 3 (1991) 339–355. 
 
 
[182] Whitten, A. and Tygar, J.D. Why Johnny Can't Encrypt: A Usability Evaluation 




[183] Wynekoop, J.L. and Conger, S.A. A Review of Computer Aided Software Engi-
neering Research Methods. Proc. IFIP TC8 WG 8.2 Working Conference on The 




[184] Zarski, T.Z. “Mine Your Own Business!”: Making the Case for the Implications 
of the Data Mining of Personal Information in the Forum of Public Opinion. Yale 
Journal of Law & Technology, 5, 2002/2003 (2002) 1–54. 
 
 
[185] Zero-Knowledge Systems. The Freedom Network Architecture (Version 1.0). 




[186] Zetter, K., CardSystems’ Data Left Unsecured, Wired News, 6/22/2005. 
 
 
[187] Zurko, M.E. and Simon, R.T. User-Centered Security. Proc. New Security Para-













Giovanni Iachello was born in Torino (Italy) in 1974. He studied Informatics En-
gineering at Padua University (Italy). After graduating in 1999, he worked for Altoprofilo 
SPA, a firm providing corporate IT consulting services, in the fields of security manage-
ment, personal data protection and mobile 3G applications. In 2002, he joined the Com-
puter Science PhD program at Georgia Institute of Technology. In 2004, he worked for 
Intel Research in Seattle (WA, USA), on the development and deployment of a location-
enhanced messaging system.  
In 2003–2004, he was Fellow of the Sam Nunn Security Program funded by the 
MacArthur Foundation, focusing his research on the security management of ubiquitous 
computing applications. He is member of ACM, IEEE, IFIP WG9.6/11.7 “IT-Misuse and 
the Law” and SIGCHI. 
When not writing his thesis, he enjoys all things Alpine: hiking, biking, skiing, 
snowshoeing and swimming. 
 
